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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three studies, one qualitative and two experimental, that center
on auditor’s use of data analytics. Data analytics hold the potential for auditors to reallocate time
spent on labor intensive tasks to judgment intensive tasks (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015), ultimately
improving audit quality (Raphael 2017). Yet the availability of these tools does not guarantee that
auditors will incorporate the data analytics into their judgments (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh et
al. 2003).
The first study investigates implications of using data analytics to structure the audit
process for nonprofessionalized auditors. As the public accounting profession continues down a
path of de-professionalization (Dirsmith et al. 2015), data analytics may increasingly be used as a
control mechanism for guiding nonprofessionalized auditors’ work tasks. Results of this study
highlight negative ramifications of using nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit setting.
The second study examines how different types of data analytics impact auditors’ judgments. This
study demonstrates the joint impact that the type of data analytical model and type of data analyzed
have on auditors’ judgments. This study contributes to the literature and practice by demonstrating
that data analytics do not uniformly impact auditors’ judgments. The third study examines how
auditors’ reliance on data analytics is impacted by the presentation source and level of risk
identified.

This study provide insights into the effectiveness of public accounting firms’

development of data scientist groups to incorporate the data analytic skillset into audit teams.
Collectively, these studies contribute to the literature by providing evidence on auditors’
use of data analytics. Currently, the literature is limited to demonstrating that auditors are not
effective at identifying patterns in data analytics visualizations when viewed before traditional
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audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). The three studies in this dissertation highlight that not all data
analytics influence judgments equally.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Completing this dissertation would not have been possible without the support and
feedback from several individuals. I wish to thank my committee members, Dr. Vicky Arnold,
Dr. Steve Sutton, Dr. Lisa Baudot and Dr. Joe Brazel, for their helpful feedback and support
throughout the dissertation process. I would like to especially thank my dissertation co-chairs
Dr. Vicky Arnold and Dr. Steve Sutton for their guidance throughout the dissertation process. I
consider myself fortunate to have received substantial guidance from the Ph.D. program director,
Steve Sutton. I am also grateful to Dr. Robin Roberts, Dr. Sean Robb, Dr. Greg Trompeter, Dr.
Khim Kelly, Dr. Theresa Libby and Dr. Jesse Dillard for their support and providing exposure to
a variety of different types of accounting research.
I appreciate the financial support of the Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting,
including providing resources for data collection. I would like to thank the following individuals
for providing feedback on experimental materials: Dr. Joseph Johnson, Dr. Yu Tian, Dr.
Elizabeth Altiero, Dr. Jeff Reinking, Dr. Amy Donnelly, Dr. Kazeem Akinyele and Wioleta
Olczak. I would also like to thank Dr. Anthony Amoruso and Dr. Charlie Cullinan for allowing
me to recruit students for my research. I would also like to thank my fellow Ph.D. students,
particularly Kazeem Akinyele, Wioleta Olczak and Amy Donnelly, faculty and staff from the
Dixon School of Accounting for the support I received during my Ph.D. experience.
I am grateful for the support of my family and friends for providing enduring support and
continuous encouragement throughout this process. Finally, I am most grateful for Dr. Brent
Anderson and the entire physical therapy staff at Polestar Pilates. Thank you for getting me back

v

up and running again. Completing my dissertation would not have been possible without your
treatment.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ xii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
Study One: Consequences of Deprofessionalization: The Use of Data Analytics to Guide
Nonprofessionalized Auditors .................................................................................................... 2
Study Two: The Impact of Data Analytics on Auditors’ Judgments and Decisions .................. 4
Study Three: The Impact of the Human Factor on Auditors’ Reliance on Data Analytics ........ 7
Overall Contribution ................................................................................................................... 9
References ............................................................................................................................. 11
STUDY ONE: CONSEQUENCES OF DEPROFESSIONALIZATION: THE USE OF DATA
ANALYTICS TO GUIDE NONPROFESSIONALIZED AUDITORS ....................................... 14
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 14
Professionalism ......................................................................................................................... 19
Knowledge and Expertise ..................................................................................................... 20
Judgment and Decision Making............................................................................................ 21
Certification .......................................................................................................................... 22
Focus on Public Interest ........................................................................................................ 23
Research Method ...................................................................................................................... 24
Setting ................................................................................................................................... 24
Data collection ...................................................................................................................... 26
Data analysis ......................................................................................................................... 29

vii

Results ....................................................................................................................................... 31
Lack of knowledge / expertise .............................................................................................. 32
Make non-programmable decisions ...................................................................................... 37
Lack of certification .............................................................................................................. 38
Public Interest Orientation .................................................................................................... 40
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 44
Power .................................................................................................................................... 46
Incentive structure................................................................................................................. 48
Use of advanced technologies (FPS) .................................................................................... 49
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 50
References ............................................................................................................................. 55
STUDY TWO: THE IMPACT OF DATA ANALYTICS ON AUDITORS’ JUDGMENTS AND
DECISIONS.................................................................................................................................. 62
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 62
Background ............................................................................................................................... 66
Data Analytics....................................................................................................................... 66
Data Analytical Models ........................................................................................................ 75
Theory and Hypothesis Development....................................................................................... 78
Cognitive fit .......................................................................................................................... 78
Methods .................................................................................................................................... 81
Participants............................................................................................................................ 81
viii

Experimental Task and Procedure ........................................................................................ 82
Results ....................................................................................................................................... 84
Identification of potential covariates .................................................................................... 84
Test of Hypotheses................................................................................................................ 86
Additional analysis................................................................................................................ 88
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 91
References ............................................................................................................................. 96
STUDY THREE: THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN FACTOR ON AUDITOR’S RELIANCE
ON DATA ANALYTICS ........................................................................................................... 105
Introduction............................................................................................................................. 105
Background and Hypotheses Development ............................................................................ 109
Data Analytics..................................................................................................................... 109
Trust and Technology ......................................................................................................... 113
Risk Identified..................................................................................................................... 116
Method .................................................................................................................................... 119
Participants.......................................................................................................................... 119
Experimental Task and Procedures ..................................................................................... 120
Independent and Dependent Variables ............................................................................... 121
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 123
Identification of potential covariates .................................................................................. 123
Test of Hypotheses.............................................................................................................. 124
ix

Additional Analysis ............................................................................................................ 125
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 126
References ........................................................................................................................... 129
GENERAL CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 137
References ........................................................................................................................... 142
APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 FIGURES ......................................................................................... 143
APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 FIGURES ......................................................................................... 147
APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 TABLES .......................................................................................... 151
APPENDIX D: STUDY 2 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS ................................................... 157
APPENDIX E: STUDY 3 FIGURES ......................................................................................... 168
APPENDIX F: STUDY 3 TABLES ........................................................................................... 170
APPENDIX G: STUDY 3 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS ................................................... 176
APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVALS ............................................................................................ 185

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Interview Protocol ..................................................................................................... 145
Figure 2 –Predictive models in use outside of accounting from the Harvard Business Review 148
Figure 3 – Graphical depiction of results of study 2................................................................... 150
Figure 4- Graphical depiction of results of study 3 .................................................................... 169

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Study 1 participants demographic information ........................................................... 146
Table 2 – Demographic profile of study 2 participants (n=98) .................................................. 152
Table 3 – Results of study 2 Reliance variable ........................................................................... 154
Table 4 – results of study 2 Fraud Risk Assessment variable .................................................... 155
Table 5 - Results of study 2 Budgeted Audit Hours variable ..................................................... 156
Table 6 – Demographic profile of study 3 participants (n=92) .................................................. 171
Table 7 - Results of study 3 Reliance variable ........................................................................... 173
Table 8 – Results of study 3 likelihood that fraud has occurred variable ................................... 174

xii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology have expanded data analysis capabilities to be incorporated into
the audit process (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). These data analytics include testing performed by
traditional analytical procedures (Appelbaum et al. 2017; Titera 2013) and have expanded to
include methods such as population testing (Kogan et al. 2014; Raphael 2017), predictive modeling
(Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013; Krahel and Titera 2015) and unstructured data analysis
(Warren et al. 2015; IAASB 2017). Prior research on auditor’s use of data analytics is limited to
showing that they are not effective at identifying patterns in data analytics visualizations when
viewed before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017).
Despite the advances in technology and the increased ability to identify relevant
information, auditors may be reluctant to rely on such tools, even when deemed 100% accurate
(Sutton et al. 1995). Thus, the potential usefulness of these tools may be constrained by the human
users (Alles and Gray 2015), and decisions will be unaffected if the decision maker refuses to use
these tools (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003). Interest to expand the use of data analytics
into the audit process is evidenced by the development of an Audit Data Analytics Guide by the
AICPA’s Assurance Services Executive Committee (ASEC) (AICPA 2017), the formation of a
Data Analytics Working Group by the IAASB (IAASB 2017), and a PCAOB board member
declaring their encouragement to use and expectation for these tools to improve audit quality
(PCAOB 2016). Thus, while data analytics are expected to play a more pronounced role in the
audit process, it is unclear if auditors will effectively use these tools, and audit quality will
ultimately improve.
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This dissertation comprises of three separate studies, one qualitative and two experimental,
examining the use of data analytics in the audit process.

The first study investigates the

implications of using data analytics to structure the audit process for nonprofessionalized auditors 1.
This study demonstrates the importance of using professionalized auditors to perform follow up
audit procedures on risks identified by data analytics. The second study examines data analytics
in the financial statement audit context by demonstrating how different data analytical models that
analyze different types of data impact auditors’ judgments. The third study highlights the
implications of presenting the findings of data analytics to external financial statement auditors
from different sources under varying levels of risk. The following subsections provide additional
detail on each chapter by highlighting the motivation for each study, the research method
employed, and the contributions of each study to the accounting literature.

The overall

contribution of this dissertation is summarized in the last section.

Study One: Consequences of Deprofessionalization: The Use of Data Analytics to Guide
Nonprofessionalized Auditors
The first study examines an attempt to structure the audit process using data analytics to
guide the work of nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit context. Since the 1970’s the
public accounting professional has undergone several changes, including loss of the power to selfregulate (embodied by the creation of the PCAOB) and delivering increasingly commodified audit
procedures (Dirsmith et al. 2015). Two distinct camps exist regarding the view of professions.
While the first camp views professions as shifting from an economically disinterested expert to an

1

The terminology nonprofessionalized auditors refers to contract workers who are hired to perform audit services
but are not required to go through a specified educational training, apprenticeship, and licensure process that is
typical of the professionals, including the financial audit profession.
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entrepreneur (Abbott 1988; Reed 1996), the other camp views professions as engaging in
commercialization tactics in an attempt to reclaim their service ideal (Dirsmith et al. 2015).
Arguably, the public accounting profession is continuing down a path of de-professionalization
(Dirsmith et al. 2015), so it is important to understand the implications of using
nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit context. The ability of technology enabled tools,
such as data analytics, to structure the audit process (Dowling and Leech 2014) calls into question
the necessity of public accounting firms to utilize professional auditors to the extent currently done.
Regulators may need to reconsider whether the audit profession should maintain its monopoly over
the performance of certain types of audits.
To examine the use of hiring nonprofessionalized auditors to work in a critical audit setting,
a group of healthcare regulatory fraud auditors called Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPICs)
were examined. Several characteristics of the ZPIC auditors were identified as violating the
criteria of an established profession. Although there are multiple frameworks for defining what
constitutes a profession, generally professions meet four criteria. First, professions hold a unique
set of knowledge and expertise and employ this expertise (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al. 2003) to
symbolize power and control over a domain (Blackler et al. 1993). Second, the unique knowledge
and expertise must enable the professional to make decisions that cannot be preprogrammed and
to apply rules that cannot be entirely codified (Larson 1977). Third, professionals must hold a
credential to certify their expertise and engage in continuing education (Kimball 1995). A fourth
requirement is that professions must serve and support the public interest and not engage in selfinterested behavior (Kultgen 1988; Fogarty et al. 2006). The results of this dissertation study
indicate that ZPIC auditors fail to meet these four criteria of a profession.
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Data was collected primarily through reviewing publicly available documents discussing
the ZPIC auditors coupled with interviews of ZPIC auditees.

While Reports to Congress

highlighted purported benefits of the ZPICs audit activity, practitioner sources suggested there
were drawbacks (Vishnevetsky 2012; Van Halem et al. 2012; Baucus et al. 2013; DHHS 2012;
DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015).

In total, 36 semi-structured interviews were conducted with

individuals employed by healthcare providers subject to ZPIC audit.

Interview data was

triangulated with archival documents provided by participants and publicly available information
(such as from government agencies including the Office of Inspector General) to enhance the
validity of the findings. The results of this study highlight several consequences of empowering
nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit setting. These results highlight that the mere
availability of data analytic tools is insufficient to improve decision making. Several opportunities
for improvement of data analytics are highlighted including ensuring that users have an appropriate
level of power, ensuring that employers maintain a properly designed incentive structure, and
ensuring that users have adequate training to understand the implications of false positives.
This study demonstrates that using nonprofessionalized auditors to audit accounts and
transactions identified by a data analytic tool as high risk may have unintended consequences,
including potentially negative societal implications. The study raises concerns over whether the
deprofessionalization of the audit profession and allowing auditors not a part of the profession to
conduct audits may not be in the public interest.

Study Two: The Impact of Data Analytics on Auditors’ Judgments and Decisions
Study Two examines the impact of different data analytical models that analyze different
types of data has on auditors’ judgments.
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Prior accounting research focuses on the capabilities and benefits of data analytics (Jans et
al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014). Research examining auditors’ use of data analytics is limited to
demonstrating that they are not effective at identifying patterns in visualizations when viewed
before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). With the expansion of the data analytical tools
(Brown-Liburd et al. 2015), it is unclear if auditors will use these tools uniformly. Research has
shown that even when decision aiding tools are deemed to be 100% accurate, auditors are still
reluctant to rely on these tools (Sutton et al. 1995). Accordingly, this study seeks to address the
gap in the literature by investigating whether the type of data analytical model and data analyzed
impacts auditors’ judgments.
Drawing upon the theory of cognitive fit, this study hypothesizes that auditor’s judgments
will be impacted more by anomaly data analytical models and data analytics that analyzed financial
data. Cognitive fit occurs when there is congruence between the method or process used by a
decision maker and a decision facilitating tool (Vessey and Galletta 1991; Arnold and Sutton 1998;
Al-Natour et al. 2008). Cognitive fit increases with a decision makers experience using a decision
aiding tool (Goodhue and Thompson 1995; Dunn and Grabski 2001). Auditors’ use of analytical
procedures tends to focus on simpler versions of anomaly models (Hirst and Koonce 1996;
Brewster 2011; Brazel et al. 2014), and research and practitioner literature suggests that auditors’
use of predictive models is limited. Thus, auditors are expected to experience higher cognitive fit
when using anomaly models than predictive models, resulting in anomaly models causing a greater
change in judgments. As auditors are less experienced and less effective at using nonfinancial data
compared to financial data (Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel et al. 2009; Brazel et al. 2014), auditors are
expected to experience higher cognitive fit when using data analytics that analyzed financial data,
resulting in a greater change in judgments.
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An experiment utilizing a 2 x 2 experimental design was conducted. The experiment
involved external financial statement auditors making judgments related to a potential risk
identified by their firm’s central data analytics group. Specifically, participants made judgments
relating to reliance, fraud risk assessments, and budgeted audit hours. The two independent
variables for the experiment are the type of data analytical model used (anomaly vs. predictive)
and type of data analyzed (financial vs. nonfinancial). Although the same risk was presented from
the central data analytics group, the underlying analysis used to identify the risk was manipulated.
The experiment manipulates the type of data analytical model used by describing the central data
analytics groups as using either anomaly or predictive models. Furthermore, the type of data
analyzed was manipulated by informing participants that the anomaly or predictive models
analyzed either journal entries (financial data) or e-mail language (nonfinancial data).
The results of this study suggest that while the type of data analytical model used and type
of data analyzed do not result in different reliance and fraud risk assessments, their combined effect
impacts budgeted audit hours. The change in budgeted audit hours resulting from a risk identified
by data analytical model is contingent upon the type of data that is analyzed. Specifically, when
predictive models are used, auditors increase budgeted audit hours more when financial data is
analyzed as compared to nonfinancial data. The opposite is true for anomaly models, such that
auditors increase budgeted audit hours more when nonfinancial data is analyzed as compared to
financial data.
This study illustrates the joint effect of the type of data analytical models used and type of
data analyzed on auditors’ judgments with regard to budgeted audit hours. This study provides
initial experimental evidence on the impact of different types of data analytics impacting auditors’
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judgments. The results highlight the importance of considering joint effects of the impact of data
analytics on auditors’ decisions.

Study Three: The Impact of the Human Factor on Auditors’ Reliance on Data Analytics
Study Three applies the theory of Trust to auditors’ use of data analytics and explores
auditors’ reliance on data analytics based on the effect of the presentation source of the findings
and level of risk identified. Data analytics may be viewed as an outgrowth and expansion of
analytical procedures (Appelbaum et al. 2017). While traditional audit teams have possessed the
necessary skillset to perform analytical procedures (Hirst and Koonce 1996; Trompeter and Wright
2010), the advanced capabilities of data analytics requires different technical skills to be acquired
by audit teams (Richins et al. 2017). To implement this skillset, audit teams can consult with data
scientists or use their firm’s data analytical software (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a;
Richins et al. 2017). These two methods may not be relied on uniformly, as individuals may be
reluctant to rely on, and less trusting of technology to perform functions as compared to other
humans (Waern and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000). Auditors are more likely to rely
on information that requires a simple course of follow up action (Glover et al. 2005). Yet, decision
makers trust information provided by other humans more consistently, such as under varying levels
of risk, than information provided by a system. Thus, developing and leveraging data scientist
groups may be effective at inducing reliance on data analytics for a variety of circumstances.
Drawing upon the theory of Trust, this study hypothesizes that auditor’s reliance on data
analytics will be greater when results are presented from a data scientist and a low level of risk is
identified. Trust refers to “The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
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trustor...” (Mayer et al. 1995, pg. 712). Decision makers trust information provided by another
human more than technology enabled systems (Lewandowsky et al. 2000), and this trust increases
reliance (Muir 1989; Lerch and Prietula 1989). Thus, auditors are predicted to rely more on
information provided by another human as compared to a system. Additionally, when audit
evidence suggests a high risk, auditors rely less on this information at is requires a complex
subsequent course of action (Glover et al. 2005). Thus, auditors are predicted to rely more on
information that presents a low audit risk than a high audit risk. As prior research indicates that
decision makers rely more consistently on information provided by humans than systems
(Lewandowsky et al. 2000), when the results of data analytics identifying a high risk is presented
by a system it is expected to result in a greater decrease in reliance than when presented by another
human. Thus, this study predicts that the level of risk identified will moderate the effect of
presentation source on auditors’ reliance on data analytics.
For this study, an experiment using a 2 x 2 design was conducted. The experiment involved
external financial statement auditors determining how likely they are to rely on the findings of data
analytics. The two independent variables for the experiment is the presentation source (another
human vs. a self-generating system) and the level of audit risk identified (high vs. low). The
experiment presents participants with a report of the findings of data analytics, however the
presentation source and the information content of the report is manipulated. Participants were
informed that the output report of the data analytics was either presented from their firms’ data
scientist, or was shown on their computer using the data analytics software. Participants were
informed that the results of the data analytics suggested either a high or low audit risk.
The results of this study show that auditors’ reliance on data analytics do not differ as a
result of a different presentation source or level of risk identified. Although the predicted
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moderation of level of risk identified on presentation source was not observed, examining the joint
effect of these two variables on reliance presented an unexpected finding. The level of risk
identified and presentation source have a joint impact on auditors’ reliance on data analytics.
When the results of the data analytics are presented from a self-generating system, auditors are
more likely to rely on a high risk than a low risk. The opposite is true when the results of data
analytics are presented from another human, as under these circumstances auditors are more likely
to rely on a low risk as compared to a high risk.
The results of this study suggest that developing and leveraging data scientist groups may
not be the most effective manner for firms to induce auditors’ reliance on data analytics that
identify high risk audit areas. While identifying low risk audit areas may aid in performing more
effective audits, data analytics may be used to facilitate auditors focusing their time on more high
risk, judgment intensive tasks (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). The results of this study suggest that
the approach used by the firms of developing data scientist groups to aid in data analysis results in
a reluctance of relying on high risk information when presented by another human. Thus, firms
should reevaluate the effectiveness of their approach of developing data scientists groups to
implement data analytics into the audit process.

Overall Contribution
Accounting firms have increased their use of data analytics (Deloitte 2010; AICPA 2015;
Coffey 2015; Ernst and Young 2015). Prior research examining auditors’ use of data analytics has
indicated that auditors are not particularly effective at identifying patterns of data analytic
visualization when viewed prior to traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). The three studies
reported in this dissertation seek to extend and contribute to the data analytics literature and are
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centered on auditors’ use of data analytics. Combined, these three studies aim to demonstrate the
need for professional auditors to perform follow up audit work after data analytics identify a
potential risk (Study One) and shows that even when presenting the same results, the underlying
method used by the data analytics and presentation of the output of the data analytics impacts
auditors’ judgments under some circumstances (Study Two and Study Three).
Results from Study Two and Study Three support the notion that data analytics impact
auditors’ judgments. Although both studies focus on auditors’ judgments using data analytics, the
focus of these studies are quite different. The focus of Study Two is on the new forms of data
analysis arising from advancements in technology (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). A variety of other
types of data analyses could have been explored that present opportunities for future research. In
contrast, Study Three focuses on the effectiveness of including data scientists into the audit team
in order to induce auditors’ reliance on the findings of data analytics. The results of Study Three
highlight that there is a joint effect of the presentation source and the level of identified risk.
Collectively, these studies contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the mere availably of
data analytics is insufficient to uniformly change auditors’ judgments. Different types of data
analytics may result in different judgments. These studies provide initial experimental support for
the impact of data analytics on auditors’ judgments. They highlight the need to investigate
previously unexplained phenomena within this emerging domain.
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STUDY ONE: CONSEQUENCES OF DEPROFESSIONALIZATION: THE
USE OF DATA ANALYTICS TO GUIDE NONPROFESSIONALIZED
AUDITORS
Introduction
Certain factors call into question if the public accounting profession is still truly
representative of a profession. Although a fundamental aspect of professions is that they are
self-regulating (Kimball 1995), the downfall of Arthur Andersen resulted in the passage of SOX
and the creation of the PCAOB to regulate the public accounting profession. Additionally,
increased audit market competition has created continuous pressure to lower audit fees (Dirsmith
et al. 2015), calling into question the long term profitability and viability of the auditing
profession. In response to pressure to decrease audit fees, audit procedures are often
standardized. Such standardization results in increasing automation and decreasing professional
judgment required of auditors. This commodification of audit procedures compels
commercialization practices (Dirsmith et al. 2015) and has resulted in auditors expanding the
types of auditing services provided (Gendron and Barrett 2004; O’Dwyer 2011; Suddaby et al.
2009). Such commercialization practices raise questions as to whether the auditing profession is
truly a profession seeking to serve society, or merely purporting to serve society as justification
for engaging in profit seeking endeavors (Wyatt 2004).
Two distinct camps exist regarding perceptions of professionalism as it relates to
commercialization (Dirsmith et al. 2015). The first camp views professionals as shifting from an
economically disinterested expert to an organization-based knowledge worker or entrepreneur
(Abbott 1988; Reed 1996). For many years professions, such as public accounting, gained social
status and authority by providing an expert service to society (Merton 1968), while striving to
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achieve a “service ideal” for clients (Larson 1977). Although professions may claim to serve the
needs of society, this claim may truly represent serving the vested interests of the profession
rather than society (Larson 1977). Such claims may be attributable to shifts in societal values
emphasizing performance and outcomes regardless of the underlying processes (Krause 1994).
Professionals moving away from self-seeking knowledge workers and toward commercialization
/ commodification practices may result in the “death of the professions” (Krause 1994; Brint
1994). The second camp views professionals as seeking to reclaim their service ideal (Dirsmith
et al. 2015). This camp views the expansion of non-certified numbers expanding the need for
auditing (Power 1999), which increases the need for services and professionalism among
accountants. This camp views the right to serve clients as highlighting their professional
endeavor (Dirsmith et al. 2015). This camp views commercialization of assurance (Gendron and
Barrett 2004; O’Dwyer 2011; Suddaby et al. 2009), and consulting services (Suddaby et al.
2007), as accountants and public accounting firms using their expertise to provide additional
necessary services to society. Yet it is unclear which of the two camps best explains the
commercialization of auditing on the accounting profession and the implications of using
nonprofessionalized auditors in a professional audit context. The lingering question is whether
we would be better off eliminating the profession and its monopoly over audit services, and
simply recognizing it as an industry where competition can produce similar results at less cost in
the absence of monopoly rents.
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using nonprofessionalized auditors
in a critical audit context. Specifically, this study examines a unique setting where the U.S.
federal government is leveraging data analytics to structure the audit process for
nonprofessionalized auditors. Technology enabled tools, such as data analytics, can be used to
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control, facilitate, and support audit work (Winograd et al. 2000; Banker et al. 2002; Dowling
and Leech 2007). These tools may be used to standardize the audit process and restrict the
auditor’s ability to exercise professional judgment and ensure that intended audit procedures are
followed (Dowling and Leech 2014; Westermann et al. 2015). This automation may enable
professionals to disseminate knowledge to nonprofessionals during the audit process and
decrease the need of professionals. Yet, using such technologies may have adverse implications
on the users, such as failing to consider issues beyond what was identified by the technology
(Seow 2011).
A component of the U.S. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 required the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to implement a data analytic tool called the Fraud
Prevention System (FPS) to help identify Medicare fraud. Several well known contractors
including Verizon, Northrop Grumman and IBM aided CMS in developing and implementing
the FPS, providing legitimization to the new FPS (DHHS 2012). Subsequent to the FPS
identifying an outlier, an outsourced contractor called a Zone Program Integrity Contractor
(ZPIC) is assigned the task of performing a forensic audit of the outlier, as well as investigating
the auditee for any overall pattern of fraudulent claims. Although the ZPIC firms are encouraged
to employ professionals (CMS 2007), the results of this study highlight the extensive use of
nonprofessionals by the ZPIC firms to perform audit work.
To examine the impact of using nonprofessionalized auditors, data was primarily
collected through reviewing public documents discussing the ZPIC auditors’ performance and
interviews of ZPIC auditees. While Reports to Congress highlighted the benefits of ZPIC audit
activity, practitioner articles highlighted several drawbacks (Vishnevetsky 2012; Van Halem et
al. 2012; DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015b; Baucus et al. 2013). Interviewing auditees
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allowed the researcher to identify both benefits and drawbacks arising from ZPIC audit activity.
Additionally, interviewing participants on their relationships with other regulatory auditors and
financial statement auditors allowed the researcher to assess the congruence of perceptions
related to ZPIC auditors and whether these perceptions were attributable to the form of oversight
or to differences in the ZPICs’ audit tactics.
Thirty-six semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals employed by
providers subject to ZPIC audit. Interview data was triangulated with archival documents from
participants and publicly available information from government agencies (i.e., Office of
Inspector General) and practitioner websites (i.e., attorneys, CPAs, and consultants) in order to
enhance the researcher’s understanding of these audit relationships and to increase the validity
and reliability of the data and analysis (Yin 2009).
This study contributes to the academic literature by illustrating the implications of
utilizing nonprofessionals in an audit setting. The advancement of technology enables the
standardization and commodification of auditing procedures, enabling commercialization
(Dirsmith et al. 2015), and calling into question the necessity of professional auditors. Such
commercialization opportunities expand auditors’ jurisdiction, while impairing objectivity and
independence (Wyatt 2004; Zeff 2003a; Zeff 2003b). As the public accounting profession is
expressing increasing interest in using data analytics as part of the audit process (Appelbaum et
al. 2017; Coffey 2015; AICPA 2017), this study highlights the importance of using professional,
as compared to nonprofessionalized, auditors to audit identified anomalies even when using data
analytics. Prior professionalism research has focused on what defines a profession (Kimball
1995; Kultgen 1988), or the challenges professions face regarding threatening forces and barriers
to expansion (Dirsmith et al. 2015; Covaleski et al. 2003; Pentland 2000). Yet, there is a lack of
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research examining the regulatory auditors’ claim to expertise in the public sector (Gendron et al.
2007) and the implications of nonprofessionalized auditors acting in a professional capacity
(Suddaby et al. 2009). While utilizing outside contractors allows organizations to focus on core
activities and avert costs such as training and recruitment (Covaleski et al. 2003; Matusik and
Hill 1998), this study demonstrates adverse societal implications from utilizing
nonprofessionalized auditors to guide and execute audits.
This study is very timely and important as the most recent Report to Congress published
by DHHS and CMS indicates an intention to expand ZPIC jurisdiction to other U.S.
governmental agencies (DHHS 2015c), specifically, Medicaid and the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP). 2 Evidence of ZPIC expansion to Medicaid is further demonstrated
by the creation of Unified Program Integrity Contractors (UPICs) in 2016 that combines the
work of the ZPIC auditors with their Medicaid counterparts. Although the findings in this study
were confined to Medicare, the expansion of ZPIC jurisdiction suggests similar findings will
follow in Medicaid. Overall, these activities provide substantial evidence of ZPIC auditors’
jurisdiction expanding without consideration of the societal impact.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. The next section provides
background on the relevant academic literature. The following section discusses the method
utilized in this study. The fourth section presents the findings of this study. The fifth section
presents a discussion of the findings and the final section presents concluding remarks.

2

Medicare is a federal health insurance program in the U.S. for individuals over the age of 65, whereas Medicaid is
a program that helps with medical costs for individuals with low incomes and limited resources (CMS 2000).
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Professionalism
While multiple frameworks exist for defining what constitutes a profession, generally
professions are considered to be defined by meeting four criteria. A profession must necessitate
a unique set of knowledge and expertise and employ this expertise (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et
al. 2003) to symbolize power and control over a domain (Blackler et al. 1993). A second
requirement is that this unique knowledge and expertise must enable the professional to make
judgments that cannot be preprogrammed, that applies rules that cannot be entirely codified, and
that allows the professional discretion to cope with unforeseen problems (Larson 1977). A third
requirement is that professionals must hold a credential to certify their expertise (Kimball 1995),
and that continuing education is prescribed to maintain this credential (Kultgen 1988). A fourth
requirement is that a profession must serve and support the public interest and not engage in selfinterested behavior (Kultgen 1988; Fogarty et al. 2006).
As the public accounting profession continues down a path of de-professionalization
(Dirsmith et al. 2015), consideration should be given to the implications of displacing
professionals to a non-professional environment. Moving from a profession-based environment
into a nonprofessional work environment may change the core professional values (Suddaby et
al. 2009). Nonprofessionals often do not understand or appreciate the importance of acting
professional when conducting engagements (Suddaby et al. 2009). Problems arise when placing
professionals in non-professional work environments (Aranya and Ferris 1984). Placing a
professional in a nonprofessional work environment emphasizing efficiency and limiting
individual discretion will erode the individual’s professional values and reputation over time
(Scott 1966). When professionals are employed by professional service organizations, they are
subject to socialization practices and disciplinary techniques to align their actions with
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organizational goals (Dirsmith et al. 1997; Covaleski et al. 1998), however these socialization
practices and disciplinary techniques are less prevalent when working for non-professional
service firms (Suddaby et al. 2009).

Knowledge and Expertise
Professionals must develop and hold a unique set of knowledge and expertise (Kultgen
1988; Covaleski et al. 2003). Knowledge using professional judgment creates a claim to
expertise deserving recognition as a profession (Elliott 1999; Kultgen 1988). A profession is
recognized by establishing dominance over competing knowledge bases and expertise (Abbott
1988; Covaleski et al. 2003). Claims to expertise are more persuasive when they are linked with
objective facts (Latour 1987). As expertise is associated with performance (Bédard and Biggs
1991; Knapp and Knapp 2001; Knechel et al. 2013), professions are expected to report strong
performance outcomes. Merely claiming this expertise can arguably be more effective than
actually possessing this expertise (Alvesson 1993).
Professions often encounter substantial challenges that can be used to legitimize their
expertise (Abbott 1988; Gendron et al. 2007; Gendron and Barrett 2004; Pentland 2000; Power
1999; Power 2003; Rittenberg and Covaleski 2001). During the emergence of a profession,
constructing a need to be fulfilled is arguably more important than demonstrating technical
abilities to fill that need (Van de Van and Garud 1993). Skilled use of language as a means of
managing public impressions aids in legitimization (Ruef 2000; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005;
Hopwood 2009). A profession may legitimize their expertise in a new domain by linking that
domain to a domain where it already has established legitimacy (Latour 1987). Thus, legitimacy
maintains a dominant order by enabling powerful actors to remain in power (Archel et al. 2011;
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Suddaby et al. 2007). Efforts to enhance legitimacy include exploiting fears of others (GuéninParacini et al. 2014), and gaining recognition, such as by a government agency (Power 2013;
Power 1997).
Legitimizing expertise can also be enabled by the use of technology, such as the ZPIC
auditors’ use of the FPS. Technology enabled tools may be used to justify decisions (Newell and
Marabelli 2015), disseminate expertise, and structure tasks for lower level decision makers
(Dowling and Leech 2014). Thus, demonstrating the expertise of the individuals that developed
the technology may be adequate to legitimize the use of the technology. Technology may aid in
legitimizing decision makers expertise by demonstrating the ability to identify highest risk areas
in need of greatest investigation (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015a). Gaining recognition
by a government agency, such as CMS, legitimizes the use of technology (Power 2013; Power
1997).

Judgment and Decision Making
The second requirement of a profession is that the specialized knowledge held allows
professionals to make judgments that cannot be preprogrammed or reduced to a set of rules,
while allowing the professional autonomy to make decisions (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988). As
professions advance, their expertise tends to become commodified allowing the unique
knowledge to be translated into a set of rules resulting in a struggle for control of domains and
markets. Building a claim to expertise is a continuous process (Gendron et al. 2007). The
development and maintenance of abstract systems of knowledge used to establish their
jurisdictions is crucial to the survival of professions (Abbott 1988). A profession’s failure to
develop new knowledge will result in individuals questioning if the work performed is truly
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representative of a profession. Once a domain is established, professions engage in
commercialization tactics by using their abstract knowledge to develop new knowledge and
expand their jurisdiction to new practice areas, ultimately annexing new areas in order to ensure
survival (Abbott 1988; Dirsmith et al. 2015). Sites of ambiguity become opportunities for
professions to expand their area of expertise and jurisdiction (Gendron et al. 2007). Thus
professions may seek to highlight a need in order to fill that need, making their claim to expertise
indispensable and enabling expansion of their jurisdiction (Courtois 2017; Callon 1986).
Although assurance services of accountants and public accounting firms have expanded
(Gendron and Barrett 2004; O’Dwyer 2011; Suddaby et al. 2009) along with consulting services
(Suddaby et al. 2007), this commercialization can be argued to be “out of control” (Gendron and
Spira 2009). Although the field where an audit occurs may change, more activities are being
made auditable, including environmental audits, educational audits, medical audits, energy audits
and value for money audits (Pentland 2000). Although expanding auditing requirements is
intended to result in increased accountability, increased accountability may not result in
improved performance (Pentland 2000).

Certification
The third requirement of a profession noted above is having a credential certifying
expertise in an area. Kimball (1995) discusses how the emergence of the modern professional is
produced by several stages, concluding with obtaining a credential to certify expertise and formal
learning. Among public accountants in the U.S., the CPA credential serves as symbolizing
auditing expertise. Holding a credential helps legitimize the expertise required for professions
(Reed 1996; Covaleski et al. 2003).
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New discoveries or innovations create opportunities for professionals to undergo
professional growth by gaining an understanding of these developments (Abbott 1988). For
professionals to ensure that their domain specific knowledge or expertise stays current in light of
environmental changes, they utilize continuing education (i.e., CPE courses) (Kultgen 1988).
Changing environmental factors require professionals to continuously “reeducate” themselves in
response to even incremental developments (Abbott 1988). This continuous education requires
an ongoing effort from professionals to ensure that their domain specific knowledge remains
current (Abbott 1988).

Focus on Public Interest
The fourth requirement of a profession noted above is that professions seek to develop
new services to address societal issues, while refusing to engage in self-interested behavior
(Abbott 1988; Kultgen 1988; Fogarty et al. 2006). Professionals seek to serve the public while
simultaneously safeguarding their jurisdiction against competing professions (Abbott 1988;
Cooper and Robson 2006). Despite the importance of a professional serving the public interest,
public accountants may be more concerned with serving the client than serving the public
interest (Cooper and Robson 2006).
Although public accounting firms have the expertise to certify numbers (Power 1999),
some have argued that the portfolio of services delivered are expanding too rapidly (Gendron and
Spira 2009). Thus, it is unclear if the additional services delivered to the public by the public
accounting profession are truly in the public interest, or merely an attempt by firms to maximize
profitability at the public’s expense. Although public accounting firms currently have a
monopoly over providing financial statement auditing services, this monopoly could be
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withdrawn if regulators no longer felt the profession’s members were serving the public interest.
Eliminating the public accounting firms monopoly would potentially allow competition that may
produce similar results without the excess costs of monopoly rents accrued by the profession.

Research Method
Setting
Section 4241 of the U.S. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 required CMS to implement
the Fraud Prevention System (FPS), a data analytic tool to help identify Medicare fraud. Such
government initiatives are commonly used in an attempt to constrain costs (Chua 1995; Samuel
et al. 2005). The motivation behind the development of this tool demonstrates how technology
can be used as a component of a broader initiative (Preston et al. 1992; Power 1997; Ogden
1997), in this case to purportedly fight healthcare fraud. 3 This new tool was implemented on
June 30, 2011 (DHHS 2012). To assist in conducting on-site audits of possible fraudulent
activity identified by the FPS, CMS outsourced audit responsibilities to ZPIC firms (CMS
2007). 4 Subsequent to CMS performing data analysis by using the analytics discussed above and

3

Within the healthcare industry in the U.S., revenue is generated by providing services, then potential payers such
as health insurance providers (e.g., United Healthcare) or government programs (e.g., Medicare) are billed so that
the provider can be reimbursed for services provided. Per USC 18 § 1347, Healthcare fraud is defined in the U.S. as:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or
payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both. If the violation results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), such person
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in death, such
person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both.
(b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific
intent to commit a violation of this section.
4
The ZPICs replaced Program Safeguard Contractors (PSCs) subsequent to the PSCs being criticized by OIG for
opening an insufficient number of new audits and ineffective data analysis (OIG 2007).
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identifying an outlier, a ZPIC firm is assigned the role of auditing the outlier for possible fraud
(DHHS 2012). ZPIC auditors are the primary users of the FPS (DHHS 2015a). Four full years
of operations have now been reported, and implementation has been described as a success based
on reporting of an increasing Return on Investment of 3.3:1 in 2012, 5:1 in 2013, 10:1 in 2014
and 11.5:1 in 2015 (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015b; CMS 2015). 5 This impression of
perceived success has created a desire to expand similar analytic tools to other government
programs, specifically Medicaid and CHIP (DHHS 2015c). Despite the increasing ROI, Reports
to Congress do not discuss factors such as access to care and changes to the quality of care at
providers undergoing ZPIC audit. Further, the reported ROI is based on projected fraud
collections and not actual realization.
As the ZPIC auditors are focused within the healthcare industry, it is important to
understand industry specific issues related to healthcare fraud. In addition to fraud, abusive and
wasteful practices are also of major societal concern. The distinction between fraud, abuse and
waste is often difficult to delineate. Fraudulent activities include billing for services that are not
provided to patients or services that are provided but unnecessary. Abusive practices are viewed
as borderline fraudulent, for example prescribing multiple doctor visits to a single patient when
one is sufficient. The distinction between abuse and fraud relates to motivation of the provider,
such that if there was an expectation for at least a marginally better medical result, then it is
abusive and not fraudulent. Waste is defined as a service that passes neither a cost-effective test
nor a cost-benefit test. Wasteful procedures are often performed as a pre-emptive defense
mechanism by physicians against malpractice litigation, and may include duplication of

5

Return on Investment is calculated based on Total Estimated Savings (Actual Savings plus Projected Savings)
divided by Total estimated Costs (Development Contractor Costs, Modeling Costs, Employee salaries and benefits,
and Investigation costs) (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015b; CMS 2015).
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procedures (Mashaw and Marmor 1994). Although decreasing the instances of fraud is of
primary concern, reducing the amount of abuse and waste are potential added benefits of ZPIC
audit activity.
ZPIC auditors may conduct an on-site audit without giving the auditee prior notice,
reducing the opportunity for an auditee to alter or destroy incriminating evidence. Four different
ZPIC firms cover seven different geographic zones, including nine designated “hot-spots”
(DHHS 2012). ZPIC auditors’ compensation changed fairly recently from being based on cost
reimbursement (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014) to being based on the amount of savings (fraud
dollars) reported (DHHS 2015c). ZPIC firms are paid by and report to CMS.
The ZPIC auditors have the ability to recommend suspension of Medicare payment that, if
accepted, results in eliminating cash flow derived from Medicare services rendered. Due to the
results of ZPIC Medicare audit activity discussed in Reports to Congress (DHHS 2012; DHHS
2014), sub-contractor audit activity has expanded to Medicaid (DHHS 2015b) and thus far the one
contract awarded for a specific jurisdiction was awarded to a former ZPIC firm (CMS 2016a).

Data collection
Sutton et al. (2011) discuss how the use of qualitative methods is often preferable as a
research method for examining emerging phenomena. An example of such emerging
phenomena is the implications of using nonprofessionalized auditors in audit settings. As
organizations may report different experiences from ZPIC audits and prepare and respond
differently, a cross-sectional field study was selected for this study (Lillis and Mundy 2005).
Semi-structured interviews were utilized as they allow for data collection on topics of
interest (identified by the process below); however, these interviews also permit the interviewer
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to adjust as appropriate to explore new insights that present themselves. The five components of
research design outlined by Yin (2009) were followed. Consistent with Yin (2009), the
researcher first identified the primary research question, “why are ZPIC auditors so successful as
reported to Congress and how are data analytics contributing to this success?” (As new insights
presented themselves, this question began to evolve as success might not really be success, and
data analytics might not really be beneficial to achieving real success). The second component is
to identify propositions, however as this study is exploratory, propositions are not necessary (Yin
2009). Third, the unit of analysis was determined; in this study the unit of analysis was ZPIC
audit activities and execution. The fourth component identifies the analysis (see the “data
analysis” section below). In order to ensure the validity in the interpretation of findings, the final
component of research design (Yin 2009), the researcher sought any instances contrary to the
primary findings.
To develop the protocol, as the ZPIC auditors are concerned with regulatory compliance,
first previous literature was reviewed to determine which factors have been shown to increase
regulatory compliance, such as increased oversight (Hoopes et al. 2012; Atwood et al. 2012).
The researcher then developed a series of questions with the input of a partner, a manager and a
senior in the healthcare practice of a national accounting firm, a member of the AICPA’s Health
Care expert panel, two auditing professors, as well as three former external financial statement
auditors. Figure 1 provides the interview protocol. 6
Contact with healthcare providers subject to ZPIC audit was established through various
sources including an accounting firm, state and sub-industry healthcare organizations and

6

Additional questions in the “Societal Impact” section were added to the protocol after the 24th interview.
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conferences, articles in publicly available sources, consultants and attorneys. Employees of
several providers were then interviewed regarding the ZPIC audit process. In total, thirty-six
individuals from across the U.S. were interviewed. The interviews were subsequently
transcribed by the researcher.
Most of the interviews were conducted with C-level executives (or other top-management
personnel equivalent) or owners of healthcare providers. The remaining interviews were with
two administrators (similar to office managers), a consultant, two directors, a manager and other
high ranking clinical personnel. 7 Participants located in six of the seven geographic zones have
been interviewed covering audits by three of the four ZPIC firms. Thirty-six percent of the
participants were located in a designated hot spot region. Sixty-seven percent of participants had
an on-site visit from the ZPIC auditors. There were seven different types of healthcare providers
included in the sample. 8 Twenty-two percent of the participants were employed by not-for-profit
organizations. Seventeen participants worked for small organizations or organizations with
significant family involvement; thus, interviewing these participants addresses a concern of prior
research that small organizations are not always adequately represented in healthcare academic
research (Marmor and Morone 2005). Overall, there is substantial diversity among the
participants. No significant differences were noted attributable to different sub-groups (i.e.,
industry type or location). Table 1 provides complete demographic information.
The interviews lasted from 31 to 104 minutes and took place from March 2015 through
April 2017. The interviews were conducted in the participants’ office, over the phone, or in a
public location. Participants were provided with broad topics that would be covered during the

7

Although the directors and manager were not in the “C-suite” they all oversee reimbursement for organizations of
significant size and capacity.
8
One of the country’s largest Medicare billers is included in the sample
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interview at least two business days prior to the interview. All potential interviewees were
informed that the results of the interviews would be reported in a manner that ensured keeping
their identities confidential.
As part of soliciting participants, potential interviewees were informed that they would be
asked to have the interview recorded. Additionally, the researcher explained this to the participants
prior to conducting each interview. The researcher explained to all interviewees that the recorder
was being used to capture quotes accurately and enhance the flow of the conversation. Participants
were also told that they could ask the researcher to turn off the recorder at any point during the
interview. One interviewee declined to be recorded. During this interview the researcher took
extensive hand written notes and wrote direct quotes when possible. All remaining interviews
were recorded on an MP3 player and subsequently fully transcribed by the researcher. Eleven
participants asked for copies of their transcripts. No concerns were expressed by these participants
over the content of the transcripts. 9 Time was spent at the beginning of each interview to establish
a rapport with the interviewee and to understand the interviewee’s background. The sequence in
which issues were addressed varied throughout different interviews. Detailed notes were taken
during and after each interview. After each interview, the researcher reflected on the interview
and considered possible issues to explore in future interviews.

Data analysis
Consistent with prior research, a three step process was used to analyze the data: data
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (O’Dwyer 2004; Irvine and Gaffikin

9

Several participants requested that specific quotes that are in included in the paper be approved prior to inclusion.
The quotes were accepted without modification. One of the participants discussed a finding with the researcher that
caused the researcher to add footnote 6 to Table 1.
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2006; O’Dwyer et al. 2011; O’Dwyer 2011). Data reduction was accomplished by pilot coding
the initial interviews (Yin 2009). As the interviews were transcribed and the transcripts were
reviewed, the researcher noted that the discussions centered on certain topics. Next, to
accomplish data display, a summary was prepared for each of the initial transcripts to easily
identify these themes and explain their nature and location within each transcript. As needed,
additions were made to these summaries through an iterative process of reading the additional
transcripts. Upon completion of the summaries, the researcher proceeded to the conclusion
drawing/verification step. A coding scheme was established for the main discussion points of
the interviews. The researcher assigned descriptive labels, creating first-order codes, to the main
discussion topics while striving to stay as objective and true to the content as possible.
Next, the researcher examined the first-order codes to identify codes to collapse into
higher-level nodes, or first-order categories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Dacin et al. 2010). The
categories that emerged were primarily from one section of the protocol (the “ZPIC Audits”
section). For example, several participants discussed issues with the time lag for ZPIC auditors
to process information. The researcher then identified commonalities among the categories and
collapsed them into distinct clusters, or second-order themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Dacin et
al. 2010). This process identified the following themes: the use of technology and
dehumanization of work performed by providers, methods of reporting findings, documentation
requests, inadequate communication, the ZPICs perceived inadequate expertise, and societal
implications.
Next, the links between these second-order themes were conceptualized as factors that
influence and have implications for an overarching dimension. The links identified the central
dimension as “ZPIC audit procedures”. For example, auditees expressed concern regarding the
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ZPIC audit process highlighting issues such as the ZPICs lack of professionalism, experience and
inadequate oversight. The quotes that best represent the main themes identified were selected for
inclusion in the findings.

Data saturation, a point where additional interviews are neither

contradicting nor adding any significant new information (Rahaman et al. 2010; Sutton et al. 2011)
was achieved.

Additionally, the researcher validated the findings through triangulation of

interview data with archival documents (Yin 2009). These documents include communication
with the ZPIC auditors from participants and various publicly available information sources such
as practitioner websites (i.e.: attorneys, CPAs and consultants). The practitioner literature has
largely been consistent with the findings of this study (Vishnevetsky 2012; Van Halem et al. 2012;
Moore Stephens Lovelace 2013). While the Reports to Congress portray ZPIC audit activity as
being very successful, the reports do not discuss the ZPICs’ audit procedures and the implications
they have on providers and society—they merely quantify success as based on reported fraudulent
funds identified versus cost of audits.

Results
Four requirements of a profession noted above are that professions must 1) develop a
unique set of knowledge and expertise and employ this expertise (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al.
2003), 2) use this unique knowledge and expertise to make judgments that cannot be
preprogrammed or reduced to a set of rules, while allowing the professional discretion to cope
with unforeseen problems (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988), 3) hold a credential to certify expertise
(Kimball 1995) and 4) support the public interest and not engage in self-interested behavior
(Kultgen 1988; Fogarty et al. 2006). The results of this study demonstrate that auditees’
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observations and perceptions of ZPIC auditors’ behavior are inconsistent with the expectations of
a profession and as a result, this behavior entails significant concerns for the public interest.

Lack of knowledge / expertise
Importing expertise from a previous domain aids in legitimizing expertise (Latour 1987).
Thus, using well-known data analytic developers to assist in developing a data analytical tool
helps legitimize this new tool. Consistent with this strategy, CMS used a variety of well-known
contractors, including Northrop Grumman, Verizon and IBM to assist in developing a data
analytical tool called the Fraud Prevention System (FPS) to help identify Medicare fraud.
Northrop Grumman was selected as the Development Contractor to build, design and
implement the data analytics. Northrop Grumman partnered with Verizon’s Federal Network
Systems to implement their proven predictive analytics technologies into the FPS. Additionally,
Northrop Grumman partnered with National Government Services for their Medicare policy and
data expertise. IBM had prior experience using predictive analytics in a variety of industries,
including health care, and was selected as the modeling contractor to create, refine and test new
predictive models. IBM provided CMS with a variety of potential algorithms along with
Medicare and Medicaid expertise. The IBM team focuses on developing models and works with
CMS and Northrop Grumman to integrate the models into the FPS (DHHS 2012). Using these
contractors permitted CMS to leverage preexisting expertise and technology when developing
the FPS, and to reinforce its legitimacy. In a Report to Congress, CMS touts the expertise of FPS
users and overseers as highlighted by the following:
•

Staffed by experts in data analysis, statistics, and behavioral and other social sciences, the
Analytics Lab directs the advancements of FPS models, maintaining and refining existing
FPS models and guiding the development of new ones (DHHS 2012, pg. 6).
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•

•

To provide effective oversight and input to the FPS, CMS assembled an expert,
multidisciplinary team in the CPI Analytics Lab. These social science analysts are
economists, statisticians, and programmers who research fraud indicators to uncover current
and emerging fraud schemes” (DHHS 2012, pg. 14).
CMS and its contracting partners met or exceeded all SBJA requirements, implementing the
FPS ahead of schedule, on a nationwide scale, and with greater capabilities than the SBJA
required (DHHS 2012, pg. 4).
Using technology enabled tools, such as the FPS, can be used to control, facilitate and

support auditors (Winograd et al. 2000; Banker et al. 2002; Dowling and Leech 2007). In this
case, the FPS guides auditor focus and effectively sets risk as very high for conducting
substantive tests. Thus, the FPS represents a tool that can be used as a control mechanism to
restrict auditors’ ability to exercise professional judgment and ensure that predetermined audit
procedures are followed when conducting the audit (Dowling and Leech 2014). Centralized
expertise, such as the FPS, is designed to facilitate auditors targeting their investigations to the
highest risk claims (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015a). While these tools may permit
centralized expertise to be disseminated to lower level auditors (Dowling 2009), they may have
unintended consequences, such as causing lower level auditors to insufficiently consider issues
beyond information identified (Seow 2011). As high risk claims are identified for further audit,
it can be argued that there is a decreased need for professional auditors’ judgment, with a greater
focus on mechanistic tasks in order to achieve positive outcomes. Thus, it may be argued that
the ZPIC auditors investigating these high risk claims may not need to be professional level
auditors, but rather laborers sufficiently trained to carry out prescribed mechanistic tasks as
guided by the data analytics. This is consistent with the ZPIC auditors’ charge:
•
•

ZPICs use the FPS to more efficiently and effectively fulfill their responsibility to investigate
Medicare fraud in their designated region (DHHS 2012, pg. 15)
The FPS screens claims data before payment is made, allowing ZPICs to rapidly implement a
potential administrative action … (DHHS 2012, pg.15).
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This appears contrary to the foundation of professionalism, that prescribes professionals
as being required to develop a unique set of knowledge and expertise and to apply that expertise
with professional judgment (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al. 2003) in situations that cannot be
preprogrammed or confined to a set of rules (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988). During the interviews
conducted in this study participants frequently expressed concerns with the ZPICs auditors’
expertise in conducting healthcare fraud audits. Participants expressed concerns with the ZPIC
auditors’ domain level expertise, including the acumen behind what the ZPICs were auditing, the
lack of judgment utilized in interpreting audit test findings, and the accuracy of the ZPIC
auditors’ assessments.
Participants expressed concern that the ZPIC auditors were not clear on what they were
auditing. For example, the participant employed by arguably the most sophisticated organization
in the sample explained that whenever a regulatory agency requests additional charts they are
usually able to determine what the auditors are examining, however this was not the case with
the ZPIC auditor’s request. Although professions are required to hold a unique set of knowledge
and expertise (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al. 2003), participants expressed skepticism whether
ZPIC auditors held such expertise.
•

•
•

Well, it was really kind of bizarre … the only commonality that we could determine from the
sample was that there was some kind of psychiatric diagnosis associated with the inpatient
stay… on these particular charts that were pulled … we were grasping to say “I’m not clear
what they are looking for” and there doesn’t seem to be any big deviation (Participant 4)
I don’t think they know [what they are looking for]. I honestly don’t. I talked to several
providers and they all agree [with] me, we don’t think they even know what they were
[looking for] (Participant 2)
… they got already close to fifty percent of the charts, if they would base it on my current
census, or my yearly census in [year], they got, they already achieved at least 50% of that
population. That’s more than enough, to say, “okay does this agency show any evidence of
fraud activity?” (Participant 36)
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Participants also highlighted some of the erroneous findings reported by the ZPIC
auditors. Three of the participants employed by organizations that are still operating had a final
fine that was substantially reduced during the appeals process. Of the overpayments purportedly
identified by the ZPIC auditors, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports that approximately
twenty percent are ultimately collected by CMS (OIG 2017a). This suggests that approximately
eighty percent of the improper payments that the ZPIC auditors’ report to Congress to justify
their cost and report on their performance success are invalidly included. Such reductions are
attributable to factors such as the appeals process (OIG 2017a). As expertise is associated with
performance (Bédard and Biggs. 1991; Knapp and Knapp 2001; Knechel et al. 2013), such a
high error rate suggests low performance, thus low expertise, casting doubt upon the ZPICs’
audit expertise.
•

•
•

…we got a statement from them saying that [fiscal intermediary] should not have re-opened
cost reports. That was their mistake. [They’re] sorry they did that, but [fiscal intermediary]
letters said that they were instructed by … [ZPIC] to re-open all the cost reports and that’s
what they did, with instruction from [ZPIC]. (Participant 2)
… the ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] 10 found that, that the government really was only
due $1,500 some odd dollars, that’s a less than 3% error rate [from the initial fine].
(Participant 22)
I mean this is just extortion … $1.56 million [in fines assessed] turned into $622. (Participant
11)
The results of ZPIC audit activity discussed in Reports to Congress have been portrayed

as a success, attributable to an increasing ROI (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015a).
Despite the Reports to Congress stating the importance of tracking actual recoveries (DHHS
2015a), the ROIs include funds reported by ZPIC auditors as fraudulent as opposed to actual
recollected funds (OIG 2017a). Including only actual benefits reduces the ROI from 3.3:1, 5:1

10

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) represents the third level in the appeals process
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and 10:1 for the first three years to approximately 0.5:1, 0.5:1 and 1:1 for the same periods. The
OIG highlights the shortcomings in previous congressional reports when examining the ROI
calculation:
•
•
•
•

... it is important to track the amounts of actual recoveries that FPS or any of our program
integrity activity returns to the Medicare Trust Funds... (DHHS 2015a, pg. 13).
... methodology for calculating other reported amounts included some invalid assumptions
that may have affected the accuracy of those amounts ... methodology assumes 100% of the
amount referred to law enforcement will be recovered (OIG 2012, pg. 5)
Identified savings does not represent a true return on investment because only a portion of
those savings are returned to, or prevented from leaving, the Medicare Trust Funds. (OIG
2014, pg. iii)
CMS did not use the amounts actually expected to be prevented or recovered (i.e., adjusted
savings) to evaluate FPS model performance. (OIG 2017b, pg. 7)
Much of the dissonance in the ZPIC auditors’ findings appear to be rooted in an inability

to properly integrate FPS data analytic findings with other audit evidence. ZPIC auditors are
authorized to extrapolate findings. Several participants reported that the ZPICs would examine
the identified sample of high risk medical claims and then extrapolate the audit error findings
across the entire population of claims. Yet, the claims identified by the FPS for the ZPICs to
audit represent the highest risk claims (DHHS 2014; DHHS 2015a), thus these claims are not
representative of the population. As part of the appeals process, participants reported hiring a
statistician as a consultant to examine the validity of the extrapolation. The statisticians were
able to identify deficiencies in the methods used to extrapolate findings, including that the
sample used by the ZPIC auditors to extrapolate was not representative of the population. Thus,
the extrapolation methods used represents another area of deficiency in the ZPICs expertise,
further highlighted below.
•

... [the statistician] literally tore these people up. As how inept, how ridiculous their formula
was, and they couldn’t document it, they couldn’t back into how they got to this number
(Participant 14)
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•
•

… threw the extrapolation out because of … data deficiencies, whatever, the way they
calculated they couldn’t reproduce (Participant 20)
… the PhD that put that together said … in short, their extrapolations are not reliable
(Participant 21)
Taken together, this study demonstrates the lack of knowledge and expertise held by

ZPIC auditors. Several well-known contractors were used to develop a powerful data analytic
tool (DHHS 2012) in an attempt to use technology, in this case the FPS, to structure the audit
process and control auditors (Dowling and Leech 2014). This results in an attempt to bypass the
need for auditors to apply unique expertise and professional judgment, which is a requirement of
a profession (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al. 2003). The evidence calls into question the ZPIC
auditors’ expertise, and suggest that the nonprofessionalized auditors blindly followed the
prescriptions of the automated technology tool without truly understanding how to aggregate and
assess the audit evidence.

Make non-programmable decisions
Participants noted the lack of domain specific knowledge required in the findings
reported by the ZPIC auditors. Professionalism entails developing a unique skillset and expertise
to apply to subjective decision making (Kultgen 1988; Covaleski et al. 2003). Abstract
knowledge must be developed by the profession in order to make judgments that cannot be
preprogrammed or reduced to a set of rules and allows professionals discretion in coping with
unforeseen problems (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988). Several participants discussed that the
findings reported by the ZPIC auditors did not require such professional judgment. Medical
records may be subject to scrutiny related to the necessity of care delivered, but such scrutiny
requires substantial professional judgment and not simply checklist evaluation. Participants were
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concerned that the ZPIC auditors did not focus on the quality of care delivered to the patient to
any extent.
•
•
•

… what ZPICs are doing, they’re just checking off, they’re not really reading the medical
content of the chart (Participant 12)
… [ZPICs are] not really looking at what we did for the patient, what’s wrong with the
patient, how we can took care of the patient, how we had a good quality report (Participant
24)
... they’re [reimbursement claims] not being denied on [medical] necessity, they’re being
denied on technicalities (Participant 11)
Overall, the ZPIC auditors’ findings were not centered on the quality or sufficient need of

care delivered, rather the findings were focused on documentation issues. Focusing on such
documentation issues may be reduced to a series of rules, which violates one of the required
criteria of a profession (Larson 1977; Abbott 1988). When evaluation criteria are reduced to a
set of rules, professional judgment is no longer necessary.
•

•
•

… we use electronic signatures with a lot of the doctors ... and Medicare accepts it. … when
they do it electronically, the little symbol for the electronic signature also prints the date in…
And they [ZPICs] denied those claims saying that the doctor did not sign and date the order,
he just signed it and the machine dated it. (Participant 9)
...they were trying to find any little little spec, not to pay any little claim. (Participant 14)
... I will say that they were without question more critical of the charts than any other auditor
... the smallest anything they could find, they found and denied it, they considered the claim
no good (Participant 20)
Lack of certification
A requirement of professions is to have extensive training and education (Kultgen 1988)

and to hold a credential certifying formal learning (Kimball 1995; Kultgen 1988). Government
auditors’ qualifications have been questioned by auditees, including auditees claiming to have
greater expertise than the auditor (Gendron et al. 2007). Thus, healthcare regulatory auditors,
such as the ZPICs, should have a professional background in healthcare and auditing. When
professional auditors, CPAs, are faced with performing a task that they do not have the
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knowledge or expertise to complete, these professionals may bring the desired expertise into the
audit team by hiring a specialist. In these circumstances, professional standards (AS 1210)
permit auditors to utilize a specialist contingent upon evaluating the specialist’s qualification and
the auditor understanding the work performed. Although the ZPIC auditors are encouraged to
have certain education requirements and certifications (CMS 2007), the results of this study
reveal that this does not appear to be the case, and calls into question the ZPIC auditors’
professional qualifications. Participants stated that several of their ZPIC auditors were former
police officers, which calls into question their health care forensic auditing expertise. There is
little evidence of ZPIC audit teams having an adequate level of expertise in audit evidence
gathering and evaluation, as well as industry (i.e. healthcare) knowledge. Several participants
called into question the ZPIC auditors’ professional background and qualifications.
•

•
•

... we also ran background checks on the [ZPIC] people. One was a disbarred financial
planner, one was a CPA that had his CPA license revoked, and the rest of them were all excops, what the hell do they know about healthcare? … so how can you look at clinical charts
and evaluate them if you’re not a clinician? ... we’re like “what did you make this clinical
decision on? you’re an ex-cop” (Participant 2)
… their background was in law enforcement … each one of them went through their
background, had nothing to do with healthcare (Participant 24)
... none of them are clinicians (Participant 25)
To obtain additional data on the ZPIC auditors’ professional backgrounds, a random

sample of 180 ZPIC auditors’ LinkedIn profiles were examined. The researcher searched
LinkedIn using a variety of key words, such as “Zone Program Integrity Contractor”, “ZPIC”
and the names of the various ZPIC firms. ZPIC auditors come from a variety of professional
backgrounds, including law enforcement, healthcare practitioners (e.g. physical therapists), and
medical claims analysis. Analysis of LinkedIn profiles suggests that there is a high level of
ZPIC auditors with law enforcement backgrounds. While healthcare practitioners may appear to
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be appropriate auditors, less than 16% of the profiles examined were classified as having a
healthcare background.
Proper credentials are required to be recognized as a profession (Kimball 1995). Of the
profiles examined, the most prevalent certification was a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE). Yet,
less than fourteen percent of the individuals in this sample claimed to be a CFE. 11 As the CFE
certification entails general anti-fraud knowledge (Courtois 2017), ZPIC auditors holding a
healthcare specific fraud examination certification, Accredited Health Care Fraud Investigator
(AHFI), was examined as well. Of the profiles examined, less than four percent held the AHFI
certification. Of the profiles examined, one CPA was identified. Thus, while financial statement
auditors are required to have university level education in accounting and auditing plus generally
experience working for an audit professional to become a licensed CPA, ZPIC auditors for the
most part do not appear to have established comparable professional level certification—a basic
expectation for any profession (Kimball 1995; Kultgen 1988).

Public Interest Orientation
While the Reports to Congress suggest significant benefits of ZPIC audit activity, they do
not discuss issues of public health and implications for non-fraudulent providers delivery of
services after having undergone a ZPIC audit (for example adverse impacts to quality of care or
providers refusing to treat patients with certain needs) (DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014; DHHS
2015c). Professions are allowed to exist in order to deliver services that serve society and

11

CFE license holders have questioned the rigor of the CFE certification exam and licensure screening process
(Courtois 2017)
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positively address societal issues and needs (Kultgen 1988; Abbott 1988). Auditees did have a
good understanding of the positive effects that could accrue from ZPIC audit activity:
•
•
•

… I do believe there is a benefit. ... It gets the doctors to take what they do, or how they
document what they do seriously. … so that in itself was a huge learning opportunity.
(Participant 22)
… if you were 99.9% compliant before, now you’re 99.99% compliant… (Participant 6)
… ZPICs … regularly engage in education and program integrity activities (DHHS 2014, pg
17)

Yet, not all auditees support the notion of the positive societal impact attributable to ZPIC audit
activity:
•
•

… to say there’s some education benefit to this … is garbage … it has been an insane
distraction for us, that really has zero benefit to the government and zero benefit to the
patient. So it’s just really a pretty sickening process. (Participant 13)
… ZPIC [gave] us nothing for denial reasons (Participant 10)
There are several negative implication to society arising from ZPIC auditor activity,

suggesting drawbacks of using nonprofessionalized auditors. Several participants expressed
intentions to respond to the ZPIC auditors and deter punishment by decreasing the number of
Medicare patients treated or to stop treating Medicare patients altogether. This is long standing
with healthcare providers changing operations (i.e. patient mix) in response to governmental
regulation (Blanchard et al. 1986; Eldenburg and Soderstrom 1996; Eldenburg and Kallapur
1997). If a sufficient number of providers stopped accepting Medicare due to ZPIC audits, it
limits the potential provider choices for Medicare consumers. Furthermore, with the expansion
of ZPIC auditors’ jurisdiction to Medicaid, it could limit the potential provider choices for
Medicaid consumers, as well as healthcare providers’ ability to sustain operations by
diversifying their services. For both Medicare and Medicaid patients, mobility and affordability
of traveling greater distances to seek providers is frequently not feasible. Despite the
ramifications, the audit outcomes necessitated changes as noted in the following:
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•
•
•
•

… we’re going to stop taking Medicare totally, because at least we know Medicaid is going
to pay. We got to meet our payroll. (Participant 6)
I had to stop taking Medicare today. I cannot afford to pay staff, phone, lights with no
financial relief. (Participant 10 archival document)
… we are making an assessment if we want to just stay away from Medicare patients all
together … this [audit] process bankrupt’s companies. (Participant 16)
... providers have voluntarily withdrawn from Medicare after the start of a targeted
investigation by our program integrity contractors (DHHS 2015a, pg. 15)
The potential for a company to close down due to a ZPIC regulatory audit is a salient

fear, as auditees have been forced to declare bankruptcy due to their ZPIC audit. These effects
are driven more by interim effects where the ZPIC auditors can freeze funds from Medicare for
an extensive time period pending resolution of purported fraud activity, even though actual
collections are ultimately quite low. Bankruptcies limit the number of providers availabe to
deliver Medicare services to those in need and presents issues for access to care for Medicare
beneficiares. The potential for auditees to simply close their doors after a ZPIC audit appears
very real.
•
•
•
•

… small mom and pop that are just a one location thing, if they ever faced this they’d be out
of business… (Participant 13)
… we’ve heard that there’s companies that completely shut down. And then when they go to
appeal the judge rules in their favor, but there’s no company any more (Participant 16)
… I bought one of my nursing homes because they had gotten hit and couldn’t survive this.
(Participant 2)
The ZPIC eventually caused us to sell… (Participant 21)
Examining the quality of care delivered by healthcare providers is largely overlooked by

accountants (Pflueger 2016). Hindered patient care adversely impacts patient satisfaction and
ultimately decreases the likelihood of a patient seeking medical aid when needed, complying
with a therapeutic regimen and maintaining a relationship with a physician (Larsen and Rootman
1976). Thus, not surprisingly, overseers of ZPIC auditors emphasize their commitment to
ensuring that operational disruption is minimal and quality of care is not adversely impacted.
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•
•

CMS is committed to ensuring that fraud prevention efforts do not place unnecessary
administrative and compliance burdens on legitimate providers nor interfere with their
business operations (DHHS, 2012, pg 34)
The FPS governance process ensures that the system’s ... sophisticated analytics minimize
impact on beneficiaries and legitimate providers and do not adversely affect the quality of
health care. ... Reducing fraud contributes to ensuring that beneficiaries have access to
quality health care. ... when fraud occurs, there are direct human costs (DHHS, 2012, pg 33).
Yet, several participants reported disrupted operations and/or hindered quality of care

during their ZPIC audit. One of the providers in the sample is the only provider in the region
that provides services over the weekend, thus without this provider, patients would have to wait
for services or simply not have services when needed, harming the public good. Another
participant described that despite being the largest provider in the country for a specific type of
service, part of their ZPIC audit settlement stated they were prohibited from continuing to
provide that service. This is particulary troubling given that “patient experience / satisfaction” is
a top priority of healthcare providers (The Beryl Institute 2015).
•

•
•

… I think the most challenging process was the allocation of resources and time spent from
our team that took us away from patient care. Because most of our really, really good
clinical nurse leaders needed to be putting these charts together [for the auditor] (Participant
3)
… do I think care was compromised? I most certainly do (Participant 34)
… the patients are the ones who are suffering. Absolutely the patients are the one’s who are
suffering (Participant 25)
Taken together, a picture comes together that suggests it is not uncommon for providers

subject to ZPIC audits to be at risk of declaring bankruptcy. Of the agencies in this study that
have been able to avoid declaring bankruptcy, several have expressed intentions to stop
delivering Medicare services. These two factors limit the number of providers operating that
will deliver Medicare services. Finally, of the agencies in this study that did continue delivering
Medicare services, several reported a decline in the qualty of care delivered. Thus, among the
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more limited set of providers available to deliver Medicare services, the quality of care was
lowered as a result of the ZPIC audits.
Choosing proper indicators to evaluate the performance of government auditors is
essential (Gendron et al. 2007), and the results of this study demonstrate that merely focusing on
the ROI of ZPIC audit activity does not provide a comprehensive understanding of their actions.
Further, the ROI that is used is based on flawed data. As professions are required to serve the
public (Kultgen 1988; Abbott 1988), the nature of the ZPIC audit process that elects not to
engage audit professionals is a failure to promote the very public interest that the audit process is
designed to provide. These results suggest additional consideration of the benefit of using audit
professionals to perform audits should be given with the inherent codes of conduct that reject
self-interested behavior adversely impacting society.

Discussion
While examining the use of nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit setting,
several differences from the results presented in the Reports to Congress were identified.
Throughout the interviews, participants discussed other healthcare regulatory auditors, and at
times making comparisons of these other auditors to the ZPIC auditors. The insights taken from
these interviews suggests that the findings noted above are not simply the result of having an
audit, but confined to the nature of the ZPIC audit process. Participants’ discussion of other
regulatory auditors highlights the distinctions from the ZPIC auditors:
•

…The government is more willing to help and work with you if it's not intentional fraud or
abuse. With the ZPICs it's more of 'this is what you're paying us, have a good day’
(Participant 3)
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•
•

•

… [ZPIC] main objective was to close down agencies… most auditors that I’ve been
through, their main objective is to come in and educate. … If you feel we need to be educated
fine educate us, but that’s not enough reason to shut an agency down. (Participant 25)
…[other auditors] do an entrance conference with us to kind of meet with the people that
they should meet with, establish the parameters of the survey ... most surveys we sort of get,
sort of an informal daily assessment “hey guys we found this, we saw this, we liked this,
we’re still looking for this” … they always do an exit interview at the end of the survey
where they say “here’s a list of our preliminary findings” and at that point we have an
opportunity to say you know “I’m confused about this” or “didn’t you see this piece of
paper” ... little minor issues are headed off at that point. … 9 out of 10 times of what they
said at the exit is what we actually see on the survey report. Once in a blue moon they put
something a little different of a twist in there ... There is a lot of feedback along the way …
[with ZPICs] It’s just a letter and then you submit your records, and then it’s another letter
saying you’re a criminal and you owe a gazillion dollars (Participant 13)
… what’s ironic is every single one of my agencies went through a survey, accreditation
survey ... And I went through a [audit] survey, and it went fine. And I went through an
[audit] survey, and I went through a state audit surveyor from [audit], so cause each branch
had a different requirement for survey, and I went through all 3 of them, no problems
(Participant 28)
Participants also discussed their interactions with their CPA firm that provides the annual

financial statement audit:
•
•

… [financial statement auditors] they’re good to deal with, and the banks we deal with seem
happy with the financials that are produced. (Participant 20)
…[financial statement auditors] they’re very client oriented. They come in they consult with
me, tell me what they think, tell me where I can improve it … from an accounting standpoint
we’re sparkling clean because we take care of suggestions and improve our operations. They
do an outstanding job. (Participant 21)
Participants also discussed their perceptions of the fraudsters that the ZPIC auditors were

able to identify. Overall, the participants were supportive of fraudsters being identified and even
shut down. This suggests that participants are supportive of the government’s initiatives to
identify fraud.
•
•
•

The ones that are blatantly across the board committing fraud, shut them down, I have no
problem with that… (Participant 25)
But if they [ZPIC] are there and you [provider] did commit fraud I’m happy as heck
(Participant 11)
… [convicted fraudsters] needed to be handled appropriately and should’ve been shut down
(Participant 32)
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Several factors may be contributing to the gap between how the Reports to Congress
discuss the ZPIC auditor’s performance and the results presented above. These factors may help
ensure that such a gap does not manifest in the public accounting profession as it becomes
increasingly de-professionalized (Dirsmith et al. 2015). Contributing factors may be the power
provided to the ZPICs, their incentive structure and the manner in which advanced technologies
are used.

Power
Actors in power can influence those with less power (Kipnis 1972). Such power may be
used to repress, censor or constrain those subject to this power (Foucault 1983). Holding such
power via resource dependence enables powerful actors to exert unethical demands on less
powerful actors (Palmer 2012; Marmor and Morone 2005). The ZPIC auditors exhibit
substantial resource dependence over auditees, as ZPIC auditors hold the power to suspend
Medicare cash flow (DHHS 2012). For example, if a provider derives fifty percent of their
revenue from Medicare, the ZPIC auditors have the ability to temporarily eliminate half of the
provider’s cash flow. Thus, ZPIC auditors are in a position of power over auditees. This is
substantially different from a financial statement auditing setting, as financial statement auditors
hold minimal, if any, power via resource dependence over auditees. Participants discussed the
ZPIC auditors’ use of this power, including exercising this power without communicating with
the auditee in a timely manner.
•

… we received a letter May 12th stating that we were on Medicare suspension effective May
6th. … on CMS letterhead from [ZPIC] signed by [ZPIC employee]. And that prior notice
of suspension was not provided because the [Medicare] trust funds would be harmed
(Participant 25)
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•
•

… letter said that we would be under suspension effective that day (Participant 33)
… even though [fiscal intermediary] controls the money, they respond to ZPIC. When ZPIC
says put a hold on this, they just put a hold on it mindlessly. (Participant 36)
While CPAs are held accountable by the PCAOB (PCAOB 2007; PCAOB 2008), such

oversight is not apparent for the ZPIC auditors. While CMS has the responsibility to oversee the
ZPIC auditors (CMS 2007), CMS appears to provide limited oversight over the ZPIC auditors
(DHHS 2011; Van Halem et al. 2012). 12 While inadequate oversight may result in ineffective
audit services being provided (Okma et al. 2011), limited oversight may also create an
opportunity for some ZPICs to exhibit behaviors perceived as unprofessional.
•
•
•

There’s a lot power at the ZPIC level right now, and that needs to be balanced … It is very
discouraging to downright criminal the abuse of power that we are currently seeing from the
ZPICs and other entities that are letting this happen such as CMS/[D]HHS (Participant 29)
Because they know that they are really putting us in a situation, and they have that power. ...
You give power to somebody … they know that they have the power to close you down and
take everything away (Participant 30)
… Essentially, ZPICs consider themselves above the law. Efforts to persuade them to
moderate or reverse course on any aspect have fallen on deaf ears. … The letter [ZPIC] sent
was from a manager, and not copied to or to our knowledge reviewed by any lawyer. The
admissions of extra statutory conduct and claims of immunity from statutory, regulatory, and
even policy manual protections is amazing. (attorney from archival documents)
Additionally, some participants highlighted that despite not being physicians, and having a

lower level of education than physicians, ZPICs have the power to override a physician’s
judgments.
•
•

… They can override a physician’s face to face that CMS put in place. They can override a
clinician’s determination (Participant 25)
…this is a nurse who’s questioning a physician’s orders (Participant 10)

12

Upon review of archival documents an attorney stated: “…the conduct of ZPICs here and elsewhere in this
country is outrageous. CMS’ failure to police the ZPICs and confine them to justifiable fraud investigation is also
unacceptable…”
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Taken together, this section demonstrates how ZPIC auditors are placed in a position of
power over auditees (DHHS 2012). This power becomes uninhibited with the lack of oversight
from government agencies (DHHS 2011), enabling behavior perceived as lacking
professionalism. The results suggest that ZPIC auditors willfully exercise their power by
imposing cash flow suspensions on auditees and by overriding the professional judgments of
individuals with high levels of domain knowledge.

Incentive structure
ZPIC firms compensation switched fairly recently from primarily cost reimbursement
(DHHS 2012; DHHS 2014) to the amount of fraudulent dollars reported (DHHS 2015c). Yet, a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of the ZPIC firms’ compensation contracts revealed
that ZPIC firms draw over 90% of their compensation from cost reimbursement, and that no
change in compensation structure occurred. Thus, ZPIC auditors are financially incentivized to
follow even frivolous leads which incur greater costs and increase the firm’s compensation.
ZPIC firms’ also have incentive to utilize audit procedures and interpretations of findings that
make them appear more successful, as their responsibilities are being consolidated by CMS with
their Medicaid counterparts to create Unified Program Integrity Contractors (UPICs). By
increasing their reported results, ZPIC firms can increase the likelihood of expanding their
jurisdiction and increasing future revenue through additional contract awards. As engaging in
self-interested behavior is prohibited for professionals, this type of conflict of interests is the
primary reason professional auditors are not allowed to charge contingent fees. This financial
incentive appears real as all but one of the ZPIC firms were awarded a UPIC contract. Evidence
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of anticipated expansion can be seen from participants receiving requests to submit Medicaid
documentation for requests.
•
•

… they said “we need 40 charts, only this time we need your Medicare and we need 40 more
on your Medicaid side”… on the Medicaid side, I said “I didn’t know you were allowed to-”
“it’s a pilot program, and this is the way we’re doing things now” (Participant 11)
… [attorney] stated that they didn’t have authority to request the Medicaid records
(Participant 16)
These results demonstrate how the cost reimbursement compensation structure provides an

incentive for ZPIC auditors to perform inefficient work and to impose additional work on auditees.
This method of creating an appearance of competence and thoroughness appears to be effective
given the first UPIC jurisdiction contract was awarded to a former ZPIC auditor. Additionally,
although only one UPIC jurisdiction has been awarded to date, two former ZPIC audit firms were
awarded ad hoc contracts.

Use of advanced technologies (FPS)
Using advanced technologies, such as data analytics, can enable auditors to reduce time spent on
labor intensive tasks and reallocate this time to judgment intensive tasks (Brown-Liburd et al.
2015; Agnew 2016b; Raphael 2017). Although data analytics are more effective at identifying
statistical outliers, these outliers may merely represent false positives (Vasarhelyi et al. 2015;
Yoon et al. 2015), that have legitimate explanations (Kogan et al. 2014). As the potential
usefulness of data analytics are limited by the capabilities of the human users (Alles and Gray
2015), training auditors to effectively use data analytics is essential. When decision makers use
data analytic tools to aid in their decision making, relying on the analytics without understanding
the process used by the analytic results in a missed opportunity for the decision maker to learn
from their mistakes (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013). Thus, there is a missed opportunity
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for the decision maker to enhance their expertise and results in hindering their professional
development. Subsequent to the FPS identifying an outlier, ZPIC auditors may feel pressure to
report an error associated with the identified outlier, as the outlier by definition represents a highrisk account or transaction. This is concerning given the level of specialization in the healthcare
industry (Mashaw and Marmor 1994; Cassel and Reuben 2011), which by the nature of
specialization yields outliers that will not appear typical but are clearly explainable. Concerns
expressed by participants regarding the use of the FPS provide insights to this problem:
•

•

… just to be presumed guilty by a statistical analytic, has never been done before. … they
said anybody in our sample … because they were statistical outliers, we’re assuming you did
something wrong and therefore we’re not paying you. … every bill that was pulled was
denied 100 cents on the dollar, denied, because statistically it didn’t make sense to
somebody. … There’s no concept of an average family because the average family has one
and three quarter kids, so it doesn’t exist. Statistically you can have an outlier, but that
doesn’t mean you did anything wrong … (Participant 6)
… [the physician] came up on somebody’s radar and because he’s a specialist, he’s geriatric,
so 70% of his patients are all going to be in the Medicare aged… (Participant 29)
Despite the potential benefit for data analytics to identify high risk audit areas, these

results highlight challenges to implementing data analytics into a highly specialized industry,
specifically healthcare. The ZPIC auditors may feel compelled to report findings identified by
the analytics, as the highest risk areas have purportedly been identified. Thus, the FPS may
provide justification for the ZPIC auditors’ behavior.

Conclusion
Increased competition in the audit market has resulted in increased pressure for firms to
reduce audit fees (Dirsmith et al. 2015). This fee pressures has led to the commodification of
audit services. Technology enabled tools promise to further enable the commodification of
services, as these tools enhance firms ability to disseminate centralized knowledge and control
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auditors’ ability to exercise professional judgment (Dowling and Leech 2014). To the degree the
audit process can be defined by a series of mechanistic procedures, the greater the potential for
audit professionals to be replaced with lesser trained nonprofessionals. Commodifying
professional services results in commercialization of a profession—a transformation from a
profession to an industry.
Two distinct camps discuss the use of commercialization tactics by professions. While
one camp views professions engaging in commercialization tactics as shifting from an
economically disinterested expert to an entrepreneur (Abbott 1988; Reed 1996), the other camp
views professions engaging in commercialization tactics as seeking to deliver additional needed
services to society (Dirsmith et al. 2015).
This study reports the results of constructing nonprofessionalized auditors to examine the
use of nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit context. Results from this study illustrate
issues of using nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit setting, and how these auditors’
practices adversely impact society. Despite the ZPIC auditors’ creation to fight fraud, of the
fines participants in this study incurred, none were fraud related. All fines reported in this study
were related to alleged insufficient documentation. The demands the ZPIC auditors placed on
providers has in many cases resulted in patient care suffering, which in extreme cases may lead
to death. While accounting devices such as the FPS may be used to remake and define the
patient in accounting terms in an attempt to reduce waste (Kurunmäki 1999; Llewellyn 1998;
Preston 1992; Samuel et al. 2005; Covaleski et al. 1993), such devices can blur the line between
cost and caring (Llewellyn 1998; Samuel et al. 2005).
The results of this study are particularly concerning, as the public accounting profession
has been exhibiting a trend toward declining professionalism (Dirsmith et al. 2015). If the public
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accounting profession continues de-professionalizing, potentially even to the point that society
no longer sees the need for the profession to retain its monopolistic rights over financial
statement auditing, similar results to those seen in this study that are associated with using
nonprofessionalized auditors may manifest in the public accounting profession. Research has
already noted the lack of focus by public accountants on serving the public interest (Cooper and
Robson 2006). Although the public accounting profession seeks to expand its services (Gendron
and Barrett 2004; O’Dwyer 2011; Suddaby et al. 2009), it is imperative that public accounting
seeks to rebuild and regain its professional stature.
Despite the attempted transparency of ZPIC audit activity through Reports to Congress,
these reports focus on financial numbers and do not discuss the real societal implications of
ZPIC audit activity (i.e., patient care suffering and providers refusing Medicare patients). This is
consistent with actor’s manipulating information in order to achieve certain ends (Nizet and
Rigaux 2014; Goffman 1959), such as using language to manage public impressions to aid in
legitimization (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Hopwood 2009), and governments focusing on
outputs and not expertise (Gendron et al. 2007). Additionally, the Reports to Congress seem to
present improper payments identified by the ZPICs, not improper payments recollected by CMS
(DHHS 2015b; OIG 2017a). Over one third of appeals are ruled entirely in the provider’s favor
(DHHS 2015c), and evidence from the sample indicates that partially favorable decisions
through appeal result in substantially reduced fines. Thus, it is vital for effective oversight to
consider a range of metrics to evaluate the success of nonprofessionalized auditors, such as the
ZPICs. It is for this reason that professions are often allowed to exist and self-regulate—it is
difficult for those that are not a part of the profession to assess the level of performance in such
services.
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Like any research study, this paper is subject to limitations. The first limitation is
attributable to the sample size. While a limited number of individuals were interviewed it is
possible that other ZPIC auditees would have constructed their ZPIC auditors more positively,
however the results of the study are consistent with the practitioner literature of issues identified
with ZPIC audits. Similarly, the sample does not extend to providers that were actually found
guilty of fraud. While human subjects research approval was obtained to interview prisoners, to
date the researcher has been unable to reach any volunteers in this population willing to be
interviewed. Further, participants from all seven zones did not participate in this study, and all
four ZPIC firms were not included in the sample. While it is possible that different individuals
would have constructed their audit experience differently from the other ZPIC firm not included
in the study, there is no compelling reason to believe that this would be the case, and no
substantial distinctions between ZPIC firms are noted in the practitioner literature. Finally, the
study began with a convenience sample, then additional participants were pursued in potentially
underrepresented groups to enhance validity and reliability.
The results of this study present a glimpse at examining nonprofessionalized auditors in a
critical audit setting. Future research may seek to examine how other nonprofessionalized auditors
act in a professional setting. Throughout the data collection process, some individuals speculated
that the ZPIC auditors are focusing a disproportionate amount of resources on smaller/minority
providers, which would be consistent with prior research’s discussion of political markets targeting
those with disproportionately lower resources (Marmor and Morone 2005). This is an example of
previous research discussing how technology may be misused to target certain groups or
individuals (Newell and Marabelli 2015) such as the indigenous, low-income and women (Everett
et al. 2007). While larger providers have successfully resisted activity of healthcare regulatory
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auditors (as demonstrated by American Hospital Association vs. Kathleen Sebelius 13), small
organizations may be unable to make their story visible (Roberts 2015), allowing a phenomena, in
this case the ZPIC audit tactics, to go undetected by society (Neu et al. 2015) and remain a secret
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Future research may seek to examine if nonprofessionalized auditors
are more likely than professional auditors to focus a disproportionate amount of resources on risks
related to smaller/minority agents. The Reports to Congress describing the ZPIC activity have
cited the “Sentinel Effect” as an added benefit of ZPIC audit activity, suggesting that providers
will be less inclined to engage in fraudulent activity subsequent to hearing about the ZPIC auditors’
capabilities. Yet, empirical evidence of the Sentinel Effect in a fraud setting does not appear to
exist. Future research may seek to examine the impact the examples of audit procedures and tactics
noted in the paper are having on providers not yet subjected to a ZPIC audit and their viability in
reducing fraud risk, an area gaining increasing attention in the literature (Power 2013).

13

This lawsuit focused on the location of patient care (inpatient vs outpatient) for billing purposes. Recovery Audit
Contractors were denying reimbursement of inpatient claims, stating the services should have been provided
outpatient. By the time the denial was made, hospitals were beyond the timeframe to bill for outpatient services,
thus received no revenue for services provided. The ruling stated that if an inpatient claim was rejected, an
extension would be granted to resubmit the claim for outpatient reimbursement.
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STUDY TWO: THE IMPACT OF DATA ANALYTICS ON AUDITORS’
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS
Introduction
Recent advances in technology have caused auditors and firms to increase their use of
data analytics (Deloitte 2010; AICPA 2015a; Coffey 2015; Ernst and Young 2015a). Advances
in technology have facilitated development of more sophisticated data analytical tools and hold
great promise for implementation into the audit process. These new analytical tools extend audit
capabilities by enabling testing of entire populations to identify all outliers based on established
criteria (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014; Sinclair 2015; Raphael 2017; Agnew 2016b; Titera
2013; Alles 2014; Gray and Debreceny 2014; Richins et al. 2017; Huerta and Jensen 2017; Jans
et al. 2010). Additionally, data analytics can be used for predictive modeling (Kuenkaikaew and
Vasarhelyi 2013; Statistical Analysis System (SAS) Institute 2014; Krahel and Titera 2015),
cluster analysis (Thiprungsri and Vasarhelyi 2011) and unstructured data analysis such as text
and videos (Holton 2009; Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Yoon et al. 2015; Warren et al. 2015; PCAOB
2016; Agnew 2016; IAASB 2017; Raphael 2017). Data analytics hold the potential to
fundamentally change the audit process by greatly reducing the distinction between analytical
procedures and substantive testing (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014). Furthermore, data
analytics may help minimize the risk of failing to identify an existing misstatement, resulting in
improved audit quality and effectiveness, and greater value for audit stakeholders (Agnew
2016b; Raphael 2017; Titera 2013).
While data analytics hold the potential to fundamentally change the audit process, prior
research examining the impact of data analytics on auditors’ decisions is limited. Rose et al.
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(2017) examines the impact of the timing of data analytics visualizations and processing mode
has on auditors incorporating data analytics into their judgments. The results demonstrate that
auditors are not effective at identifying patterns in data analytics visualizations when viewed
before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). Further, the question of whether auditors
will incorporate the information generated from the data analytics into their decision process is
unknown. Prior research examining other decision aiding tools indicate that auditors do not
always incorporate the information into their decisions (Sutton et al. 1995). This may be
attributable to auditors reluctance to investigate identified risks, as auditors face criticism from
supervisors when no error is identified subsequent to investigating such risks (Brazel et al. 2016).
Thus, while data analytics may be very effective at identifying audit relevant information that
can improve the audit process, the use of data analytics may be constrained by the decision
maker (Alles and Gray 2015). The mere availability of these tools is insufficient to improve
decision maker performance, as no improvement in performance will be observed if these tools
are not used (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003). While incorporating data analytics into
the audit process has several practical implications, such as reducing labor intensive tasks and
allowing auditors to focus more on judgment intensive tasks (AICPA 2015a; Brown-Liburd et al.
2015; Agnew 2016; Raphael 2017), if auditors refuse to use data analytics these benefits will not
be realized.
The incorporation of these new data analytical tools into the audit process is highlighted
by a joint initiative between the AICPA and CPA Canada encouraging increased use of data
analytics in the audit process (Coffey 2015) as well as the development of data analytical
standards by the AICPA’s Assurance Services Executive Committee (ASEC) (AICPA 2015b;
Appelbaum et al. 2017; AICPA 2017). The IAASB has also expressed interest in increasing the

63

use of data analytics in the audit process to in an effort to enhance audit quality (IAASB 2017).
This demonstrates that data analytics will play a more pronounced role during the audit process;
thus, examining the impact of various inputs, such as the type of data analytical model and type
of data analyzed, on auditors’ decisions is essential. If auditors do not adequately understand the
analysis performed by the data analytics and properly utilize these analytics, the result is a
potential missed opportunity to improve the audit process and audit quality (PCAOB 2016). The
purpose of this study is to examine whether auditors’ decisions are impacted by the type of data
analytical models used and the type of data analyzed by the models.
A 2 X 2 experimental design is used to examine the impact of the type of data analytical
model (predictive vs. anomaly) and type of data analyzed (financial vs. nonfinancial) on the
decisions of 98 auditors. Anomaly models identify unusual activities by performing a
distributional (bell curve) analysis to identify outliers that may warrant additional scrutiny (SAS
2014). Predictive models use forward-looking analytics that analyze patterns of previously
identified issues and compare them to current patterns, creating the potential to identify issues
before they occur (Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013). Although prior archival research
demonstrates that predictive models can help identify heightened fraud risk (Perols et al. 2017;
Dechow et al. 2011), it is unclear if auditors use these models. Further, these data analytical
models are capable of analyzing unstructured nonfinancial data, which creates new opportunities
for auditors to identify audit relevant information from sources such as e-mails, phone calls and
board minutes (Warren et al. 2015; Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Agnew 2016; PCAOB 2016).
Using cognitive fit theory, auditors are predicted to have greater cognitive fit with data
analytics generated using anomaly models. Cognitive fit occurs when there is congruence
between the method or process used by a decision maker and a decision facilitating tool (Vessey
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and Galletta 1991; Arnold and Sutton 1998; Al-Natour et al. 2008). Auditors are experienced in
using analytical procedures, which are similar, albeit simpler, versions of anomaly models (Hirst
and Koonce 1996; Cohen et al. 2000; Asare et al. 2000; Glover et al. 2005; Brazel et al. 2009;
Brewster 2011; Brazel et al. 2014) and are more familiar with using anomaly models. Predictive
models have been noted as more accurate and reliable than other analytical models and are most
suitable for complex patterns as they can identify otherwise undetectable and seemingly
unrelated patterns (SAS 2014; DHHS 2015). Unfortunately, auditors are largely unfamiliar with
the methods used by predictive models, thus these models will likely have lower cognitive fit
with an auditor’s decision making process. Auditors are not as effective at analyzing
nonfinancial data as compared to financial data (Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel et al. 2009; Brazel et
al. 2014). Thus, auditors’ judgments are expected to be more impacted by the results of data
analytics using financial data due to high cognitive fit.
The results of the study indicate that neither the type of data analytical model nor the type
of data analyzed affects auditors’ fraud risk assessment or reliance. Interestingly, the two
variables have an interactive impact on budgeted hours. Specifically, when financial data is
analyzed, auditors increase budgeted audit hours more when this data is analyzed by predictive
models compared to anomaly models. The opposite is true when nonfinancial data is analyzed,
as auditors increased budgeted audit hours more when this data is analyzed by anomaly models
compared to predictive models.
The results of this study have implications for practice and research alike. The
implications of this study are timely and important given the interest to increase the use of data
analytics throughout the audit process from the AICPA and CPA Canada (Coffey 2015), the
IAASB (IAASB 2017) and the AICPA’s development of data analytical standards (AICPA
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2015b; Appelbaum et al. 2017; AICPA 2017). Furthermore, public accounting firms and
government agencies have demonstrated a commitment to incorporating data analytics into their
respective audits (DHHS 2015; Ernst and Young 2015b; Wall Street Journal MoneyBeat 2015).
The results of this study suggest that while data analytics impact decisions uniformly for certain
tasks (i.e., fraud risk assessments), decisions for other tasks (i.e., determining budgeted audit
hours) are jointly impacted by the type of data analytics used and the type of data analyzed. This
study contributes to the literature on the impact data analytics have on auditors’ decisions.
Research on data analytics impacting auditors’ decisions is limited to demonstrating that the
timing of viewing the results of analytics impacts auditors’ judgments (Rose et al. 2017). This is
the first study to show that the new types of data analytics and data analyzed have a joint impact
on auditors’ judgments. Additionally, this study provides initial evidence that different types of
data analytics impact budgeted audit hours decisions.
The remainder of this paper is comprised of four sections. The following section discusses
insights from the academic literature into the use of data analytics and auditors’ judgment and
decision making. Section three discusses the research methods. The fourth section discusses the
results of this study. The final section presents a discussion of the findings and concluding
remarks.

Background
Data Analytics
As technology advances, the capability of and interest in analytics, including the analysis
of unprecedentedly large data sets, in the accounting literature has expanded (Alles and Gray
2015). In line with the expansion of capabilities of analytics, the AICPA’s Assurance Services
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Committee (ASEC) is developing an “Audit Data Analytics Guide” to replace the Analytical
Procedures Guide, suggesting that these new data analytics are an outgrowth and expansion of
analytical procedures (AICPA 2015b; Appelbaum et al. 2017). Thus, analytical procedures can
be viewed as a predecessor and subset of data analytics. Data analytics entail a greater ability to
disaggregate and perform analyses than analytical procedures (Titera 2013), holding the potential
to perform more sophisticated analyses and obtain better insights from data (PWC 2015). Audit
data analytics are defined as “… the science and art of discovering and analyzing patterns,
identifying anomalies, and extracting other useful information in data underlying or related to the
subject matter of an audit through analysis, modeling, and visualization for the purpose of
planning or performing the audit” (AICPA 2017). The Data Analytics Guide identifies various
uses for data analytics during the audit process, including risk assessment, testing controls, and
substantive testing (AICPA 2017). Similar to the AICPA’s ASEC committee, the IAASB has
established the Data Analytics Working Group (DAWG) (IAASB 2017). The primary objectives
of the IAASB’s DAWG is to determine how to effectively use data analytics in the audit process
to enhance audit quality and to consider revising international standards to allow for data
analytics to be used in the audit process (IAASB 2017). Furthermore, Chief Audit Executives of
Fortune 500 corporations revealed that data analytics are drastically changing their
organization’s internal audit processes (Rose et al. 2017).
The expansion of database sizes and analysis capabilities provides new opportunities on
how to utilize data analytics (Warren et al. 2015). Improving analytical abilities over datasets
may be utilized to identify new audit relevant information (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014;
Jans et al. 2010), and improve fraud prevention and detection initiatives (Brivot and Gendron
2011; Jans et al. 2014; Smith 2016; Titera 2013; Jans et al. 2010). New methods of analysis
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including pattern recognition, data mining, and language processing are now available (Yoon et
al. 2015). Several papers in a recent Accounting Horizons special issue on data analytics discuss
the use of nonfinancial measures (e.g., Yoon et al. 2015; Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Warren et al.
2015). Additionally, new data such as video surveillance, news videos, cell phone videos
(Vasarhelyi et al. 2015), e-mails and social media postings (Warren et al. 2015) can now be
analyzed. Auditors must implement new audit techniques enabled by these tools to keep pace
with the changing business environment (Rezaee et al. 2002).
Incorporating data analytics into the audit process has several practical implications, such
as reducing labor intensive tasks and allowing auditors to focus more on judgment intensive
tasks (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Agnew 2016b; Raphael 2017). This will facilitate faster and
more comprehensive auditing (Raphael 2017). The ability to analyze entire populations in
conjunction with expanding visualization capabilities has the potential to enhance audit quality
and create more value for audit stakeholders (Sinclair 2015; Agnew 2016b; Raphael 2017). Yet,
incorporating these data analytics into the audit process will likely require expanding the analysis
capabilities of audit teams (Richins et al. 2017). An example of how data analytics can identify
audit relevant information can be seen from process mining, the examination of chronological
records of computer system activities (Jans et al. 2014; Jans et al. 2010). Jans et al. (2014)
conducted process mining of event logs of procurement data to identify transactions containing
audit-relevant information such as payments made without approval. The results demonstrate
that data analytics can be used to identify financial accounting exceptions, breakdowns in
internal control and even possible fraud using nonfinancial data. This study also demonstrates
how social network analysis may be used to facilitate identification of collusion.
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Auditors use technology enabled tools, such as computer-assisted audit techniques
(CAATs) (Janvrin et al. 2009). Thus, auditors are expected to use other technology enabled
tools, such as data analytics. Auditors typically use CAATs to facilitate their understanding of
the client systems and business processes, to test computer controls and to evaluate fraud risks
(Janvrin et al. 2009). While it is less common for auditors to use CAATs for substantive testing
(Janvrin et al. 2009), data analytics provide an opportunity to facilitate substantive testing (Jans
et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014). Auditors are more likely to use computer-related audit
procedures and IT specialists when control risk is set as less than maximum, suggesting that such
technology enabled tools are more commonly used for lower risk functions (Janvrin et al. 2009).
As larger firms tend to have more CAAT resources readily available to their staff (Banker et al.
2002; O’Donnell and Schultz 2003), auditors at larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to
use CAATs (Janvrin et al. 2009). Auditors are more likely to use CAATS when they have
greater expectations of the CAATs, greater organizational pressure to use CAATs and greater
technical support infrastructure to implement CAATs (Bierstaker et al. 2014). The mere
availability of these tools is insufficient to improve decision maker performance, as no
improvement in decision maker performance will be observed if such tools are not used by the
decision maker (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003).
Prior research on data analytics has focused on developing data analytics for more
effective outlier identification (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014), however there is a lack of
research examining auditors’ use of data analytics (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). As previously
stated, data analytics can be viewed as an outgrowth of analytical procedures. While the focus of
this study is on auditors’ decisions using data analytics, an area receiving limited attention from
the prior literature, additional insights on this topic can be obtained from examining auditors’ use

69

of analytical procedures (see Messier et al. 2013 for a review). Analytical procedures are often
used by auditors during planning, and have been shown to influence auditors’ nature, timing and
extent of substantive testing (Asare et al. 2000). Analytical procedures aid auditors, particularly
more experienced auditors, in making more effective fraud risk assessments (Knapp and Knapp
2001). The results of analytical procedures impact auditors’ judgments more when auditing high
risk clients (O’Donnell and Schultz 2005). Auditors perceive analytical procedures as stronger
when they present a lower risk of misstatement (Glover et al. 2005). Additionally, altering the
presentation of the results of analytical procedures has been shown to lead to more effective
decisions (O’Donnell and Schultz 2003; Knechel et al. 2010; Brewster 2011).
PCAOB inspections have identified several deficiencies in auditors’ use of analytical
procedures (PCAOB 2007a; PCAOB 2007b; PCAOB 2008). This suggests that auditors may not
be using analytical procedures properly (Messier et al. 2013). As data analytics may be viewed
out an outgrowth of analytical procedures, such improper use may continue for auditors’ use of
data analytics. Deficiencies identified by the PCAOB relating to auditors’ use of analytical
procedures include auditors insufficiently investigating unexpected fluctuations identified by
analytical procedures (PCAOB 2008).
Although prior research has focused on auditors’ use of analytical procedures using
financial measures (Asare et al. 2000; Knapp and Knapp 2001; O’Donnell and Schultz 2005),
research has also examined the incorporation of nonfinancial measures in analytical procedures
(Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel et al. 2009; Trompeter and Wright 2010; Brazel et al. 2014).
Nonfinancial measures can be used to develop more precise expectations for analytical
procedures (Trompeter and Wright 2010). Examples of nonfinancial measures that can be used
in analytical procedures include employee headcount, production space, warehouse space,
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trading volume, retail space, economic conditions, industry changes, growth, and market
penetration (Amir and Lev 1996; Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel et al. 2009; Brazel et al. 2014).
Industry specific examples of nonfinancial measures may be valuable as well; for example, in the
healthcare industry, the change in the number of provider locations can be considered in
conjunction with the change in assets and/or revenue (Brazel et al. 2009). Nonfinancial
measures are often less complex to determine than financial measures and verification is often
more straightforward (e.g. number of employees vs. oil and gas reserve) (Brazel et al. 2009).
Despite the benefits of nonfinancial measures, auditors experience difficultly
incorporating nonfinancial measures into their analytical procedures as compared to financial
measures (Cohen et al. 2000; Trompeter and Wright 2010). Rather, auditors focus more on
analytics using financial data (Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel et al. 2014) and only respond to
inconsistent results presented from financial and nonfinancial measures when prompted to do so
(Brazel et al. 2014). As inconsistencies among financial and nonfinancial measures are greater
among firms where fraud has occurred, analytical procedures using nonfinancial measures have
the ability to enhance fraud identification (Brazel et al. 2009). This may be attributable to
nonfinancial measures not being the focus of manipulation by management while engaging in
fraudulent financial reporting (Cullinan and Sutton 2002).
Prior research on nonfinancial data focuses on structured data (i.e., employee headcount,
warehouse space) (Brazel et al. 2014), that has organizational rigor and can be analyzed (Huerta
and Jensen 2017). In addition to structured nonfinancial data (i.e., employee headcount), more
opportunities are arising to transform and analyze unstructured nonfinancial data (Huerta and
Jensen 2017), which accounts for 90% of all data (Syed et al. 2013). Such structuring presents
an opportunity to identify audit relevant information (Borthick and Pennington 2017; Richins et
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al. 2017). Unstructured data refers to data lacking organizational rigor (Beath et al. 2012;
Davenport et al. 2012), and structuring this data into a format suitable for analysis can be very
challenging (Huerta and Jensen 2017). Nevertheless, unstructured data is expected to play a
more prominent role in decision making (Richins et al. 2017). Although many companies have
been collecting unstructured data, they are uncertain how to effectively leverage this new
information source (Earley 2015). For example, the SEC has used satellite imagines to help
uncover accounting fraud (SEC 2017).
Language processing tools are now available that can analyze unstructured data such as
e-mails, social media postings (i.e., Facebook, LinkedIn, twitter), video surveillance, news
videos and cell phone videos (Holton 2009; Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Raphael 2017; Huerta and
Jensen 2017). Deloitte’s new tool “Argus’ performs text analysis of leases to determine
differences in terminology across a population of leases (Raphael 2017). CEOs use of vocal
cognitive dissonance markers is associated with a greater likelihood of a restatement (Hobson et
al. 2012). Firms use lower levels of pessimistic language in press releases than corresponding
MD&A’s, as press releases are less regulated (Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012). Poor
environmental performers use language that is more optimistic and less certain in their
environmental disclosures than strong environmental performers (Cho et al. 2010). Additionally,
firms with unusually optimistic disclosures are subject to more litigation (Rogers et al. 2011).
Firms with more positive forward looking statements in their MD&A exhibit better current
performance, lower accruals, have a lower market-to-book ratio and have lower return volatility
(Li 2010). Firms that use more negative words in their annual reports utilize more aggressive tax
planning strategies (Law and Mills 2015). Additionally, current earnings is negatively associated
with the extent of R&D disclosures (Merkley 2014). Certain linguistic cues are associated with
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fraudulent financial firm’s disclosures, such as more activation language, words, imagery,
pleasantness and group references. Such disclosures are of greater length in an attempt to appear
more credible; however substantive content included is minimal (Humpherys et al. 2011).
Furthermore, tone used in MD&A may be used to predict bankruptcies (Mayew et al. 2015).
Finally, the language used in twitter posts is associated with stock price (Sul et al. 2014) and
earnings (Bartov et al. 2018).
E-mails are a significant unstructured data source for forensic accounting investigations
(Clopton et al. 2014). Analyzing unstructured data, such as e-mails, have been used by
regulators during lawsuits and forensic accounting investigations, including the FTC and DOJ
(Beach and Schiefelbein 2014; Torpey et al. 2010; Torpey et al. 2009). E-mails may present
audit relevant information for identifying missing journal entries (Clopton and Callahan 2017).
Analyzing e-mails are not limited to key word searches (Clopton et al. 2014). E-mail tone may
be analyzed as well to identify conspiratorial tone (Clopton and Callahan 2017; Ernst and Young
2013).
Despite the advances in data analytics, there are still limitations to their usefulness. The
identification of new audit relevant information may be categorized as either violations of
business process rules or significant statistical deviations from the steady state of business
(Kogan et al. 2014). The identification of an outlier is not a guarantee of an error (Kogan et al.
2014), and data analytics may merely identify false positives (Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Yoon et al.
2015). Thus, while data analytics may facilitate more effective identification of outliers, these
outliers may have a reasonable explanation (Kogan et al. 2014). In certain circumstances
analytical procedures may be unable to identify the existence of error or fraud (Cullinan and
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Sutton 2002); however, the ability to detect an existing fraud will arguably be more prevalent
with the use of data analytics (Smith 2016).
The effectiveness of data analytics will be limited if auditors do not incorporate the
findings from these analytics into their decision making process (Davis et al. 1989; Venkatesh et
al. 2003). As auditors prefer to rely on simple analytical procedures (Ameen and Strawser 1994;
Trompeter and Wright 2010), and data analytics are an advanced form of analytical procedures,
auditors may be reluctant to rely on data analytics. Decision makers may not use accounting
information when presented to them (Hodge et al. 2004; Janvrin et al. 2013). Information
provided by data analytics may be so large that it overwhelms auditors (Brown-Liburd et al.
2015; Issa and Kogan 2014). Although many correlations may be identified, some may represent
spurious correlations (Richins et al. 2017). Overwhelming accountants, including auditors, with
information hinders decision making (Iselin 1988; Stocks and Harrell 1995; Chewning and
Harrell 1990; Simnett 1996; Casey 1980). Thus, while data analytics may be able to identify
new audit relevant information, viewing all of this information may hinder auditors’ ability to
effectively incorporate it into their decision making process and affect their final decisions.
Additional factors that may inhibit auditors’ use of data analytics include a client refusing
to provide data, not reporting data in a useable format, or providing unreliable data. Auditors’
concerns over a data breach may inhibit them from collecting client data (Pentland 2014). Auditors
may be reluctant to use data analytics as a previously existing misstatement may be identified.
Additionally, subsequent to identifying risks, auditors must perform additional work to examine
these risks (AICPA 2017). Auditors’ legal liability is higher when a fraud risk is identified but
follow up work does not identify fraud, compared to when no fraud risk is identified (Reffett 2010).
Thus, auditors may seek to avoid identifying risks in order to minimize litigation risk.
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Data Analytical Models
Data analytical models can be grouped into four distinct groups (DHHS 2014). The first
type of model is an anomaly model that identifies data exhibiting abnormal patterns compared to
the peer group; for example, an anomaly model could identify a credit card with more charges
for televisions than 99% of all other credit cards in a single day. The second type of model is a
predictive model that analyzes patterns of previously identified issues and compares them to
current patterns; for example, a predictive model could compare known characteristics of
improper credit card charges and identify new charges with similar characteristics. This is an
innovative feature of data analytics, as it allows the models to adapt and independently create
new models subsequent to gathering sufficient data (Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013). The
third type of model is a rules-based model that identifies data based on predetermined criteria;
for example, a rules-based model could a charge for a television in Florida while the cardholder
lives in California. The fourth type of model is a network model that performs link analysis; for
example, a network model could identify a credit card associated with a phone number that was
linked to another card with fraudulent charges (DHHS 2014). Of these four models, a Report to
Congress places greatest emphasis on the use of predictive models, specifically stating, “A single
predictive model is often as effective as multiple non-predictive models” (DHHS 2015, pg.9).
Prior research on analytical procedures has focused primarily on similar, but less
sophisticated, versions of anomaly models (Hirst and Koonce 1996; Asare et al. 2000; Cohen et
al. 2000; Glover et al. 2005; Brazel et al. 2009; Brewster 2011). Thus, auditors are experienced
with the mental processes required to incorporate the results from anomaly models into their
decision making. Anomaly analytical models use a distributional (bell curve) analysis to identify
observations that are outliers (i.e., three standard deviations from the mean) in relation to the
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distribution of other observations (SAS 2014). Examples from the healthcare industry of
anomaly models include the following: a provider that bills for a greater quantity of a particular
service in a given day than 99% of similar providers in the same area, treating an abnormally
high number of patients, performing an abnormally high number of procedures, having a high
ratio of patients from outside the practice area, and high patient lengths of stay (DHHS 2014;
SAS 2014).
Anomaly models seek to identify an observation that is significantly different from other
observations within the same dataset. A limitation of anomaly models is that they may merely
identify false positives. For example, a specialist at a teaching hospital that is nationally known
may take only extremely complex cases; yet, anomaly detection models would identify this
specialist as an outlier and a potential fraudster. Another limitation of anomaly models is that
fraudsters may become aware of detection thresholds, and be able to elude detection by
remaining just below such thresholds (SAS 2014).
Predictive models offer forward-looking analytics, and provide the potential to identify
fraud before it occurs (Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013) and predicting future sales demand or
stock performance (Schneider et al. 2015). Predictive models “analyze patterns and past
performance in relationships to a particular desired outcome to predict the probability of that
outcome” (SAS 2012b, pg. 2). For example, previous frauds can be analyzed, and the strongest
variables can be combined into an algorithm and applied to current data to identify otherwise
undetectable patterns, which may be indicative of fraud. Predictive models are gaining increased
popularity today, and several examples of their applications are discussed in a recent edition of
the Harvard Business Review (See Figure 2 for examples) (Mankins and Sherer 2014; Mccarthy
2014a; Elton and Arkell 2014; Frick 2014; Choucair et al. 2014; Mccarthy 2014b; Boudreau
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2014; McGrath 2014; Reinartz and Rajkumar 2014; Mills 2014; Fox 2014). While predictive
analytical models are able to quickly adapt to new schemes, they are limited to identifying
fraudulent behavior that is previously known (SAS 2014). By identifying early indicators of
fraud before fraud actually transpires, predictive analytics allow organizations to optimize their
resources by instituting corrective action before potentially harmful behavior occurs (SAS
2012b; Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013). Within a healthcare setting, predictive models can
aid fraud investigators in determining which new clinics are potentially fictitious prior to
commencing fraudulent billing. Other models would only be able to identify a clinic after the
fraud has occurred, and the clinic has potentially shut down, making the collection of the funds
much more resource intensive.
Predictive data analytical models can detect fraudulent filings (AAERs) (Dechow et al.
2011; Perols et al. 2017). Predictive data analytical models have identified that firms are more
likely to file fraudulent financial statements subsequent to reversing abnormally high accruals
(Dechow et al. 2011). Large earnings growth dispersion can be used to predict future
restatements of macroecnomic factors (i.e., GDP) by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) (Nallareddy and Ogneva 2017). Predictive data analytical models can facilitate asset
valuations (Sinclair 2015), and forecasting cash flows interest rates and future revenue changes
(Agnew 2016b). There is limited academic research examining whether auditors use predictive
data analytical models, which suggests that these models are not commonly used in practice and
auditors may not be knowledgeable on how to appropriately use the results from these models.
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Theory and Hypothesis Development
Cognitive fit
Cognitive fit is the congruence of the cognitive process used by a decision maker and the
underlying decision strategy of a tool used to facilitate decision-making (Vessey and Galletta
1991; Arnold and Sutton 1998; Al-Natour et al. 2008). The Theory of Technology Dominance
(TTD) states that a decision maker’s reliance on a decision aiding tool is a function of cognitive
fit as well as task experience, task complexity and decision aid familiarity (Arnold and Sutton
1998). TTD defines cognitive fit as the “...degree to which the cognitive processes used with the
decision aid to complete or solve a task match the cognitive processes normally used by an
experienced decision maker” (Arnold and Sutton 1998, pg. 180). Greater cognitive fit between
the decision maker and information improves the ease of information acquisition, which in turn
leads to greater reliance on information, and quicker and more accurate problem solving (Vessey
1991; Vessey and Galletta 1991; Hampton 2005; van der Land et al. 2012; Tsai et al. 2013; Dunn
et al. 2017; Agarwal et al. 1996a). Experience using decision aiding tools improves the decision
maker’s cognitive fit with the processes used by such tools (Goodhue and Thompson 1995; Dunn
and Grabski 2001).
A lack of cognitive fit between the decision maker and the decision aiding tool requires
the decision maker to mentally transform the information presented into a useful format. When a
decision maker is presented with information that must be mentally transformed into a familiar
format that, the decision maker often discsounts or disregards this information (Nisbett and Ross
1980). When a decision maker is not required to mentally tranform information into a format
that is useful, it is less mentally taxing, which induces use of the information (Hampton 2005).
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Data analtyics may be used as a tool to aid auditors’ decision making. When using data
analytics to facilitate decision making, the method or process used by that tool influences the
cognitive fit between that tool and the decision maker (Vessey and Galletta 1991; Arnold and
Sutton 1998; Al-Natour et al. 2008). While the results from anomaly analytical models may be
similar or even identical to the results presented from predictive analytical models (for example,
stating “data analytics identified this account as being high risk”), the process used to arrive at
that conclusion varies significantly. Auditors will experience high levels of cognitive fit when
viewing the findings of data analytics that utilize a process with which auditors are experienced
using. Thus, cognitive fit will result in increased reliance on the findings of the data analytics
when there is congruence between the model and the decision maker (Arnold and Sutton 1998).
When approaching a problem, a decisions maker does not have a blank slate to form
mental representations (Agarwal et al. 1996b). Since analytical procedures represent less
sophisticated versions of anomaly models, auditors are more familiar with the underlying process
used by anomaly models (Hirst and Koonce 1996; Asare et al. 2000; Cohen et al. 2000; Glover et
al. 2005; Brazel et al. 2009; Brewster 2011; Brazel et al. 2014). Thus, auditors are expected to
exhibit greater cognitive fit when viewing results from anomaly models as compared to
predictive models. On the other hand, auditors are expected to experience low cognitive fit when
evaluating results from predictive models because the underlying process of these models is not
congruent with the decision-maker’s model; and low cognitive fit has been shown to reduce
decision makers’ reliance on tools intended to facilitate decision making (Hampton 2005). As
the process similarity of anomaly models is expected to result in greater cognitive fit with the
auditor during the risk assessment process, auditors’ decisions will be more affected by the
results of anomaly models. This leads to the first hypothesis:

79

H1: Auditors’ decisions will be impacted more by unusual activity identified by data
analytics using anomaly models as compared to predictive models.
While the use of data analytics is expanding to encompass nonfinancial information,
financial information influences decision making more than nonfinancial information (Heyman
and Ariely 2004; Mazar et al. 2008; Kouchaki et al. 2013). Yet, nonfinancial measures offer
great promise for developing more precise expectations (Brazel et al. 2009; Trompeter and
Wright 2010). Examples of nonfinancial measures that may be used to develop more precise
expectations include employee headcount, production space, warehouse space, trading volume
and retail space (Brazel et al. 2014). Examining financial data in conjunction with nonfinancial
data can aid auditors in fraud identification by identifying inconsistencies in client data (Brazel et
al. 2009). Yet, auditors only identify such inconsistencies when prompted to do so (Brazel et al.
2014). Auditors’ reluctance to use nonfinancial data may be attributable to the costs associated
with acquiring and implementing this data. For example, auditors are required to validate
underlying data used as part of the audit process (Richins et al. 2017). If auditors are presented
with the findings of nonfinancial data, this may mitigate the reluctance to use this data, as the
auditors would not need to incur acquiring, implementing nor validating costs. Cognitive fit can
be influenced by individual characteristics, such as training and experience (Goodhue and
Thompson 1995; Dunn and Grabski 2001). While nonfinancial measures have potential for
improving decisions (Messier et al. 2013), auditors are trained and educated to examine
primarily financial data and financial statements. Auditors are less accustomed to and less
effective at incorporating nonfinancial data into their decision making (Cohen et al. 2000; Brazel
et al. 2009; Trompeter and Wright 2010; Brazel et al. 2014). As a result, auditors will have a
greater understanding of and better cognitive fit with information presented from data analytical
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models that use financial data. Thus, auditors’ judgments are expected to be influenced more by
data analytical models that analyze financial data.
H2: Auditors’ decisions will be impacted more by unusual activity identified from data
analytics analyzing financial data as compared to nonfinancial data.
Methods
Participants
Utilizing personal connections, responses from 98 external financial statement auditors
who completed an online experiment were obtained and analyzed. 14 Auditors of all ranks use
analytical procedures to some extent as part of their job (Trompeter and Wright 2010), and data
analytics are an outgrowth of analytical procedures as suggested by the creation of data
analytical standards (Appelbaum et al. 2017). Thus, auditors of all ranks are expected to use data
analytics to some extent as part of their job. As the data analytical standards developed by the
AICPA apply to all auditees (public and private companies of all sizes), firms of all sizes are
expected to use data analytics. Thus, any external financial statement auditor was eligible to
participate in this study. In order to provide an incentive to complete the experiment, all
participants could choose from a list of charities to which a $5 donation would be made on their
behalf upon completion of the survey. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions.
Participants averaged 9.0 years of audit experience. Thirty-seven participants (38%) had
the title of manager, director or partner. Sixty participants (61%) were employed by national or

14

Six participants failed manipulation checks. The results presented include all participants, however excluding
participants that failed the manipulation checks from the analysis does not change the inferences drawn from this
study unless otherwise noted. One participant indicated their intention to decrease budgeted audit hours by 10% in
response to the risk identified by the data analytics. This participant was excluded from the analysis.
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international sized firms. Seventy-six participants (78%) were CPAs. Fifty participants (51%)
audit manufacturing clients, and eighty-two participants (84%) audit privately held clients.
Table 2 provides a summary of participants’ demographic information.

Experimental Task and Procedure
Using a case adapted from Brazel and Agoglia (2007), participants were told to assume
the role of senior auditor for Madison Inc., a privately held mid-sized sporting equipment
manufacturer that is a continuing client. Participants were told that they would be tasked with
providing a preliminary fraud risk assessment for the current year. Participants were initially
provided background information about the client, including information related to Madison’s
fraud risk assessment, and were informed that fraud risk was initially assessed as “LOW”.
Participants were informed that the Central Data Analytics Group was used to help in the fraud
risk assessment phase of the audit, and were provided additional background information on the
Central Data Analytics Group. Participants were informed that the Central Data Analytics Group
identified possible unusual activity related to the revenue cycle. Participants received an
explanation of the underlying logic of the respective models and the data that was analyzed.
Participants were then asked to answer questions regarding fraud risk, budgeted audit hours and
reliance. After completing the case, participants completed demographic information and
answered manipulation checks.
Independent and Dependent Variables
Two independent variables (the type of data analytical models used and the type of data
analyzed to reach this conclusion) were manipulated between participants resulting in a 2 X 2
design. Model type was manipulated by describing the models used by the Central Data
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Analytics Group as either anomaly models or predictive models. In the anomaly models
condition, participants were told that unusual activity related to revenue was identified by
comparing Madison Inc.’s current year activity with the current year activity of other sporting
goods manufacturing clients. In the predictive models condition, participants were told that
unusual activity related to revenue was identified by comparing Madison Inc.’s current year
activity against the activity of a different sporting goods manufacturing client from five years
ago when the other company had a material misstatement.
The type of data used by the data analytical models was described as either financial or
nonfinancial. For the financial data manipulation, participants were informed that the Central
Data Analyzed Group analyzed the ratio of journal entries just below performance materiality to
the total number of journal entries (financial information). This ratio was chosen as a major
fraud, Healthsouth, began with several fraudulent journal entries just below materiality to avoid
auditor detection (Beam 2015; Smith 2016). For the nonfinancial data manipulation, the Central
Data Analyzed Group analyzed the ratio of optimistic language in external e-mails to internal emails (nonfinancial data). As advances in technology have allowed for unstructured internal data
such as e-mails to be analyzed (Warren et al. 2015) and e-mails have been analyzed as part of
forensic accounting investigations (Beach and Schiefelbein 2014; Torpey et al. 2009; Torpey et
al. 2010), e-mails were chosen for analysis. Optimistic language was chosen to analyze as this
type of language differs among companies public filings (Cho et al. 2010; Davis and TamaSweet 2012).
To analyze the impact of data analytics on auditors’ decisions, three dependent variables
were used. The first dependent variable was participants’ level of reliance on the data analytics.
Reliance was measured using a five item scale adapted from Hampton (2005). Each item was
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measured on a seven point likert scale. The first item elicited participant’s belief that the
information identified by the data analytics represents a fraud risk. The second item measured
participant’s confidence in the accuracy of the information identified by the data analytics related
to fraud risk. The third item measured the participant’s level of confidence in evaluating fraud
risk without the data analytics and was reverse coded. Item four addressed participant’s
willingness to incorporate the findings from the data analytics into their fraud risk assessment.
The final item captured participant’s willingness to rely on the findings from the data analytics.
To assess the reliability of the measures of reliance, Cronbach alpha was calculated as 0.83,
which is above the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978). 15
The second dependent variable was fraud risk assessment. Participants were asked to
assess the fraud risk level for Madison Inc. on a seven point likert scale with endpoints of “very
low fraud risk” and “very high fraud risk” based on the information provided by the Central Data
Analytics Group.
The third dependent variable was budgeted audit hours. Using a sliding scale anchored at
negative 100% and positive 100%, participants were asked by what percentage they would change
budgeted audit hours for revenue from the initial budget of 30 hours.

Results
Identification of potential covariates
Information was collected on participants’ experience using data analytics, specifically
anomaly and predictive models, as potential covariates. Participants who have experience using

15

Additionally, composite reliability was calculated as 0.83, which is above the recommended threshold of 0.70
(Fornell and Larcker 1981).

84

data analytics were asked to respond on five point likert scales regarding how experienced they
were at using anomaly and predictive models (with brief descriptions of these models included)
with endpoints of “Not at all experienced” and “Extremely experienced”. Analysis of these two
questions identified an unexpected and noteworthy finding. A t-test revealed no significant
difference (t=0.497) in participants’ experience using predictive models (mean 2.559) as
compared to anomaly models (mean 2.590). The argument put forth in the literature review is
that auditors will have greater cognitive fit with anomaly models due to more extensive
experience; however, this demographic information suggests that use of predictive models may
be more prevalent in practice than prior literature suggests. A correlation matrix revealed that
participants who do not audit private companies were more likely to have prior experience using
data analytics (p=0.061).
Stacked regressions were used to identify potential covariates, as has been done in prior
research (Brochet et al. 2014; Blankespoor et al. 2014). Stacked regressions identified prior
experience performing fraud risk assessments as a potential covariate for the Fraud Risk
Assessment dependent variable (p<0.10). For the Reliance dependent variable, stacked
regressions identified participants title, firm size, gender, percent of time auditing manufacturing
and private clients, and prior experience using either type of data analytics examined in this
study as potential covariates for participants’ reliance on data analytics to aid in fraud risk
assessments (p<0.10). Stacked regressions identified the size of the accounting firm the
participants was employed by as a potential covariate for budgeted audit hours (p<0.10) and was
included as a covariate in the analysis.
Levene’s test revealed that the data does not meet the assumption of homogeneity of
variance for the “Fraud Risk Assessment” dependent variable. Homogeneity of variances are not
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required if ANOVA cell sizes are equal (Field 2009). Consistent with prior research (Lyubimov
et al. 2013), a random number generator was used to delete two observations to equalize cell sizes
at 24 when testing the hypothesis using the “Fraud Risk Assessment” dependent variable.

Test of Hypotheses
All hypotheses are tested using the three dependent variables discussed above: reliance
on the data analytics, fraud risk assessment, and budgeted audit hours. H1 predicts that auditors’
judgments will be impacted more by unusual activity identified by anomaly data analytical
models as compared to predictive data analytical models. Thus, H1 predicts that auditors will
rely more on the data analytics to aid in their fraud risk assessments, make higher fraud risk
assessments, and increase budgeted audit hours more when anomaly analytical models identify
unusual activity as compared to predictive models. Table 3 Panel A provides descriptive
statistics for the reliance dependent variable. None of the potential covariates identified by the
stacked regressions were identified as significant covariates. The ANOVA results indicate that
participants do not exhibit any differences (p=0.981) in their likelihood to rely on anomaly
models as compared to predictive models to aid in fraud risk assessments. Figure 3 Panel A
provides a graphical representation the results for reliance.
Table 4 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the fraud risk assessment dependent
variable. Prior experience performing fraud risk assessments was identified as a significant
covariate and was included in the analysis. 16 More extensive fraud risk assessment experience is
associated with high fraud risk assessments. The descriptive statistics suggest that participants

16

Prior experience performing fraud risk assessments was not identified as a covariate when only analyzing
participants that passed both manipulation check questions.
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increase their fraud risk assessment when data analytics have identified unusual activity,
regardless of the type of model used and type of data analyzed. In the case provided, fraud risk
was initially assessed as low, yet all conditions uniformly increased fraud risk to approximately
medium. Table 4 Panel B shows that participants do not exhibit any differences (p=0.825) in
their fraud risk assessments when unusual activity is identified by anomaly models as compared
to predictive models. Figure 3 Panel B provides a graphical representation of the results for fraud
risk assessment.
Table 5 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for budgeted audit hours. The descriptive
statistics shows that participants increase budgeted audit hours by approximately 16 percent
when data analytics have identified unusual activity, regardless of the type of model used and
type of data analyzed. Employer firm size was identified as a covariate and included in the
analysis (p=0.015). Examining the correlation between firm size and budgeted audit hours
revealed that participants employed by larger firms recommend greater budgeted audit hours in
response to unusual activity identified by data analytics. Table 5 Panel B shows that participants
do not exhibit any differences (p=0.898) in their judgments to change budgeted audit hours when
unusual activity is identified by anomaly models as compared to predictive models. Figure 3
Panel C shows the graphical representation of the results for budgeted audit hours
Taken together the findings from the three dependent variables (reliance, fraud risk
assessment and budgeted hours) suggest that anomaly models do not impact auditors’ judgments
more than predictive models. Thus, H1 is not supported.
H2 predicts that auditors’ judgments will be impacted more by unusual activity identified
by data analytics that analyzed financial data as compared to nonfinancial data. Thus, H2
predicts that auditors will rely more on the data analytics to aid in their fraud risk assessments,
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make higher fraud risk assessments, and increase budgeted audit hours more when data analytics
analyzed financial data, as compared to nonfinancial data, to identify unusual activity. Table 3
Panel B shows that participants do not exhibit any differences (p=0.163) in their reliance on data
analytics that analyzed financial data as compared to nonfinancial data. Table 4 Panel B shows
that auditors do not exhibit any differences (p=0.919) in their fraud risk assessments when
unusual activity is identified by data analytics that analyzed financial data as compared to
nonfinancial data. Table 5 Panel B shows that participants do not exhibit any differences
(p=0.237) in their judgments to change budgeted audit hours when unusual activity is identified
by data analytics that analyzed financial data as compared to nonfinancial data. Taken together,
the findings from the three dependent variables (reliance, fraud risk assessment and budgeted
hours) suggest that data analytics that analyze financial data do not impact auditors’ decisions
more than data analytics that analyze nonfinancial data. Thus, H2 is not supported.

Additional analysis
The interactive effect of the type of data analytical models used and the type of data
analyzed on participants’ decisions was examined as well. Table 3 Panel B demonstrates that no
interactive effect was noted for participants’ reliance on data analytics to aid in fraud risk
assessments (p=0.571). Table 4 Panel B shows that no interactive effect is noted for
participants’ fraud risk assessment in response to unusual activity identified by data analytics
(p=0.562). Table 5 Panel B shows that the type of data analytical model interacts with the type
of data analyzed to impact participants’ determination of budgeted audit hours (p=0.015). These
results highlight the distinction between auditors’ use of data analytics for fraud risk assessments
as compared to budgeted audit hours. Increasing budgeted audit hours expresses an intention to
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investigate a potential risk further, whereas increasing fraud risk suggests that the auditor
believes the potential risk is an indicator of fraud risk. Thus, a potential risk must be perceived
as riskier in order for auditors to rely on that information and to increase fraud risk as compared
to budgeted audit hours.
These results demonstrate that when predictive models are used, participants increase
budgeted audit hours more in response to unusual activity identified by analyzing financial data
as compared to nonfinancial data. The opposite is true for anomaly models; when anomaly
models are used, participants increase budgeted audit hours more in response to unusual activity
identified by analyzing nonfinancial data as compared to financial data. These results suggest
that auditors’ decisions are impacted by the type of model used in conjunction with the type of
data analyzed.
Due to the significant interactive effect on budgeted audit hours identified in Table 5
Panel B, simple main effects, while controlling for employer firm size, were examined and are
shown in Table 5 Panel C. The results indicate that the type of data analyzed by predictive
models significantly impacts participants’ budgeted audit hours (p=0.010). When predictive
models are used, participants increase budgeted audit hours more when these models analyzed
financial data as compared to nonfinancial data. Additionally, the results presented in Table 5
Panel C show that the effect of the type of data analytical models used on budgeted audit hours is
impacted by the type of data analyzed. Specifically, when financial data is analyzed by
predictive models, participants increase budgeted audit hours more compared to when such data
is analyzed by anomaly models (p=0.093). 17 Alternatively, when nonfinancial data is analyzed
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Excluding participants that failed manipulation checks results in this finding becoming insignificant (p>0.10).
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by anomaly models, participants increase budgeted audit hours more compared to when such
data is analyzed by predictive models (p=0.071). 18
The impact of data analytics on budgeted audit hours is likely attributable to cognitive fit.
The crossover effect identified in this study is consistent with prior cognitive fit research
(Wheeler and Jones 2003; Speier et al. 2003; Dennis and Carte 1998). Cognitive fit increases
with training and experience (Goodhue and Thompson 1995; Dunn and Grabski 2001), thus
auditors experience using certain types of data analytics are expected to increase cognitive fit
using those models. The use of predictive models in accounting tends to focus on financial data
such as accruals, financial performance and earnings dispersion (Beneish 1997; Dechow et al.
2011; Sinclair 2015; Agnew 2016b; Perols et al. 2017; Nallareddy and Ogneva 2017) while the
use of predictive models using nonfinancial measures in accounting is limited to abnormal
employee reduction and text mining aiding in fraud risk assessments (Holton 2009; Dechow et
al. 2011). Thus, when using predictive models, auditors may have more experience, and greater
cognitive fit, with such models that analyzed financial data as compared to nonfinancial data.
This may explain the simple main effect noted in Table 5 Panel C (p=0.010).
When considering the use of nonfinancial data, prior research focuses on the use of
anomaly models compared to predictive models. This is likely attributable to the prominence of
unstructured information, and the potential that it has to identify audit relevant information. As
previously discussed, unstructured nonfinancial data has been used in prior research primarily to
make comparisons against a peer group to identify patterns associated with very high amounts of
a certain type of language, suggesting that using nonfinancial data is more commonly analyzed
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Excluding participants that failed manipulation checks results in this finding becoming more significant (p<0.05).
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by anomaly models than predictive models (Cho et al. 2010; Li 2010; Humpherys et al. 2011;
Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012; Hobson et al. 2012; Warren et al. 2015; Yoon et al. 2015). This
explains auditors’ greater increase of budgeted audit hours when nonfinancial data is analyzed by
anomaly models compared to predictive models (p=0.071 shown in Table 5 Panel C).
Alternatively, considering the analysis of financial data, predictive models focus almost
exclusively on analyzing financial data (Beneish 1997; Dechow et al. 2011; Sinclair 2015;
Agnew 2016b; Perols et al. 2017; Nallareddy and Ogneva 2017), whereas anomaly models may
analyze financial or nonfinancial data (Brazel et al. 2014; Cohen et al. 2000; Glover et al. 2005;
Cho et al. 2010; Hobson et al. 2012). The greater focus of predictive models on financial data, as
compared to anomaly models, explains auditors’ greater increased budgeted audit hours when
financial data is analyzed with predictive models compared to anomaly models (p=0.093 as
shown in Table 5 Panel C).

Conclusion
The advancement of technology has enabled the development of more sophisticated data
analytics that hold the potential to improve the audit process by facilitating analysis of larger
datasets of traditional data (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014; Sinclair 2015; Raphael 2017;
Jans et al. 2010), along with analysis of new types of nonfinancial data and unstructured data
(Warren et al. 2015; PCAOB 2016; Agnew 2016; IAASB 2017). Interest in using more data
analytics during the audit process can be seen from the IAASB and PCAOB, as well as a joint
initiative by the AICPA and CPA Canada (IAASB 2017; PCAOB 2016; Coffey 2015).
Furthermore, the AICPA has developed data analytical standards to replace the analytical
procedures guide (AICPA 2015b; Appelbaum et al. 2017; AICPA 2017). Taken together, data
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analytics are expected to play a more pronounced role in the audit process in the near future.
Despite the interest from practice to incorporate data analytics more into the audit process, there
is a lack of research examining how auditors use such analytics and whether data analytics
impact decisions. Prior research is limited to identifying that auditors are not effective at
identifying patterns in data analytics visualizations when viewed before traditional audit
evidence (Rose et al. 2017). This study contributes to the literature by providing initial evidence
on the impact of different data analytics on auditors’ decisions. Inadequate planning to
effectively implement data analytics into the audit process may result these tools not being used
to their full benefit, and thus a missed opportunity to improve audit quality and effectiveness and
create additional value for stakeholders (Sinclair 2015; Agnew 2016b; Raphael 2017; Titera
2013).
The results of this study show that auditors are willing to rely on data analytics to aid in
their fraud risk assessments. By relying on the findings of data analytics, auditors demonstrate a
willingness to increase fraud risk. The results of this study demonstrate that auditor’s reliance on
data analytics, fraud risk assessments and budgeted audit hours does not differ by the type of
data analytical model used and the type of data analyzed.
Interestingly the interactive effect of the type of data analytical model used and type of
data analyzed do impact budgeted audit hours. Auditors budget different audit hours to follow
up on a potential risk based on the joint effect of type of model used and type of data analyzed.
When auditors view the results of predictive models, budgeted audit hours are greater when these
models analyze financial data as compared to nonfinancial data. Yet, the opposite is true for
anomaly models; when auditors view the results of anomaly models, budgeted audit hours are
greater when these models analyzed nonfinancial data as compared to financial data. This
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finding is likely attributable to the use of such models in practice. Predictive data analytical
models that analyze financial data appear to be more prevalent than predictive models that
analyze nonfinancial data. Alternatively, anomaly analytical models that analyze nonfinancial
data appear to be more prevalent than anomaly models that analyze financial data.
The results of this study contributes to the cognitive fit literature by demonstrating that
cognitive fit influences auditor’s budgeted audit hours decisions using data analytics. The results
of this study also contribute to the cognitive fit literature by demonstrating that cognitive fit does
not always impact reliance. Although the findings related to the joint impact of the type of data
analytical model used and types of data analyzed on budgeted audit hours were not hypothesized,
examination of demographic data collected and prior research suggest that these findings may be
explained by cognitive fit. As no differences in the type of data analytical model used was
noted, closer examination of prior research and practice literature suggests that predictive models
focus almost exclusively on analyzing financial data as compared to non-financial data, and nonfinancial data tends to be analyzed using anomaly models. Thus, auditors would be expected to
have greater experience analyzing financial data with predictive models compared to anomaly
models and greater experience analyzing non-financial data with anomaly models compared to
predictive models. As cognitive fit is influenced by users prior training and experience
(Goodhue and Thompson 1995; Dunn and Grabski 2001), these differences in experience likely
contribute to different levels of cognitive fit and ultimately decision making, which supports the
findings of this study related to budgeted audit hours.
As this study is the first to examine auditors’ use of data analytics in an experimental
setting, there are limitations to this study along with several opportunities for future research.
Future research should examine how to effectively induce auditors’ reliance on data analytics to
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improve decisions along with auditors comfort using different types of data analytics (GuéninParacini et al. 2014). A limitation of this study is that it only examines the impact of two types
of data analytical models that analyzed two types of data on the decision outcome.

Future

research should examine how the inputs in this study and other inputs impact auditors’ decision
making processes when using data analytics. Future research should examine auditors’ reliance
on other types of data analytical models, such as rules-based models and social network analysis
(Jans et al. 2014) and analysis of other types of data including structured vs. unstructured
nonfinancial data. Future research should seek to examine what combination of data analytical
models (for example using anomaly models in conjunction with rules based models) result in the
greatest change in auditors’ decisions, providing more useful insights than relying on only one
type of data (Richins et al. 2017). Future research also may seek to examine the data analytics
that auditors choose from when provided with several analytical models options. As data
analytics applications can analyze financial and non-financial data, future research may seek to
examine how auditors rely on data analytics that analyze financial data in conjunction with
nonfinancial data. Future research may also seek to examine decisions for tasks beyond fraud
risk assessments and changing budgeted audit hours, for example internal control evaluations.
Examining the impact of the accuracy of data analytics on auditors’ decisions may present
another fruitful opportunity for research.
Another limitation of this study is that the survey was distributed electronically, limiting
control over participants. Greater experimental control would require using students in an
experimental lab. As this study examines auditor’s use of data analytics and draws upon prior
audit experience to make judgments, using student participants would not be appropriate. Thus,
although experimental control may have been compromised on some participants, practicing
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auditors were necessary for this study. Another limitation is that demographic information
revealed that predictive data analytical models are used more commonly in practice than prior
research suggests. This casts doubt upon the external validity of the research and practice
articles cited in the literature review regarding auditors’ use of data analytics. Thus, future
research should seek to examine how data analytics are commonly used during the audit process.
Effective implementation of data analytics will likely consist of substantial
implementation costs. Such costs will likely be passed on to clients through the audit fee. Thus,
future research should examine how audit fees will change as a result of implementing data
analytics into the audit process. Also, future research should investigate under what
circumstances auditees are willing to accept a greater audit fee, and what persuasion tactics
auditors may employ in order to ensure a sustained relationship with the client in light of such
fee increases.
Future research should seek to examine differences in forensic and internal auditors’ use
of data analytics compared to financial statement auditors. Different regulatory oversight
regimes (i.e., PCAOB) or personality traits might result in using different data analytics. Future
research may also seek to examine how prior fraud experience impacts auditors’ decisions using
data analytics to aid in fraud risk assessments. Finally, future research may seek to examine how
data analytics will impact the auditing profession’s knowledge development. While reducing the
technical skills required to use technology enabled tools increases reliance on such tools, relying
on data analytics may result in de-skilling of auditors, and ultimately hindering advancement of
auditing knowledge.
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STUDY THREE: THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN FACTOR ON
AUDITOR’S RELIANCE ON DATA ANALYTICS
Introduction
Auditors’ use of analytical procedures has received considerable attention in the prior
academic literature (Cohen et al. 2000; Knapp and Knapp 2001; Glover et al. 2005; Brazel et al.
2009; Trompeter and Wright 2010; Glover et al. 2015). Advances in technology have enabled
analytical procedures to move beyond ratio analysis and unusual fluctuations, and to emerge into
more advanced forms, including population testing of supporting data (Jans et al. 2014; Gray and
Debreceny 2014; Alles 2014; Titera 2013; Murphy and Tysiac 2015; Richins et al. 2017; Jans et
al. 2010), predictive modeling (Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013; Statistical Analysis System
(SAS) 2014; Krahel and Titera 2015) and analysis of non-financial data (Warren et al. 2015).
These technology enabled analytics are referred to as data analytics. Data analytics encompass
analytical procedures historically used by auditors (Appelbaum et al. 2017; Titera 2013), as well
as business intelligence and analytics techniques using applications grounded in data mining and
statistical analysis (Chen et al. 2012). The capability and use of data analytics in accounting is
greatly expanding in practice (Deloitte 2010; DHHS 2012; KPMG 2012;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2013; AICPA 2015; Coffey 2015; Ernst and Young 2015a); These data
analytics may fundamentally change the audit process, which may greatly reduce the distinction
between analytical procedures and substantive testing (Jans et al. 2014). However, how to
ensure effective use of these tools as part of the audit process is unclear.
Despite the promise to improve audit effectiveness (Davenport and Harris 2007; Titera
2013), research examining the impact of data analytics on auditors’ decisions is scant (BrownLiburd et al. 2015; Appelbaum et al. 2017). Prior research on data analytics is limited but shows
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that auditors are not effective at identifying patterns in data analytics visualizations when viewed
before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). Even when similar technologies provide
information deemed to be 100% accurate, auditors are reluctant to rely on these technologies due
to fear of litigation (Sutton et al. 1995). In some instances, auditors have had adverse reactions
to technology, such as disengaging with audit tasks (Bamber and Snowball 1988) and working
around the technology (Bedard et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2007; Dowling and Leech 2014). The
mere existence of such technology-based tools is insufficient to improve decision making, as no
improvement is noted when such tools are not used (Venkatesh et al. 2003; Davis et al. 1989;
Rose et al. 2017; Huerta and Jensen 2017). Auditors may not use such tools due to factors such
as fear of litigation (Sutton et al. 1995), cognitive processing limitations (Brown-Liburd et al.
2015) or lack of trust in technology (Lee and See 2004). Thus, despite the advances in
technology and the ability of data analytics to identify outliers that auditors previously would not
have been able to identify (Alles and Gray 2015; Alles 2014; Murphy and Tysiac 2015), the
availability of data analytics does not guarantee that auditors will rely on these findings during
their decision making process, constraining and undermining the potential benefits.
The purpose of this study is to examine auditors’ reliance on data analytics under varying
levels of risk when the results are presented by another human as opposed to a system. Humans
are often reluctant to rely on, and are less trusting of, technology as compared to another human
to perform a given function (Waern and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000); yet, it is
unclear if this difference in trust is still present as technology plays a more prominent role in
society. While auditors historically had the required skillset to perform analytical procedures
(Hirst and Koonce 1996; Cohen et al. 2000; Trompeter and Wright 2010; Brazel et al. 2014),
more sophisticated exploratory data analytics will likely require more advanced analysis
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capabilities and technical skills (Richins et al. 2017; Huerta and Jensen 2017). Public accounting
firms may choose to introduce data analytics into the audit process by incorporating data
analytics software into their audit software. Auditors would be responsible for performing the
data analytics themselves. Alternatively, some firms are using data scientists to perform and
present the data analytics (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Richins et al. 2017). Given
that the level of trust in the data analytics may differ depending on the source (software or data
scientist), research is needed to ascertain if and when the source of the analytics matters.
This may be a particularly important issue as the level of risk increases within an audit.
Prior research suggests that auditors are reluctant to rely on analytical procedures as the level of
risk identified increases (Glover et al. 2005). Auditors place greater reliance on information that
suggests a low risk of material misstatement. Auditors’ reluctance to rely on information that
identifies an audit risk potentially undermines the ability to identify a material misstatement.
Examining whether reliance on data analytics decreases as risk increases can provide insight into
the impact of data analytics on auditors’ decisions. When prior information provided by a
particular source has been subject to errors, relying on current information from the same source
is accompanied by increased risk of making an error. This increased risk results in decreased
reliance on the information by the decision maker. The decrease in reliance is greater when
information is provided by a system as compared to another human (Lewandowsky et al. 2000).
Thus, the source of the information as well as the level of risk may interact to alter the impact of
either source or level of risk.
Using the Theory of Trust, auditors are predicted to trust data analytics more when
presented from another human as opposed to a system. Trust entails willingness to be vulnerable
to actions of another party without the ability to actively monitor or control that party (Mayer et
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al. 1995). Decision makers are more trusting of human sources as compared to technology
source (Waern and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000), and this trust results in reliance
(Muir 1989; Lerch and Prietula 1989; Lee and See 2004). Thus, auditors are expected to rely
more on the results of data analytics when presented from another human as compared to a selfgenerating system. Auditors are less likely to rely on information suggesting a high rather than
low risk (Glover et al. 2005). Thus, auditors are predicted to rely more on data analytics that
identify a low risk. Decision makers rely more consistently on information provided by another
human as compared to technologies (Lewandowsky et al. 2000). Thus, when a high risk is
identified by data analytics, a decrease in reliance is expected to be more pronounced when it
was identified by a technology than by a human. Therefore, the level of risk identified is
predicted to moderate the impact of presentation source on auditors’ reliance on the data
analytics.
Using an experimental setting, ninety-two auditors were informed that the findings from
data analytics were communicated by either another human (a data scientist) or a self-generating
system (a data analytics software) and if the findings suggest a high or low risk of material
misstatement. The results of this study indicate that neither the presentation source nor level of
risk identified affects auditors’ reliance on data analytics. Interestingly, the two variables have
an interactive effect on reliance on data analytics. When a self-generating system presents the
findings of data analytics, auditors are more likely to rely on the analytics when a high risk is
identified as compared to a low risk. The opposite is true when another human presents the
findings of the data analytics, as auditors are more likely to rely on the analytics when a low risk
of misstatement is identified as compared to a high risk of misstatement.
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The results of this study contribute to research and practice alike. The results of this
study are timely and important given the heightened interest in using data analytics throughout
the audit process as highlighted by the AICPA and CPA Canada (Coffey 2015), the IAASB
(IAASB 2017) the AICPA’s development of data analytical standards (AICPA 2015b;
Appelbaum et al. 2017), and PCAOB staff (PCAOB 2016). The results of this study demonstrate
that factors impacting auditor’s reliance on data analytics should not be considered in insolation,
as reliance may not be impacted by individual items, however reliance is impacted when factors
are considered together. The results present evidence on the effectiveness of firms developing a
data scientist group as compared to training individual auditors on how to use software to run
data analytics. As the results suggest that auditors are more likely to rely on a high risk when
presented from a self-generating system, this study calls into question the effectiveness of
developing a data scientist group, as auditors may be reluctant to rely on risks identified by this
group. This study contributes to research by providing experimental evidence to the limited
literature on auditors’ use of data analytics.
The remainder of this paper will be comprised of four sections. The next section discusses
insights from the academic literature into the use of data analytics and the use of technology.
Section three discusses the research method. The following section discusses the results of this
study. The final section presents concluding remarks.

Background and Hypotheses Development
Data Analytics
Data analytics have the potential to facilitate auditors’ decision making, and improve the
audit process (Moffitt and Vasarhelyi 2013; Appelbaum et al. 2017), ultimately improving audit
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efficiency and effectiveness (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Titera 2013). The AICPA has expressed
interest in increasing the use of data analytics in the audit process (Coffey 2015), as
demonstrated by the Assurance Services Executive Committee (ASEC) developing an “Audit
Data Analytics Guide” (Appelbaum et al. 2017) to replace the current Analytical Procedures
Guide. Replacement of the Analytical Procedures Guide with the Data Analytics Guide suggests
that data analytics can be viewed as an outgrowth and expansion of analytical procedures
(Appelbaum et al. 2017), and analytical procedures are a subset of data analytics (AICPA 2015a;
Titera 2013). The IAASB Data Analytics Working Group (DAWG) serves a similar purpose to
the AICPA’s ASEC committee. The DAWG is examining how to effectively use data analytics
during the audit process to enhance audit quality and to examine revising international
accounting standards to permit the use of data analytics during the audit process (IAASB 2017).
The use of data analytics is on the rise for many Fortune 500 companies’ internal audit
departments (Rose et al. 2017).
Advances in technology have enabled the development of the aforementioned data
analytics and the expansion of analysis capabilities in accounting (Trompeter and Wright 2010;
Jans et al. 2014; Warren et al. 2015; Appelbaum et al. 2017). Technological advances have
contributed to decreased costs to record and store data, ultimately increasing the size of datasets
that can be analyzed (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Mcmillan and Barr 2015). Datasets have grown
to the extent that traditional software tools are not able to effectively capture, store, manage and
analyze the information (McKinsey 2011). Data analytics have emerged from analytical
procedures and include more sophisticated anomaly modeling (Thiprungsri and Vasarhelyi
2011), population testing capabilities (Vorhies 2013; Kogan et al. 2014; Jans et al. 2014; Alles
2014; Gray and Debreceny 2014; Murphy and Tysiac 2015; Titera 2013; Jans et al. 2010),
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predictive modeling (Rose 2013; Wilkinson 2013; Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013; SAS
2014; DHHS 2014; Krahel and Titera 2015), cluster analysis (Thiprungsri and Vasarhelyi 2011),
process mining (Jans et al. 2010; Jans et al. 2013; Jans et al. 2014) and nonfinancial data analysis
including video, audio and text (Warren et al. 2015). Effectively utilizing these analytics may
prove to be challenging for auditors, as data analytics require a specialized skillset that auditors
typically do not possess (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Richins et al. 2017). Thus,
while analytical procedures can be performed within an audit team (Hirst and Koonce 1996;
Cohen et al. 2000; Trompeter and Wright 2010; Brazel et al. 2014), utilizing data analytics is
more likely to require utilizing resources, such as data scientists, outside of the traditional audit
team (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Richins et al. 2017).
Introducing data analytics into the audit process can potentially help auditors identify
new audit relevant information (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan et al. 2014), reduce labor intensive tasks
and focus time on more judgment intensive tasks (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015) and high risk areas
(AICPA 2015a). This may minimize the risk that a material misstatement exists but was not
identified, enhancing audit quality and effectiveness and creating more value for audit
stakeholders (Agnew 2016b; Raphael 2017; Titera 2013). Data analytics may also improve fraud
prevention and detection initiatives (Brivot and Gendron 2011; Jans et al. 2014; Titera 2013;
Jans et al. 2010). A former CFO of Healthsouth, a large fraud that has received attention from
the academic literature (Jones et al. 2008; Chung et al. 2008; Brazel et al. 2009; Free and
Murphy 2015; Glover et al. 2015), stated that the fraud would have been identified much earlier
had these data analytical tools been used during the Healthsouth audit (Smith 2016).
Prior research focuses on the capabilities of data analytics (Kogan et al. 2014; Jans et al.
2014; Jans et al. 2010); however, prior research on data analytics impacting auditors’ decisions is
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limited to identifying that auditors are not effective at identifying patterns in data analytics
visualizations when viewed before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). As data
analytics can be viewed as an outgrowth of analytical procedures, insights on auditors’ use of
data analytics can be obtained by examining auditors’ use of analytical procedures. Analytical
procedures during planning influence auditors’ extent, breadth, depth, and focus of substantive
testing (Asare et al. 2000), and facilitate more effective fraud risk assessments (Knapp and
Knapp 2001). Analytical procedures impact auditors’ risk assessments more for high risk clients
(O’Donnell and Schultz 2005). Deficiencies in auditors’ use of analytical procedures have been
identified by the PCAOB (PCAOB 2007a; PCAOB 2007b; PCAOB 2008); the PCAOB has cited
deficiencies in the audit work of all the big four firms (PCAOB 2011a; PCAOB 2011b; PCAOB
2014a; PCAOB 2014b). As data analytics may be viewed as an outgrowth of analytical
procedures (Appelbaum et al. 2017), these deficiencies may persist when auditors use data
analytics. Professional standards mandate the use of analytical procedures during the planning
and review phase of an audit; however, auditors often use analytical procedures during
substantive testing as well (Trompeter and Wright 2010; Appelbaum et al. 2017).
As data analytics have been enabled by technology, examining auditors’ use of data
analytics warrants consideration of auditors’ utilization of technology. There are several benefits
to human-technology collaboration such as increased consistency and accuracy (Riley 1994;
Liebl and Roy 2003; Markoff 2012), reduced costs (Riley 1994; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014)
and freeing humans from time-consuming and labor-intensive activities (Parasuraman and Riley
1997). Despite the potential benefits of human-technology collaboration, these benefits may go
unrealized if the technology is not used properly (Alles and Gray 2015). Adopting such tools is
hindered when they require advanced technical skills (Alles 2015), requiring involving the IT
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department, report obsolete information and produce reports difficult to understand (Huerta and
Jensen 2017). Effective implementation of these tools require support from management,
including a willingness to change how they do business (Kiron et al. 2014; Ferguson 2014;
Fitzgerald 2014).
Technology enabled tools can be used to facilitate and support audit work (Winograd et al.
2000; Banker et al. 2002; Dowling and Leech 2007). Without proper implementation, technology
may have adverse implications such as underuse (lack of reliance), misuse and abuse (Parasuraman
and Riley 1997; Dzindolet et al. 2003; National 2014). Thus, the mere existence of tools such as
data analytics is not a guarantee that auditors will perceive them as trustworthy, rely on them, and
ultimately incorporate the information identified into their decision making. Furthermore, the
amount of information provided by data analytics may overwhelm auditors and exceed their
processing capacity, which has been shown to impede decision making (Iselin 1988; Kleinmuntz
1990). Thus, process capacity limitations may constrain the full benefits of data analytics from
being realized (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015). For example, although data analytics may identify
high risk audit areas (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015), and allow auditors to spend more time and effort
on tasks that require human judgment (AICPA 2015a), auditor processing weaknesses and
cognitive limitations may prevent these benefits from human-technology collaboration to be
realized (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015).

Trust and Technology
Analytical procedures have historically been performed within audit teams (Trompeter
and Wright 2010). More sophisticated data analytics (i.e., predictive modeling and cluster
analysis) may require a skillset beyond what most audit teams have, thus the analysis may be
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conducted by a data analyst or data scientist (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Richins et
al. 2017). Alternatively, auditors may utilize a software to perform data analysis, as such
technologies are used to facilitate the audit process (Dowling and Leech 2014; Dowling and
Leech 2007). The source of the results of the analytics warrants consideration, as the results may
be presented directly from a software utilized by the auditor (a technology), or a data scientist
(another human). Reliance on the information provided by the software or data scientist is
contingent upon an auditor’s trust in the information source. Even when providing the same
information and demonstrating the same level of competence, humans trust information provided
by other human sources more than technology sources, and this trust has been shown to influence
decision making (Sheridan and Verplank 1978; Sheridan 1980; Waern and Ramberg 1996;
Lewandowsky et al. 2000). Tools used to facilitate decision making, such as data analytics, can
greatly improve decisions (Hale and Kasper 1989). A lack of trust in an automated technology
tool is accompanied by decreased reliance on the technology (Muir 1989; Lerch and Prietula
1989; Lee and See 2004). As data analytics have been enabled by technology, consideration of
auditors’ trust in technology is warranted when considering reliance on these analytics.
Mayer et al. (1995) puts forth the Theory of Trust, and defines trust as “The willingness
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995, pg. 712). Vulnerability exists when some level of
risk is present by trusting information provided from another party and direct observation of the
other party is impractical (Mayer et al. 1995). Thus, the need for trust only arises in risky
situations (Mayer et al. 1995).
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Trust in technology results in use of (reliance on) technology (Muir 1989; Lerch and
Prietula 1989; Lee and See 2004), confidence in the technology, and ultimately results in better
decisions (Waern and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000; Hoffman et al. 2013). When
there is a lack of trust in technology, human users will experience frustration and attempt to
avoid relying on the technology (Koopman and Hoffman 2003; Hoffman et al. 2008). A lack of
trust in technology results in misuse (the user inappropriately relying on the technology) and
disuse (the user refusing to rely on the technology) (Lee and See 2004), which ultimately hinders
performance (Sorkin and Woods 1985; Wickens et al. 2000). Despite the potential benefits of
the data analytics previously discussed, auditors’ lack of trust in and reliance on data analytics
will cause these benefits to go unrealized. A lack of trust in technology may cause auditors to
have adverse reactions to the technology, including disengaging with audit tasks (Bamber and
Snowball 1988) and attempting to work around the technology (Bedard et al. 2003; Bedard et al.
2007; Dowling and Leech 2014).
Although different sources (human or technology) may have the same competency level
and provide identical information, trust in the information provided may still vary (McGinnies
and Ward 1980). Thus trust in the source presenting the results of the data analytics is expected
to influence auditors’ reliance on the information provided. As decision makers trust
information provided by humans more than technology sources (Lewandowsky et al. 2000), and
trust increases reliance (Muir 1989; Lerch and Prietula 1989), the following hypothesis is
presented regarding auditors’ reliance on data analytics as influenced by the source of
information:
H1: Auditors will rely more on data analytics provided by another human than data
analytics that are self-generated from a system.
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Risk Identified
Trust is influenced by contextual factors such as the perception and actual level of risk
involved, the balance of power and alternatives available to the decision maker (Mayer et al.
1995). Trust in information is influenced by the complexity of the decision making process
required by relying on the information (Simmell 1964; Lewis and Weigert 1982; Luhman 1982).
Trust in information increases when it reduces complexity in the decision making process (Lewis
and Weigert 1982), suggests proceeding with a simple course of action, suggests no issues
identified, or confirms expectations arising from previously obtained information (Simmell
1964; Luhman 1982). When information suggests proceeding on a complex course of action
there will be a reduction of trust, making it less likely that the decision maker will incorporate
the information into their decision making (Simmell 1964).
Trust impacts decision making only when some level of uncertainty is present (Lewis and
Weigert 1982; Mayer et al. 1995; Tomkins 2001). Accordingly, as decision uncertainty
increases trust in information used to make the decision decreases (Lewis and Weigert 1982;
Kramer 1999). An example of a setting where such uncertainty exists is during the audit process
when auditors must consider the risk that procedures performed did not detect an existing
material misstatement (Guénin-Paracini et al. 2014, 2015; Westermann et al. 2015). As
previously stated, information that suggests a complex action is deemed less trustworthy by
decision makers (Luhman 1982). In response to identifying a risk of material misstatement,
auditors are required to consider the complex task of changing the nature, timing, and extent of
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substantive procedures. 19 Thus information identifying a risk of misstatement requiring complex
follow up actions will likely be deemed less trustworthy by auditors.
While using analytical procedures can help auditors assess a risk of a material
misstatement (see AS 2305) or fraud (Knapp and Knapp 2001; Smith 2016), this does not
guarantee that the auditor will identify an actual misstatement (Cullinan and Sutton 2002).
When analytical procedures identify information indicative of a possible misstatement, auditors
may be reluctant to rely on this information (Glover et al. 2005). Auditors rely more on the
findings of analytical procedures when the results suggest that the information being examined is
fairly stated and there is a low risk of material misstatement. This suggests that auditors are
reluctant to rely on findings of analytical procedures that require the complex task of changing
substantive testing and performing additional work (Glover et al. 2005). This is likely
attributable to the increase risk of improperly changing substantive process to increase the
amount of follow up work required. Furthermore, when analytical procedures identify an
unusual fluctuation, auditors rely on explanations suggesting that the fluctuation is not the result
of an error (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Asare et al. 2000) and thus less complex follow up work is
necessary.
As data analytics are an outgrowth of analytical procedures (Appelbaum et al. 2017),
difference in auditors’ decisions when relying on analytical procedures are expected to persist
when relying on data analytics. Thus, as auditors are reluctant to rely on analytical procedures
that suggest a heightened risk of material misstatement (Glover et al. 2005), auditors are
expected to be reluctant to rely on data analytics that suggest a heightened risk of a material

19

Specifically, AS 2301.09 states “the auditor should design and perform audit procedures in a matter that addresses
the assessed risk of material misstatement due to error or fraud for each relevant assertion of each significant
account and disclosure”
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misstatement. Auditors are expected to trust and rely on information from data analytics that do
not present a risk of material misstatement (and do not require complex follow-up decisions)
more than information that presents a risk of material misstatement. Thus, the following
hypothesis is presented:
H2: Auditors will rely more on data analytics that indicate a low risk of misstatement
than a high risk of misstatement.
Data analytics offer expanded opportunities for identification of audit relevant
information (Jans et al. 2014; Brown-Liburd et al. 2015), however performing this analysis is
likely beyond the skillset of traditional audit teams (Ernst and Young 2015a; Richins et al. 2017).
In order to compensate for this, organizations may rely on employees with a non-audit skillset,
such as data scientists, to perform more sophisticated data analysis and provide the findings to
the audit team (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Richins et al. 2017). At times,
information provided from another source (human or technology) may contain an error (Waern
and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000). When information provided by another source
contains an error, a breach of trust results. This breach of trust results in decreased reliance on
the information source, however when the information source is a technology, reliance decreases
more than when the information source is another human. Thus, when a human provides
information that is not accurate and there is a breach of trust, the decrease in reliance will not be
as great as when a technology breaches trust (Lewandowsky et al. 2000). This suggests that
information provided by a human will be relied on more consistently under different
environmental contexts than information provided by technology (Lewandowsky et al. 2000).
The willingness to continue to rely on other humans may be attributable to the ability to share
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blame with another source in the event an incorrect decision is made (Whyte 1991;
Lewandowsky et al. 2000).
After viewing information that contains an error, a human presentation source results in
more consistent future reliance than a technology presentation source (Lewandowsky et al.
2000). When the results of data analytics do not present a risk that requires the complex task of
consideration of changing substantive procedures, there is a lower risk of making an error. Thus,
the source presenting a low risk is not expected to have a significant impact on auditors’ reliance
on this information. When a high risk is identified, a decrease in reliance is expected. As
information presented by another human is relied on more consistently and less subject to
contextual factors (Lewandowsky et al. 2000), this decrease is expected to be more pronounced
when presented by a technology. Thus, when technology identifies a risk that requires a
complex decision making process, auditors are expected to rely less on this information. This
hypothesis is formally stated as:
H3: The level of risk identified by the data analytics will moderate the effect of the
presentation source such that auditors will rely less on the findings of data analytics
identifying a high risk of misstatement when the information comes from a system rather
than a human.
Method
Participants
Personal connections were utilized to obtain and analyze responses from 92 external
financial statement auditors that completed an online experiment. 20 As the data analytic
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Of the 110 auditors that completed the experiment 64.55% of participants failed at least one manipulation check.
Thus excluding all participants that failed manipulation checks would result in excluding a substantial portion of the
sample and would limit any inferences drawn from this study. The results presented in the remainder of this study
contain the responses of the 92 participants that passed at least one manipulation check.
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standards state that public and private companies stand to benefit from these standards, auditors
from all size firms and all types of clients were eligible to participate. Furthermore, auditors of
all ranks use analytical procedures as part of their job (Trompeter and Wright 2010), and as data
analytics can be viewed as an outgrowth of analytical procedures (Appelbaum et al. 2017),
auditors of all ranks will be expected to use data analytics as part of their job. Thus, auditors of
all ranks employed by any size firm were eligible to participate in this study. As the task
required prior experience performing control risk assessments, participants were required to have
prior experience performing control risk assessments.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Participants
averaged 3.2 years of audit experience with a range of 0.5 years to 20 years. Forty seven
participants (51%) had the title of supervisor, manager or director. Thirty nine participants
(42%) were employed by national or international firms. Seventy eight participants (85%) were
CPAs. Table 6 provides a summary of the participants’ demographic information.

Experimental Task and Procedures
To test the hypothesis proposed above, a 2X2 experiment manipulating the presentation
source of the results of data analytics (a human versus a system) and the level of risk identified
(high versus low) as the independent variables was distributed to participants. Across all
experimental conditions, participants were told that upper level management has begun to pilot
test using data analytics on low risk audit areas of low risk engagements. Participants were
informed that their client, Omega computer parts, has been selected by upper management for
this program. Participants were informed that as part of planning the audit, data analytics would
be used to help assess the risk of material misstatement in a historically low risk account,
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accounts payable. Accounts payable was chosen as the audit area to apply the data analytics
because this area has been examined in previous data analytics research (Jans et al. 2014; Kogan
et al. 2014) and the AICPA has developed a guide for accounts payable (AICPA 2018).
Participants were informed that process mining was used to analyze the accounts payable
cycle, as process mining can identify audit relevant information (Jans et al. 2010; Jans et al.
2013; Jans et al. 2014). Process mining is the comparison of actual processes against designed
processes, and can identify the frequency of predetermined steps not occurring sequentially (Jans
et al. 2014). Participants were informed that the following predetermined steps should occur
sequentially, (1) create a purchase order, (2) sign a purchase order, (3) release a purchase order,
(4) receive goods, (5) receive invoice, and (6) pay invoice.

Independent and Dependent Variables
To manipulate presentation source, participants were informed that the findings of the
data analytics applied to accounts payable were communicated by either a software, or the firm’s
internal data scientist. A data scientist was chosen as the human presenting the results as firms
are developing data scientist groups (Ernst and Young 2015a; Agnew 2016a; Deloitte 2018). 21
While data scientists may not have strong accounting domain specific knowledge, they are able
to perform more sophisticated exploratory analysis than accountants are capable of conducting
(Richins et al. 2017); yet, accountants are likely better able to leverage this information (Kaplan
2006). Thus, in the data scientist condition, participants do not have any interaction with the
data analytics software. Alternatively, in the software condition, participants were informed that
they conducted the analytics on their firm’s software.

21

Additionally, job postings for data scientists were noted on all of the big 4’s websites.

121

To manipulate risk, participants were informed that the findings of the data analytics
identified either a high or low risk of a material misstatement. Participants were provided a
message describing the results of the analytics, which stated that the percentage of checks written
in relation to invoices received suggests a high or low risk of misstatement. They were informed
that the data analytics only presents the raw data analysis and does not incorporate financial
statement audit knowledge. Participants were asked on a seven point Likert scale the likelihood
that they would increase the level of control risk above low. 22
To measure the dependent variable of reliance, the reliance scale created by Hampton
(2005) was adapted. The scale consists of five items and is and items are measured using a
seven point Likert scale. The first item measures participant’s agreement with the information
identified by the data analytics. The second item measures participant’s confidence in the
accuracy of the findings of the data analytics. The third item measures the participant’s
preference to making audit decisions without the data analytics and is reverse coded. Item four
addresses participant’s willingness to incorporate the findings from the data analytics into their
decision making. The final item captures participant’s willingness to rely on the findings of the
data analytics. In addition to the five item measures, a question regarding participants’ trust in
the information provided was added to the reliance measure. To assess the reliability of the
measures of reliance, Cronbach alpha was initially calculated as 0.78 which is above the
recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978). Although above the recommended threshold
of 0.70, examination of the items making up the reliance variable revealed that the third item did
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As a result of the high manipulation check failure rate noted in footnote 2, a t test was used to compare the means
of the likelihood to increase control risk between the high and low risk conditions. Results suggest that participants
understood the manipulation (p=0.014). Additionally, an ANCOVA examined the differences between groups and
corroborated that the manipulation was effective (p=0.008).
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not correlate highly with the other items. As prior research discards items not loading properly
(Hampton 2005), the third item was excluded from the analysis. The five remaining item
measures are highly correlated with a Cronbach alpha of 0.90. 23
Participants were asked to assess the likelihood that fraud has occurred in the accounts
payable process. This variable was measured on a seven point Likert scale with endpoints of
“Not at all likely” and “Extremely likely”.
Finally, participants finished by answering demographic questions and manipulation
checks. A potential covariate of participant’s self-confidence effectively incorporating data
analytics into the audit process was measured as well. Self-confidence was measured as this has
been shown to influence decision maker’s trust in and reliance on technology (Muir and Moray
1996). This variable was measured using a 7 point Likert scale adapted from Lewandowsky et al.
(2000). Including this variable in the analysis does not change the inferences drawn from this
study.

Results
Identification of potential covariates
A correlation matrix was examined to identify the existence of any covariates and
differences between conditions. Participant’s age was identified as potential covariates for the
Reliance dependent variable. Participant’s prior experience using data analytics was identified
as a potential covariate for participant’s likelihood of fraud assessments. Examination of
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Prior research has found that excluding items that do not correlate with other items is appropriate (Hampton
2005). Thus, the third item was excluded from the analysis.
Additionally, composite reliability was calculated at 0.90, which is above the recommended threshold of 0.70
(Fornell and Larcker 1981).
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conditions revealed more males in the System condition (p=0.017) and more CPAs in the High
Risk condition (p=0.060). These variables were included in the results presented only when they
were identified as significant (p<0.10).

Test of Hypotheses
All hypotheses were tested using the primary Reliance dependent variable. Table 7 Panel
A provides descriptive statistics for the reliance dependent variable. While all participants
indicate a willingness to rely on data analytics, reliance is greatest when a self-generated system
presents a high risk, and lowest when a data scientist presents a high risk. Participants’ age was
identified as a covariate (p=0.078), such that younger participants were more likely to rely on the
data analytics. H1 predicts that auditors will rely more on data analytics provided by another
human than data analytics that are self-generated from a system. As shown in Table 7 Panel B,
the ANCOVA results suggest that auditors do not exhibit any difference (p=0.523) in their
likelihood to rely on data analytics presented by another human than data analytics that are
presented by self-generated from a system. H2 predicts that auditors will rely more on data
analytics that indicate a low risk of misstatement than a high risk of misstatement. As shown in
Table 7 Panel B, the ANCOVA results suggest that auditors do not exhibit any difference
(p=0.726) in their likelihood to rely on data analytics that identify a low risk of misstatement as
compared to a high risk of misstatement. H3 predicts that the level of risk identified by the data
analytics will moderate the effect of the presentation source such that auditors will rely less on
the findings of data analytics identifying high risk of misstatement when the information comes
from a system rather than a human. Although Table 7 Panel B shows an interactive effect of

124

these two variables (p=0.052), it is not the hypothesized moderation. Thus, the moderation effect
hypothesized in H3 is not supported.
The interactive effect suggests that auditors are more likely to rely on data analytics
presented from a self-generating system when a high risk of misstatement is identified as
compared to a low risk of misstatement. Alternatively, auditors are more likely to rely on data
analytics presented from another human when a low risk of misstatement is identified as
compared to a high risk. These findings suggest that auditors are more likely to rely on a system
when more extensive follow-up work is required. Alternatively, auditors are more likely to rely
on another human when less extensive follow up work is required. See Figure 4 Panel A for a
graphical representation for the results for the Reliance dependent variable.

Additional Analysis
Participants indicated the likelihood that they believe fraud occurred based on the
findings of the data analytics. Participant’s prior experience using data analytics as part of the
audit process was identified as a significant covariate (p=0.003) and was included in the analysis.
Greater prior experience using data analytics is associated with a higher assessment of the
likelihood that fraud had occurred. See Table 8 Panel A for descriptive statistics for the
likelihood of fraud variable. As shown in Table 8 Panel B, the ANCOVA results suggest that the
level of risk identified by the data analytics (p=0.268), the source of the analytics (0.221), and
their interactive effect (p=0.168) do not impact auditors’ assessments of the likelihood of fraud.
Figure 4 Panel B provides a graphical depiction of the results. Results of a planned contrast
presented in Table 8 Panel C demonstrate that auditors perceive the likelihood of fraud as lowest
when viewing the results of data analytics presented by a self-generating software that presents a
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low risk (p=0.028). 24 Thus, auditors would be least likely to increase fraud risk when results of
data analytics are presented by a self-generating system that presents a low risk.

Conclusion
Advances in technology have enabled auditors’ analytical procedures to move beyond
traditional measures of ratio analysis and have enabled more advanced forms of analysis
including population testing of supporting data (Alles 2014; Gray and Debreceny 2014; Jans et
al. 2014; Richins et al. 2017; Huerta and Jensen 2017; Jans et al. 2010), predictive modeling
(Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013; SAS 2014; Krahel and Titera 2015) and analysis of
unstructured data (Vasarhelyi et al. 2015; Warren et al. 2015). Although the use of data
analytics in accounting is expanding (Deloitte 2010; DHHS 2012; KPMG 2012;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2013; AICPA 2015a; Coffey 2015; Ernst and Young 2015a), there is
limited research examining auditors’ use of these tools (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015; Rose et al.
2017). Yet, auditors have expressed interest in increasing the use of technology enabled tools as
part of the audit process (Lowe et al. 2017). Although data analytics have the potential to
improve auditors’ decisions (Davenport and Harris 2007), these benefits will not be realized if
auditors are reluctant to rely on these tools.
The results of this study contribute to the literature by providing initial evidence on
auditor’s reliance on data analytics. Prior literature on auditors’ use of data analytics is limited
to identifying that auditors are not effective at using data analytics to identify patterns when
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Examination of variances revealed that the Likelihood of Fraud variable had unequal variances. As equal
variances are not required when ANCOVA cell sizes are equal, using the process outlined in Lyubimov et al. (2013),
participants were excluded using a random number generator to create equal cell sizes. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged, except for the significant planned contrast results noted are no longer significant.
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presented before traditional audit evidence (Rose et al. 2017). The results of this study suggest
that while the presentation source and level of risk identified do not result in different levels of
reliance on the findings of data analytics individually, together these two variables may impact
auditors’ reliance on data analytics. Specifically, auditors appear more likely to rely on data
analytics presented from a self-generating system when a high risk is identified as compared to a
low risk. The opposite appears to be true for auditors’ reliance on data analytics presented from
another human, as reliance is greater when a low risk is identified compared to a high risk. As
firms should be most concerned with a lack of reliance when a high risk is identified, the results
of this study suggest that having a data analytics group may not be as effective at inducing
reliance as training auditors to use a software on their own. Additionally, when viewing the
findings of data analytics that suggest a low risk of misstatement and is presented from a selfgenerating system, auditors’ assess the lowest likelihood that fraud has occurred.
This study also contributes to the theory of trust literature (Mayer et al. 1995) and the
trust in technology literature (Waern and Ramberg 1996; Lewandowsky et al. 2000).
Technology has advanced and has become more prominent in society (Liburd-Brown et al.
2015), which may influence decisions makers’ familiarity and trust in technology. Thus, future
research is needed to examine how advances in technology have impacted humans trust in
technology and if the findings from prior research on trust in technology still hold today.
As with any research study, these findings are subject to limitations and present
opportunities for future research. Although a substantial portion of the auditors in this study’s
sample were employed by regional and local firms, the difference in use of technology enabled
tools among firm size is diminishing (Lowe et al. 2017). As Lowe et al. (2017) does not
specifically examine data analytics, future research may seek to examine how different size firms
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are implementing data analytics. This study only examines one type of data analytics, process
mining, examining one audit area, accounts payable. Thus, future research may seek to examine
other types of data analytics, such as predictive modeling (Kuenkaikaew and Vasarhelyi 2013;
SAS 2014; Krahel and Titera 2015) and network analysis (Jans et al. 2014). Future research may
also seek to examine auditors’ use of data analytics that analyze non-financial and unstructured
data. The advancement of technology enabling language processing tools now allow for text
analysis (Yoon et al. 2015); thus, examining auditors’ use of the findings of these tools may
provide avenues for future research. Future research may seek to examine how error rate of data
analytics impact reliance on these tools, as expertise of the trustee has been shown to influence
the trustor’s trust in that party (Hovland et al. 1953; Good 1988; Lieberman 1981). Finally,
future research should examine how data analytics impact other audit tasks such as changing
budgeted audit hours. As trust has been shown to change with increased interaction (Boyle and
Bonacich 1970; Kee and Knox 1970), future research should seek to examine the impact
interaction with the data analytics has on reliance.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
The three studies presented in this dissertation explore the impact of data analytics on
auditors’ judgments.

Study One examines an attempt to structure the audit process for

nonprofessionalized auditors using data analytics.

As Study One identifies that presenting

nonprofessionalized auditors with data analytics may result in detrimental implications, Study Two
and Study Three examine the impact that data analytics have on financial statement auditors’
judgments.

Study One highlights the importance of using professional, as opposed to

nonprofessionalized auditors, to audit high risk areas identified through data analytics. Study Two
examines the impact that different data analytical models that analyze different types of data have
on auditors’ judgments. Study Three examines the impact of the presentation source on auditor’s
judgments under varying levels of identified risk.

The following paragraphs discuss the

contributions of each of the aforementioned studies from a theory and/or practice perspective.
The results of Study One highlight the importance of using professional auditors to perform
follow up audit procedures on high risk audit areas identified through data analytics. While using
data analytics may allow for auditors to focus their time on the highest risk areas (Liburd-Brown
et al. 2015), the statistical outliers identified may have justifiable explanations (Kogan et al. 2014).
The results of this study highlight the use of nonprofessionalized auditors acting in a professional
capacity. The auditors examined in this study do not meet the criteria of professionals as
demonstrated by the lack of expertise, certification, and professional judgment of these auditors
and the adverse impacts their actions ultimately can have on society. The adverse societal
implications attributable to these nonprofessionalized auditors demonstrate the need for
professional auditors to review high risk areas identified through data analytics.
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Dirsmith et al. (2015) argues that the accounting profession is becoming increasingly deprofessionalized (). With the rise of data analytics in the public accounting domain (Coffey 2015;
IAASB 2017; Appelbaum et al. 2017), it may even seem viable to structure the audit process
sufficiently through guidance from data analytics to allow nonprofessionals to adequately perform
audits. The results of this study highlight several adverse societal implications from utilizing
nonprofessionalized auditors in a critical audit setting.

This study warns against using

nonprofessionalized auditors to audit high risk areas identified through data analytics. Society
would likely be better off if the accounting profession was to actively seek a reversal of the deprofessionalization trend (Dirsmith et al. 2015) and ensure that professionals are performing
associated audit procedures over high risk areas identified through data analytics. Although this
study examines a group of healthcare fraud auditors, several shortcomings of implementing data
analytics into the audit process have been identified that may manifest in a financial statement
audit setting.
Although the procedures utilized in this study relate to healthcare regulatory fraud auditors
who are not drawn from the audit profession, it is unclear if external financial statement auditors
will also incur difficulties in properly using and interpreting data analytics. The results of the first
study set the foundation for the remaining two studies in this dissertation to examine the impact
data analytics have on external financial statement auditors’ judgments.
The results from Study Two highlight the importance of considering the type of data
analytical model used in conjunction with the type of data analyzed. While data analytics
uniformly impact fraud risk assessments, utilizing different types of data analytics results in
auditors changing budgeted audit hours by different amounts. When predictive data analytical
models are used, auditors increase budgeted hours more when such models analyze financial data
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as compared to nonfinancial data. The opposite is true when anomaly data analytical models are
used, as auditors increase budgeted hours more when nonfinancial data is analyzed as compared
to financial data. Additionally, the results of this study reveal that auditors’ use of predictive
modeling is more prevalent in practice than prior research suggests.
The results from Study Two have important implications for audit practice, as they suggest
that understanding auditors’ use of data analytical models should not be considered in isolation.
While auditors’ may not exhibit a difference in incorporating the results of data analytics that use
a type of model, or analyzed a type of data, considering these two factors together result in different
judgments. By highlighting the joint effect of the type of data analytical model and data analyzed
on auditor’s judgments, this study lays the foundation for future research on the types of data
analytics that may impact auditors’ judgments.
While Study Two examines only two types of data analytical models that analyzed two
types of data, there are many other variations of data analytical models and types of data that
auditors may utilize that can be examined in future research. Future studies should examine
auditor’s use of other types of data analytical models, including rules-based and social network
models (Jans et al. 2014) in addition to analysis of other types of data. As Study Two highlights
the joint effect of data analytical models and data analyzed, future research may seek to examine
the impact of other combinations of these variables.
The results of Study Three indicate that auditor’s reliance on data analytics are not
impacted by the presentation source or level of risk identified. Yet, the results reveal that the joint
effect of presentation source and level of risk identified impact auditor’s reliance on data analytics.
When the findings of data analytics are presented by another human, auditors rely more on findings
that suggest a low risk than a high risk. The opposite is true when the findings of data analytics
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are presented by a self-generating system, as auditors rely more on findings that suggest a high
rather than a low risk.
The results from Study Three have implications for audit practice, as they suggest that the
development of data scientist groups by accounting firms to introduce data analytical skills into
audit teams may not be the most effective method of inducing reliance on the analytics from
auditors. Data analytics can help auditors focus their time on higher risk areas that require more
judgment intensive tasks (Liburd-Brown et al. 2015). The results suggest that such benefits will
not be realized when high risk areas are presented from a data scientist. Firms should reevaluate
the development of data scientist groups, as the results of this study suggest that training individual
auditors to use data analytic software is more effective at inducing reliance on high risks.
Study Three examines the presentation source and level of risk identified by the data
analytics using analysis called process mining. Future studies should seek to examine how other
types of data analytics impact auditor’s judgments. Future research may seek to examine how
increased experience using data analytics impacts auditors’ reliance on these data analytics. As
past error rates have been shown to influence judgments (Good 1988; Lieberman 1981), future
research may seek to examine how the past error rates of analytics impacts reliance on data
analytics.
In summary, the results reported in this dissertation suggest that data analytics impact
auditors’ judgments. Understanding auditor’s use of data analytics is an emerging area with prior
research limited to demonstrating that auditors are only effective at incorporating the results of
data analytics visualizations when viewed later in the audit process (Rose et al. 2017). By
presenting empirical evidence of the use of data analytics in the audit domain, these studies
contribute to our understanding of judgment and decision-making. This dissertation highlights the
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importance of using professional auditors to assess risks identified by data analytics. Furthermore,
not all data analytics uniformly impact auditors’ judgments. Thus, merely providing a decision
maker with the findings of data analytics may not result in the desired outcome.
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Background of respondents:
1. Please tell me about your job, what you do and what your responsibilities are.
2. What has been your background leading up this point? How did you get to your current
job?
3. What is your current title? May I have a business card?
4. How long have you been in this position?
Control items:
1. Can you tell me about what kind of provider you are? (ex: hospital, SNF, physician’s
office)
2. How many beds do you have? What is the breakdown between SNF, NF, ALF, IL, etc.
3. What county and state are you located in?
4. Is the organization a Non-profit or For-profit provider?
5. Can you talk to me about the level of competition you face in your operating area.
(occupancy rates, payer mix, referrals, etc.).
ZPIC Audits:
1. Can you tell me what you know or have heard about ZPIC audits?
2. Can you tell me how and if you changed your activities (corporate compliance, education
and training provided to staff) to prepare for them? Are you preparing differently from
previous investigations?
3. Can you describe the ZPIC audit(s) experience? (the number of audits, if you received
any advance notice, the number of auditors, how long the process was, resources used)
4. Can you tell me how long were they on site for? How much of your time did they
require? How did you deal with their requests?
5. Can you tell me what the timeframe was from notice of the ZPIC audit until they showed
up and until any issues were resolved? How does this compare to previous
investigations?
6. How would you characterize your discussion with the ZPIC auditors? Can you tell me
how the ZPICs treated your employees? Were they demanding, accommodating or
considerate of your time?
7. Can you tell me if and how you have responded to the ZPIC investigation? Have you
done anything differently after the fact? What did you and your colleagues learn from this
experience?
8. Can you tell me what you think the likelihood is of them returning?
9. What were the primary issues that the ZPICs brought up? What were their primary
findings? Can I see one of the documents that you received? (***Remind the
organization to redact resident identifying information***).
10. Can you tell me if you faced any penalties or fines? If so what were they?
11. Can you tell me about the most challenging part of the audit and why it was so
challenging?
12. Can you tell me what documents do they usually look at? Can I see one that you were
cited on?
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13. Can you tell me to whom do they communicate their findings to? Is it a formal report?
Who receives the report? Are there different versions. Would you share any of the
documents with me?
Societal impact:
1. Have you experienced any unexpected to unanticipated consequences from the ZPIC
audit?
2. Has the ZPIC audit impacted the individuals/communities you serve?
3. Did the quality of care change during and after the ZPIC audit?
4. What do you think would happen to the elderly in your region if you went out of
business?
5. Did the ZPIC audit put any financial hardship on your organization? Do you think a
ZPIC audit could result in bankruptcy?
6. What do you think most of your patients would do if your organization did not exist?
What other HC options are available to the community? How could the community be
impacted by this lack of service?
Third parties influencing a change in behavior:
1. Did any third parties (external auditors, attorneys, consultants, etc.) give you any notice
or warnings about the ZPICs?
2. Did third parties (external auditors, attorneys, consultants, etc.) help you prepare for the
ZPICs? Did they provide any advice or counsel for preparation?
3. Did third parties (external auditors, attorneys, consultants, etc.) help you respond to the
ZPICs? Did they provide any advice or counsel for response?
4. How would you have liked third parties (external auditors, attorneys, consultants, etc.) to
have helped you prepare and respond to the ZPICs?
Leverage, negotiation:
1. Do you have any ability to negotiate with the ZPIC auditors? How does this compare to
previous fraud investigators?
2. How would you describe the relationship with your external auditor?
3. How would you describe the relationship with your ZPIC auditor, and previous fraud
investigators?
4. Does your relationship with the ZPICs differ from previous healthcare auditors?
After being in the industry for several years, do you think the average provider (not you,
someone else) could exert leverage on the ZPICs?

Figure 1 – Interview Protocol
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Table 1 – Study 1 participants demographic information

#
1
2
3

Job title
Manager in the revenue cycle
Owner
CEO

Financial
Hot spot Statement
ZPIC came
Subindustry
Fines6 region3 Auditor Size
on site
Hospital
SNF1
Hospice

Director in care management
department
Hospital
CEO
Hospice
Financial Director (CFO equivalent) SNF1

No
Yes
No

No
Yes
No

No
Yes
No

International
Regional4

No
Yes
Yes
N/A2

No
Yes
Yes
N/A2
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

International
National
Regional
Regional
Local
National
Local
Anonymous
Local
National4

International
Local

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

Anonymous
Local
Local
N/A
Local
Local
Anonymous
National
National
Local
Local
Local4

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

CFO
Nurse consultant
Chief Compliance Officer
Owner
CEO
Executive Director
CEO
Owner
Clinical administrator
Chief Compliance Officer
President
Owner
Chief Operating Officer
CEO
CEO
Administrator
Director in the revenue cycle
Director of Compliance

Hospice
Home Health
DME5

Home Health
Dr. Office
Hospital
Home Health

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Director of Nursing
Clinical Care Coordinator
Director of Nursing
Administrator
CFO
Owner
Chief Operating Officer
CEO
Agency director
CEO
Director of Clinical services
Owner

Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
DME5
Home Health
Home Health
Home Health
Dr. Office
DME5
DME5

Nonprofit

National

N/A
National4
N/A
National4
Local4
National4
National
Local
Regional4

1- SNF represents a Skilled Nursing Facility, commonly known as a nursing home
2- During the interview, the interviewee revealed that they did not have a ZPIC investigation. The interviewer proceeded with the interview to inquire of the
participants perspective abou the ZPIC audits based on what they understood other providers have experienced.
3- Hot Spot Region refers to if the provider has at least one location in one of the nine designed hot spots for Medicare fraud (Department 2012)
4- Some participants did not have an external financial statement audit, however they had consultant or tax work performed by a CPA firm
5- DME represents a Durable Medical Equipment company
6- All fines were related to documentation, none were fraud related

Note: More than one individual from some of the providers were interviewed
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Author
Rita McGrath

Title
To Make Better Decisions,
Combine Datasets

John Boudreau

Predict What Employees
Will Do Without Freaking
Them Out

Werner Reinartz and
Rajkumar Venkatesan
Bechara Choucair, Jay
Bhatt and Raed Mansour

Track Customer Attitudes
to Predict Their Behaviors
How Cities are Using
Analytics to Improve Public
Health

Karen Mills

Use Data to Fix the Small
Business Lending Gap
A Process for HumanAlgorithm Decision Making

Michael Mankins and Lori
Sherer
Walter Frick

Jeanne Harris and Mark
McDonald

Finding Entrepreneurs
Before They’ve Founded
Anything
What the Companies That
Predict the Future Do
Differently

Beware the Analytics
Bottleneck
When a simple Rule of
Thumb Beats a Fancy
Algorithm
Brian McCarthy
Integrate Analytics Across
Your Entire Business
Jeff Elton and Simon Arkell Create a Strategy That
Anticipates and Learns
Brian McCarthy
Justin Fox

Use
Reduction in funding to
NYC Parks and Recreation
tree pruning caused treeinjury claims to soar
Google determined when
employees are most likely to
quit, offered those
employees “new career
roles”
Predict returning customers
based on behavior
Chicago Department of
Public Health (CDPH) use
to assign risk scores for
inspections
Banks Small Business
lending
Optimizing decisions on
what collection accounts to
pursue
Identify entrepreneurs that
will likely start a company
Identify manufacturers’
machines that are about to
fail so can be replaced and
not disrupt production
Increase sales
Predicting customer
behavior
Identify key performance
indicators
Help doctors identify people
at risk of developing certain
diseases

Figure 2 –Predictive models in use outside of accounting from the Harvard Business Review
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Panel A - Reliance
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
Predictive model
Financial

Anomaly model
Non-financial

Panel B - Fraud Risk Assessment
6
5
4
3
2
Predictive model

Anomaly model
Financial

Non-financial
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Panel C - Budgeted Hours Percent Change
25
20
15
10
5
0
Predictive model
Financial

Anomaly model
Non-financial

Figure 3 – Graphical depiction of results of study 2
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Table 2 – Demographic profile of study 2 participants (n=98)
Panel A

Male
Female

n
62
36

%
63.3%
36.7%

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director
Partner

22
32
7
19
4
14

22.4%
32.7%
7.1%
19.4%
4.1%
14.3%

Local
Regional
National
International

11
27
25
35

11.2%
27.6%
25.5%
35.7%

Audit manufacturing clients
Yes
No

50
48

51.0%
49.0%

Audit privately held clients
Yes
No

82
16

83.7%
16.3%

Experience using data analytics
59
Yes
39
No

60.2%
39.8%

Gender

Title

Firm size

Experience performing fraud risk assessments
92
93.9%
Yes
6
6.1%
No
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Panel B
TITLE
Predictive
n
%
6
24.0%
7
28.0%
1
4.0%
5
20.0%
2
8.0%
4
16.0%

Financial

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director
Partner

Nonfinancial

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director
Partner

5
8
3
5
0
3

Financial

Local
Regional
National
International

FIRM SIZE
Predictive
n
%
2
8.0%
11
44.0%
4
16.0%
8
32.0%

Nonfinancial

Local
Regional
National
International

3
6
8
7

20.8%
33.3%
12.5%
20.8%
0.0%
12.5%

12.5%
25.0%
33.3%
29.2%
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Anomaly
n
6
6
0
6
1
6

%
24.0%
24.0%
0.0%
24.0%
4.0%
24.0%

5
11
3
3
1
1

20.8%
45.8%
12.5%
12.5%
4.2%
4.2%

Anomaly
n
6
3
8
8

%
24.0%
12.0%
32.0%
32.0%

0
7
5
12

0.0%
29.2%
20.8%
50.0%

Table 3 – Results of study 2 Reliance variable
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics - Reliance mean [standard deviation]

Type of Data
Financial

Predictive model
22.600
[5.635]
n=25

Type of Model
Anomaly model
21.920
[5.514]
n=25

Nonfinancial

20.333
[6.404]
n=24

20.958
[5.086]
n=24

Overall

21.490
[6.069]
n=49

21.449
[5.276]
n=49

df

MSE

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Source of variation
Type of Model
Type of Data
Types of Model*Type of Data
Error

1
1
1
94

Overall
22.260
[5.528]
n=50
20.646
[5.730]
n=48

F-Statistic
0.019
63.809
10.427
32.235

p-value
0.00
1.98
0.32

0.981
0.163
0.571

Dependent variable is the Reliance scale adapted from Hampton (2005). The reliance dependent variable is the total
score of five questions answered on 7 point likert scales. These questions measure participants 1) agreement with the
information identified by the data analytics, 2) confidence in the accuracy of the findings of the data analytics, 3)
confidence to evaluate fraud risk without the analytics (reverse coded), 4) willingness to incorporate the findings from the
analytics into their decision making, 5) willingness to rely on the findings of the data analytics. The total Reliance score
may range from 5 to 35. The means are reported in Panel A.
The Type of Model was manipulated by varying whether the participants was told the Central Data Analytics Group used
Anomaly models (Type of Model=1) or Predictive models (Type of Model=0). Type of Data was manipulated by varying
whether the Central Data Analytics analyzed financial data (Type of Data=1) or nonfinancial data (Type of Data=0).
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Table 4 – results of study 2 Fraud Risk Assessment variable
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics - Fraud Risk Assessment mean [standard deviation]

Type of Data
Financial

Predictive model
3.875
[1.262]
n=24

Type of Model
Anomaly model
4.083
[1.100]
n=24

Nonfinancial

3.917
[0.776]
n=24

3.792
[1.021]
n=24

Overall

3.896
[1.036]
n=48

3.938
[1.060]
n=48

df

MSE

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of variation
Type of Model
Type of Data
Types of Model*Type of Data
FRExp
Error

1
1
1
1
91

Overall
3.979
[1.176]
n=48
3.854
[0.899]
n=48

F-Statistic
0.052
0.011
0.357
6.426
1.053

p-value
0.05
0.01
0.34
6.10

0.825
0.919
0.562
0.015

Dependent variable "fraud risk" is measured on a 7 point likert scale with endpoints of "Very low fraud risk" and "Very
high fraud risk". The means are reported in Panel A.
The Type of Model was manipulated by varying whether the participants was told the Central Data Analytics Group used
Anomaly models (Type of Model=1) or Predictive models (Type of Model=0). Type of Data was manipulated by varying
whether the Central Data Analytics analyzed financial data (Type of Data=1) or nonfinancial data (Type of Data=0).
FRExp is measured on a 5 point likert scale with endpoints of "Not at all experienced" and "Extremely experienced".
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Table 5 - Results of study 2 Budgeted Audit Hours variable
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics - Change in Budgeted Audit Hours mean [standard deviation]

Type of Data
Financial

Predictive model
19.480
[14.021]
n=25

Type of Model
Anomaly model
14.160
[9.616]
n=25

Nonfinancial

11.375
[9.458]
n=24

18.417
[11.769]
n=24

Overall

15.510
[12.567]
n=49

16.245
[10.827]
n=49

df

MSE

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of variation
Type of Model
Type of Data
Types of Model*Type of Data
Size
Error

1
1
1
1
93

Panel C: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects controlling for employer Size
Source of variation
df
Effect of Type of Model on nonfinancial data
1
Effect of Type of Model on financial data
1
1
Effect of Type of Data on predictive models
Effect of Type of Data on anomaly models
1

Overall
16.820
[11.820]
n=50
14.896
[11.146]
n=48

13.224
90.671
935.576
752.275
122.890

MSE
409.033
353.780
843.339
101.252

p-value

F-Statistic

0.898
0.237
0.015
0.015

0.02
1.42
6.20
6.12

F-Statistic

p-value
3.33
2.88
6.86
0.82

0.071
0.093
0.010
0.366

Dependent variable is the percent change in budgeted audit hours. Participants used a slider scale ranging from -100% to 100% to
select their answer. The means are reported in Panel A.
The Type of Model was manipulated by varying whether the participants was told the Central Data Analytics Group used Anomaly
models (Type of Model=1) or Predictive models (Type of Model=0). Type of Data was manipulated by varying whether the Central
Data Analytics analyzed financial data (Type of Data=1) or nonfinancial data (Type of Data=0).
Size measures the size of the accounting firm the participant is employed by. Local firms are measured as 1, regional firms as 2, national
firms 3, and international firms as 4.
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BACKGROUND
Assume that you are the audit senior (in-charge) assigned to the 12/31/17 fiscal year-end audit of
Madison Inc. The audit team consists of you (the senior auditor), two staff, a manager, and a
partner. Madison Inc. is a domestic privately held, mid-sized manufacturer of sporting goods
equipment. It makes a variety of products for baseball, football, hockey, basketball, hunting, and
fishing. Its products are sold across the U.S. to retailers of sporting goods equipment and
directly to customers via its internet website. Your firm has audited Madison Inc. for the last five
years and past audits have always resulted in unmodified (i.e., clean) audit opinions. As in the
prior year, the partner-in-charge of the Madison Inc. audit has set overall audit risk for the 2017
audit at “Low”.
Assume it is October 2017 and you are currently in the planning phase of the 12/31/17 fiscal
year-end audit.
TASK OBJECTIVE
Based on the information provided in this case, you will be asked to prepare for the fraud
brainstorming session for Madison. During this session, fraud risk will be assessed and changing
budgeted hours will be considered for the revenue cycle in conjunction with any identified risks
for the current year (12/31/17) Madison Inc. audit. It is important that you respond to questions
in this case study as you normally would during your day-to-day activities.
Background of Revenue cycle
Inherent risk has been set at “MEDIUM” in all of Madison’s previous audits.
Control Risk for the revenue cycle for the 2017 Madison Inc. audit has been assessed as “LOW”.
Madison Inc. relies largely on adequate separation of duties and proper authorization of
transactions to meet internal control objectives. Internal controls overall are very effective. No
significant control issues have been noted during previous audits.
Performance materiality for the 2016 audit was calculated as $301,000. Performance materiality
for the current year (2017) audit was calculated as $304,000.
Considerations for Fraud Risk Assessment:
Fraud risk has been set at “LOW” for all of Madison’s previous audits. Several factors
contributed to initially assessing Madison’s fraud risk as “LOW” in the current year audit
including:
• No significant incentives/pressures, opportunities or rationalizations by management
have been identified for committing fraud.
• Experience with the client indicates that top management of Madison Inc. is fairly
conservative in terms of reporting financial results.
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•
•
•
•
•

No factors appear to exist that might motivate them to circumvent or override existing
control procedures.
The sporting goods industry is experiencing steady market trends.
Madison has reported stable profitability over the past five years and exceeds all debt
covenants by substantial amounts.
There are no significant financial interests in Madison from the Board of Directors or
Management.
Your firm has a good working relationship with Madison.
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Assume that over the past ten years all of your firm’s clients have granted your firm permission
to collect non-identifiable data to be used for data analysis during the audit process. This enables
your firm to compare non-identifiable data across clients over the previous ten years. Although
client data may deviate from industry-wide data (i.e., clients may be somewhat larger or smaller
than the industry average), the level of detail provided in the broad historical data allows for
more sophisticated analysis to be performed, and thus more effective identification of unusual
activity. Your firm’s Central Data Analytics Group is increasingly being used to analyze client
data during the fraud risk assessment phase of the firm’s audits. Note that:
• The Central Data Analytics Group is capable of analyzing various types of data using
data analytical models to identify audit relevant information.
• The general consensus in your firm is that the Central Data Analytics Group is very
skilled at data analysis. As the Central Data Analytics Group does not employ any CPAs
or anyone with an accounting background, their accounting knowledge is very limited.
At times, the Central Data Analytics Group performs very innovative analyses, however,
the audit relevancy of the information is not always apparent to the audit team. When
this occurs, your firm’s policy is to document why this information is not being used.
• When presenting the results of data analysis, the Central Data Analytics Group typically
states the risk of a misstatement and the estimated dollar amount of misstatement. Your
colleagues have reported that both of these numbers come over as very precise, yet the
numbers are not always as reliable as information identified by traditional analytical
procedures. At times, the actual misstatement has been found to be substantially higher
than the estimate provided by the Central Data Analytics Group. Alternatively, there were
times when no misstatement was identified.
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In the case of the 2017 Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group is facilitating your fraud
risk assessment of revenue by using (predictive/ anomaly) analytical models to analyze
(financial / non-financial) information, specifically (journal entries / e-mails). The Central
Data Analytics Group is experienced at using (predictive/anomaly) models to analyze
(financial / non-financial) information such as (journal entries / e-mails). (Predictive models
identify patterns in current data similar to patterns associated with previously identified
issues/occurrences / Anomaly models identify statistical outliers indicating very high or low
amounts based on you firm’s client base). The Central Data Analytics Group identifies all
activity that is deemed unusual regardless of the likely source of the activity (for example, error
or fraud). The use of (predictive/anomaly) models to analyze (journal entries / e-mails) is
discussed in more detail on the next page.
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(1a) When using (predictive/anomaly) models to analyze journal entries (financial
information) for the Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group is capable of identifying
journal entries that affect revenue. For the Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group
used this financial information to identify the number of journal entries that include revenue
and were made just below the performance materiality threshold. Although the Central Data
Analytics Group has explained what criteria they use for “just below the performance
materiality” for the journal entries, this explanation contained substantial statistical jargon and
was not well understood by your audit team. Several of your colleagues have reported similar
issues with explanations received from the Central Data Analytics Group. The Central Data
Analytics Group only performed this analysis using (predictive/anomaly) models for journal
entries that affect revenue.
(1b) When using (predictive/anomaly) models to analyze e-mails (non-financial information)
for the Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group is capable of identifying sentences in
the e-mails that discuss revenue. For the Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group used
this non-financial information to identify optimistic language used in internal and external emails for sentences that discuss revenue. Although the Central Data Analytics Group has
explained what criteria they use for “optimistic language” in the e-mails, this explanation
contained substantial statistical jargon and was not well understood by your audit team. Several
of your colleagues have reported similar issues with explanations received from the Central Data
Analytics Group. The Central Data Analytics Group only performed this analysis using
(predictive/anomaly) models for sentences in e-mails that discuss revenue.
(2a) The Central Data Analytics Group employs predictive analytical models to identify
patterns that are similar to previously identified issues. Predictive models rely on prior
historical data to identify patterns and predict future events. Predictive models compare
information in the data collected from clients associated with previously identified
events/occurrences to current information. Predictive models may be used in the audit process
to identify a pattern over several years associated with a previously identified material
misstatement that may be indicative of a current material misstatement. For the current year
Madison audit, the Central Data Analytics Group used predictive models to analyze the ratio of
(the number of journal entries affecting revenue just below performance materiality to the
number of total journal entries (financial information) / the amount of optimistic language in
external e-mails compared to internal e-mails for sentences that discuss revenue (non-financial
information)) to data collected from all of your firms’ manufacturing clients from previous
years.

(2b) The Central Data Analytics Group employs anomaly analytical models to identify
statistical outliers. Anomaly models rely only on current year (non-historical) data to identify
statistical outliers. Anomaly models compare information in the data collected from your firm’s
client base to identify very high or low amounts or ratios. Anomaly models may be used in the
audit process to identify very high or low ratios (i.e. gross margin, debt to equity, current ratio)
that may be indicative of a current material misstatement. For the current year Madison audit,
the Central Data Analytics Group used anomaly models to analyze the ratio of (the number of
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journal entries affecting revenue just below performance materiality to the number of total
journal entries (financial information) / the amount of optimistic language in external e-mails
compared to internal e-mails for sentences that discuss revenue (non-financial information)) to
data collected from all of your firms’ manufacturing clients in the current year.

(3 – this is shown in all conditions)
The Central Data Analytics Group informs you that after using (predictive analytical models /
anomaly analytical models) (as discussed above) as part of Madison Inc.’s fraud risk
assessment, the (journal entries / e-mails) were identified as containing unusual activity. This
unusual activity may indicate that sales are overstated, and thus, may represent a heightened
fraud risk. Alternatively, the Central Data Analytics Group may have identified unusual activity
attributable to innovative or unusual manufacturing practices. Thus, the unusual activity
identified may represent a significant fraud risk or have a reasonable explanation.
Despite the Central Data Analytics Group’s ability to analyze (journal entries / e-mails) using
(predictive / anomaly) analytical models, the Central Data Analytics Group does not have a
strong understanding of accounting and auditing. Nonetheless, the Central Data Analytics Group
stated that by using (predictive analytical models / anomaly analytical models) to analyze
(journal entries / e-mails), they believe there is a 56% risk that revenue is overstated by some
amount between $270,000 and $310,000. In the past your colleagues have reported that these
estimates are often not accurate. At times the actual misstatement has been substantially higher
than the estimate provided by the Central Data Analytics Group, whereas other times no
misstatement was actually identified. Performance materiality for the 2017 Madison audit has
been calculated as $304,000.

Given the information provided from the Central Data Analytics Group, how would you
assess fraud risk in the current year?
Very
Low
Slightly
Medium
Slightly
High
Very
Low
Fraud Low Fraud Fraud Risk High Fraud
Fraud
High
Fraud
Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk
Fraud
Risk
Risk

Assume 30 hours were initially budgeted to audit revenue. How would you adjust the budgeted
hours for the revenue account in percentages (every 5% change results in a change of 1.5 hours)?
_________%
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1) To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statement “the information presented from the
Central Data Analytics Group represents a fraud risk”?
Strongly
Moderately
Slightly
Neither
Slightly Moderatel
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree nor
agree
y agree
agree
disagree

2) To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statement “I am confident in the accuracy of
the information presented from the Central Data Analytics Group”?
Strongly
Moderately
Slightly
Neither
Slightly Moderatel
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree nor
agree
y agree
agree
disagree

3) Would you prefer to evaluate fraud risk WITHOUT the information presented from the
Central Data Analytics Group?
Strongly
Moderately
Slightly
No
Slightly
Moderatel
Strongly
prefer with prefer with
prefer
preferenc
prefer
y prefer
prefer
the
the
with the
e
without
without
without
information informatio informatio
the
the
the
n
n
informatio informatio informatio
n
n
n

4) Do you agree with incorporating the information identified by the Central Data Analytics
Group into Madison’s fraud risk assessment?
Strongly
Moderately
Slightly
Neither
Slightly Moderatel
Strongly
disagree
disagree
disagree
agree nor
agree
y agree
agree
disagree

5) How likely are you to rely on the information from the Central Data Analytics Group while
performing your fraud risk assessment of Madison?
Very
Moderately
Slightly
Neither
Slightly Moderatel Very likely
unlikely
unlikely
unlikely
likely nor
likely
y likely
unlikely
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Please answer the following questions:
1) In the case you read, what type of information did the Data Analytics Group Analyze?
Financial information (journal entries just below materiality)

Non-financial information (optimistic language in e-mails)

2) In the case you read, what type of data analytical model did the Data Analytics Group utilize?
Anomaly models that identify statistical outliers (such as very high or low ratios compared to
industry averages from the firm’s client base)

Predictive models that identify patterns (for example of ratios) similar to patterns associated with
previously identified issues/occurrences

3) Age _______
4) Gender
Male
Female




5) Years of Professional accounting experience ___________
6) Years of Audit experience _____________
7) What percent of your annual chargeable hours are typically assigned to manufacturing
clients?__________________
8) What percent of your annual chargeable hours are typically assigned to privately held
clients?_________________
9) What is your highest degree of education earned?
High School

Some College

Associate degree

Undergraduate

Some graduate

Master degree

Doctoral degree

10) What best describes the firm you work for?
Local

Regional

National

International

11) What is your position/rank (or equivalent title)?
Staff
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Senior

Supervisor

Manager

Director

Partner

Other (Please specify) ___________________
12) Are you a CPA?
Yes

No

13) Please list any other relevant certifications ________________________
14) How experienced are you in discussing fraud risk during brainstorming sessions?
Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

15) How experienced are you in adjusting the budget in response to a fraud risk identified during
a brainstorming session?
Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

16) Do you have experience using data analytics in the audit process?
Yes

No

17a) If you answered yes to #16, How experienced are you in using data analytics that identify
statistical outliers such as unusually high/low fluctuations or ratios (anomaly models) as part of
your job function?
Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

17b) If you answered yes to #16, How experienced are you in using data analytics that compare
current data against previously identified issues/occurrences to identify similarities (predictive
models) as part of your job function?
Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

18) How experienced are you in using financial data as part of your job function?
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Not at all
experienced

Slightly
experienced

Moderately
experienced

Very experienced

Extremely
experienced

19) How experienced are you in using nonfinancial data as part of your job function?
Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

20) How do you believe a supervisor would have evaluated your decisions if no fraud was
identified in the revenue cycle?
Below
Slightly below Met expectations
Slightly above
Above
expectations
expectations
expectations
expectations
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APPENDIX E: STUDY 3 FIGURES
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Panel A

Reliance on Data Analytics
27.000
26.000
System

25.000

Human
24.000
23.000
22.000
Low Risk

High Risk

Panel B

Likelihood of Fraud
5.000

System
Human

4.000

3.000
Low Risk

High Risk

Figure 4- Graphical depiction of results of study 3

169

APPENDIX F: STUDY 3 TABLES
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Table 6 – Demographic profile of study 3 participants (n=92)
Panel A

Male
Female

n
51
41

%
55.4%
44.6%

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director

27
18
5
28
14

29.3%
19.6%
5.4%
30.4%
15.2%

Local
Regional
National
International

24
29
10
29

26.1%
31.5%
10.9%
31.5%

Gender

Title

Size
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High Risk

Male
Female

Low Risk

Male
Female

High Risk

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director

Low Risk

Staff
Senior
Supervisor
Manager
Director

High Risk

Local
Regional
National
International

Low Risk

Local
Regional
National
International

Panel B
GENDER
System
n
%
18
72.0%
7
28.0%
17
11

TITLE
System
n
8
3
1
10
3
6
6
1
11
4

Human
n
6
10

%
37.5%
62.5%

60.7%
39.3%

10
13

43.5%
56.5%

%
32.0%
12.0%
4.0%
40.0%
12.0%

Human
n
5
4
3
3
1

%
31.3%
25.0%
18.8%
18.8%
6.3%

21.4%
21.4%
3.6%
39.3%
14.3%

8
5
0
4
6

34.8%
21.7%
0.0%
17.4%
26.1%

Human
n
2
7
2
5

%
12.5%
43.8%
12.5%
31.3%

6
9
3
5

26.1%
39.1%
13.0%
21.7%

FIRM SIZE
System
n
%
10
40.0%
5
20.0%
2
8.0%
8
32.0%
6
8
3
11

21.4%
28.6%
10.7%
39.3%
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Table 7 - Results of study 3 Reliance variable
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics - Reliance mean
[standard deviation]
Presentation Source
Control Risk Level
System
Human
High Risk
26.560
23.563
25.390
[5.598]
[6.572]
[6.099]
n=25
n=16
n=41
Low Risk

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of variation
Presentation Sourcea
Control Risk Levelb
Presentation Source
* Control Risk Level
Age
Error

24.464
[5.935]
n=28

26.348
[4.488]
n=23

25.314
[5.365]
n=51

25.453
[5.820]
n=53

25.205
[5.535]
n=39

df

MSE

F-Statistic

p-value

1
1
1

12.723
3.832
120.697

0.41
0.12
3.90

0.523
0.726
0.052

1
87

98.910
30.981

3.19

0.078

The dependent variable is measured using the Reliance scale adapted from Hampton
(2005). The reliance dependent variable is the total score of five questions answered on 7
point likert scales. The Reliance measure consists of four questions adapted from the
Hampton (2005) scale and one question measuring trust. These questions measure
participants 1) agreement with the information identified by the data analytics, 2)
confidence in the accuracy of the findings of the data analytics, 3) willingness to
incorporate the findings from the analytics into their decision making, 4) willingness to rely
on the findings of the data analytics, 5) trust in the data analytics. The total Reliance score
may range from 5 to 35. The means are reported in Panel A.
a
"Presentation Source" was manipulated by informing participants that the source
presenting the results of the data analytics was a Self-generating System (Presentation
Source=0) or a Data Scientist (Presentation Source=1)
b
"Control Risk Level" was manipulated by varying whether the data analytics presented a
low risk of misstatement (Control Risk Level=0) or a high risk of misstatement (Control
Risk Level=1)
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Table 8 – Results of study 3 likelihood that fraud has occurred variable
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics - Likelihood of Fraud mean [standard
deviation]

Control Risk Level
High Risk

Low Risk

Presentation Source
System
Human
4.440
4.188
[1.502]
[1.2234]
n=25
n=16

4.341
[1.389]
n=41

3.536
[1.575]
n=28

4.348
[1.748]
n=23

3.902
[1.688]
n=51

3.962
[1.593]
n=53

4.282
[1.538]
n=39

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source of variation
df
Presentation
Sourcea
Control Risk Levelb
Presentation
Source*Control
Risk Level
Data Analytics
Experiencec
Error

MSE

F-Statistic

p-value

1

3.333

1.52

0.221

1
1

2.720
4.246

1.24
1.94

0.268
0.168

1

20.029

9.14

0.003

87

2.193

F value
5.01

p-value
0.028

Panel C: Planned Comparison
Test
Source of variation
System/LowRisk < All Other
Conditions
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The dependent variable is participants assessment of the likelihood that fraud has
occurred on a 7 point likert scale
a
"Presentation Source" was manipulated by informing participants that the source
presenting the results of the data analytics was a Self-generating System (Presentation
Source=0) or a Data Scientist (Presentation Source=1)
b
"Control Risk Level" was manipulated by varying whether the data analytics presented
a low risk of misstatement (Control Risk Level=0) or a high risk of misstatement
(Control Risk Level=1)
c
Data Aanalytics Experience measures participants experience using data analytics as
part of the audit process on a 7 point likert scale
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APPENDIX G: STUDY 3 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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CONSENT PAGE ON QUALTRICS:
You are invited to take part in a research study conducted by Jared Koreff, PhD candidate in the
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting at the University of Central Florida. The only
requirement to participate is that you are currently employed as an external financial statement
auditor and have experience assessing control risk. Please read the following case carefully, as
you will be asked a series of questions about the case related to the findings of data analytics.
To thank you for your time, at the completion of the survey you can choose between receiving a
$10 amazon gift card or having the researcher make a donation to a charity on your behalf.
Whether you take part is up to you. If you decide to participate in this project please understand
that your participation is voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or
discontinue participation at any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
If you would like to know the results of the study please e-mail the primary researcher:
Jared.Koreff@ucf.edu.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, please contact Jared Koreff, Graduate Student,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration at (407) 8232957 or Jared.Koreff@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, College of Business
Administration at (407) 823-3192 or Vicky.Arnold@ucf.edu.
To contact IRB about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the
University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of
the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901
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CLIENT INFORMATION
Assume this is your third year on the audit team conducting the audit of Omega Computer Parts
(“Omega”), and you are the in-charge on the job. Omega is publicly traded and has been a client
for 10 years.
Omega is one of the leading manufacturing companies in the United States and has operations in
all fifty states. Omega manufactures computer hardware and peripheral equipment that are
primarily sold to small and medium sized businesses. Omega has a highly qualified and
experienced accounting department. Omega devotes substantial resources to recruit, train and
retain qualified accountants. Your firm has established a good working relationship with
Omega’s management over the past 10 years. Omega’s management usually accepts audit
findings; however, at times there is substantial discussion of proposed audit adjustments. These
discussions are professional and an amicable agreement has always been reached.
DATA ANALYTICS PILOT PROGRAM:
During the current year, upper level management of your firm has initiated a pilot program to
utilize data analytics on a sample of low-risk audit clients. Although the pilot program thus far
has identified several ineffective uses and opportunities for improvement in the use of data
analytics, your colleagues have reported the findings of data analytics can be effective at
identifying audit relevant information.
The Omega audit has been selected to be part of this data analytics pilot program as Omega has
historically been a low risk client. The control risk of Accounts Payable (AP) for Omega has
always been “low”. Thus, data analytics will be used to aid in the control risk assessment of AP
for the Omega audit.
TASK OBJECTIVE
Based on the information provided in this case, you will be asked to make a series of decisions
based on the findings of data analytics presented to you. You will be asked how likely you are to
increase control risk and the likelihood that fraud has occurred in the AP business process.
Finally, you will be asked your willingness to rely on the information identified from the data
analytics. PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION VERY CAREFULLY.
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CURRENT YEAR AUDIT INFORMATION
Your firm has provided several training sessions and created memos informing clients how to
create and format financial and nonfinancial data using the AICPA’s proposed Audit Data
Standards. After receiving these data, your firm utilizes data analytics to identify and analyze
audit relevant information. For the Omega audit, data analytics are only applied to the AP data
for the current year audit.
Omega’s AP process follows a fairly standard business process. The sequence to write checks is
as follows: (1) create a purchase order, (2) sign a purchase order, (3) release a purchase order, (4)
receive goods, (5) receive invoice, and (6) pay invoice.
After receiving the data from Omega, you [utilized your firm’s internal data analytic software on
your computer / contacted your firm’s internal data scientist who utilized data analytics] to
analyze the AP data provided. Specifically, the [software / data scientist] uses pre-programmed
data analytics to evaluate all records related to AP and assess control risk. Subsequent to
[uploading the AP data into the software on your computer and clicking “run” / e-mailing the
AP data to your firm’s data scientist and asking them to analyze the data], pre-programmed data
analytics were performed and the results were provided to you.
While violations in the AP business process identified by the data analytics may be indicative of
internal control issues (e.g., an AP clerk writing duplicate checks to vendors), such violations
may also have justifiable explanations (e.g., a change to a purchase order results in requesting
new approvals, which impacts the second and third step). Thus, violations may be indicative of a
misstatement or fraud, or may justifiably deviate from designed processes.
After analyzing the AP business process using the data analytics discussed above, the [report
displayed by the software on your computer / report handed to you by the data scientist]
indicated that the proportion of checks written in relation to invoices received was very [high /
low], which represents a [heightened / minimal] risk of a material misstatement.
The report of the findings of the data analytics provided by the [software / data scientist]
indicating a [heightened / minimal] risk of misstatement is presented on the next page.
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The results of the data analytics are based on raw data analysis and do not incorporate financial
statement audit knowledge.
The findings from the [software / data scientist] using data analytics present evidence of a [high /
low] risk of misstatement. Your colleagues have reported that information provided by the
[software / data scientist] results in changing audit procedures about half of the time. When
audit procedures are not being changed, your firm’s policy is to document why data analytic
information is not being used. Your colleagues have reported that documenting why the data
analytics are not being used is generally accepted within your firm, and this documentation takes
minimal time compared to changing audit procedures.
After viewing the results of the data analytics suggesting a [high / low] risk of misstatement, you
performed an initial inquiry with Omega’s Director of AP. The Director of AP stated that at
times more than one check is written for an invoice due to favorable payment terms. The
Director of AP proceeded to explain that at times, vendors will allow for a discount on the total
invoice amount, if a portion of the invoice is paid within 15 days of the invoice date; however
the Director is uncertain how frequently this occurs.
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1) Based on the information provided by the data analytics, how likely are you to increase the
level of control risk assigned to Accounts Payable above “low”?
Extremely Moderately
Slightly
Neither
Slightly
Moderately Extremely
unlikely
unlikely
unlikely
likely nor
likely
likely
likely
unlikely

2) Based on the information provided by the data analytics, what do you believe is the likelihood
that fraud has occurred in the Accounts Payable process?
Extremely
unlikely

Moderately
unlikely

Slightly
unlikely

Neither
likely nor
unlikely

181

Slightly
likely

Moderately
likely

Extremely
likely

3) To what extent do you agree/disagree with the findings of the data analytics?
Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderatel
y agree

Strongly
agree

4) To what extent do you agree/disagree with the statement: “I am confident in the accuracy of
the findings of the data analytics”?
Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderatel
y agree

Strongly
agree

5) Would you prefer to make audit decisions WITHOUT the additional information obtained
from the data analytics?
Strongly
prefer with
the
information

Moderately
prefer with
the
informatio
n

Slightly
prefer
with the
informatio
n

No
preferenc
e

Slightly
prefer
without
the
informatio
n

Moderatel
y prefer
without
the
informatio
n

Strongly
prefer
without
the
informatio
n

6) Do you agree with incorporating the findings of the data analytics into your audit decisions?
Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderate
ly agree

Strongly
agree

Moderatel
y likely

Very likely

7) How likely are you to rely on the findings of the data analytics?
Very
unlikely

Moderately
unlikely

Slightly
unlikely

Neither likely
nor unlikely
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Slightly
likely

Please answer the following questions:
1) How were the findings of the data analytics communicated to you?
A human (your firm’s internal data scientist) handed you a report
A report displayed on your computer by the data analysis software
2) Data analytics identified the risk of misstatement of AP as:
Low risk

High risk

3) Age _______
4) Gender
Male
Female




5) Years of Professional accounting experience ___________
6) Years of Audit experience _____________
7) What is your highest degree of education earned?
High School

Some college

Associates degree

Undergraduate

Some graduate

Master degree

Doctoral degree

8) What best describes the accounting firm you work for?
Local

Regional

National

International

9) What is your position/rank?
Staff

Senior

Supervisor

Manager

Director

Partner

Other (please specify) ____________
10) Are you a CPA?
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Yes
No




11) Please list any other relevant certifications ______________
12) How experienced are you in using data analytics as part of the audit process?
Not at all
Slightly
Somewhat
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

13) How experienced is your organization at using data analytics as part of the audit process?
Not at all
Slightly
Somewhat
Very experienced
Extremely
experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

14) How experienced are you at auditing accounts payable?
Not at all
Slightly
Somewhat
Very experienced
experienced
experienced
experienced

Extremely
experienced

15) In the case you read, what is your level of trust in the findings of the data analytics?
Very low Moderatel Slightly low Neither high Slightly Moderatel Very high
y low
nor low
high
y high

16) What is your level of self-confidence in performing the data analytics used in this case on
your own ?
Very low Moderately Slightly low
Neither
Slightly Moderatel Very high
low
high nor
high
y high
low

17) How do you believe a supervisor would have evaluated your decisions if no misstatement,
error nor fraud, was identified in the AP process?
Below
Slightly below Met expectations
Slightly above
Above
expectations
expectations
expectations
expectations
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APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVALS
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